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SOCIAL POLICY, POVERTY, AND INEQUALITY IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 
Sofiya An, Tatiana Chubarova, Bob Deacon and Paul Stubbs (editors) 
 
PREFACE  
This book derives from a workshop of the same title organized by the 
Comparative Research Programme on Poverty (CROP) at the Norwegian 
University Center in St Petersburg, Russian Federation, in June 2017. The 
workshop provided an opportunity for a systematic stock-taking of recent 
and historical post-socialist social policy developments in an increasingly 
diverse world region. Authors from different disciplines address key 
aspects of social protection including health care, poverty reduction 
measures, active labor market policies, pension systems, and child welfare 
systems. Contributions range in focus from comparative studies of welfare 
arrangements in a number of countries, to micro-level studies of the lived 
experiences of welfare users and their everyday lives. Throughout, the 
importance of policies to combat growing poverty, inequality and social 
exclusion is a major theme, with a number of texts addressing the complex 
policy nexus emerging from the interactions between international and 
domestic actors. 
The original idea for the workshop came from Bob Deacon, a 
distinguished social policy scholar whose work on social policy in Eastern 
Europe, from the 1980s to today, continues to inspire researchers around 
the world and from the region. Following a long battle with cancer, Bob 
sadly passed away on 1 October 2017, aged 73. He will be missed by all 
who are committed to social justice across the world. Bob's commitment 
to the workshop and to this book was inspirational. It was a privilege, as 
co-editors, to work with him on this project. We are sorry that he was not 
able to see the book published, but we hope that it represents another 
important part of the legacy that he leaves behind. 
We also wish to thank all those at CROP who worked hard to ensure 
the success of the workshop and to see this book to publication, in 
particular Alberto Daniel Cimadamore, Charlotte Lillefjære-Tertnæs, and 
Maria Sollohub. Thanks to Stein Kuhnle for his hard work during the 
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workshop. We thank all participants in the workshop and, particularly, all 
contributors, for their commitment to the project. From the publisher's 
side, Jakob Horstmann provided patient guidance throughout the process, 
for which we are extremely grateful. Comments at the proposal stage by 
Thomas Pogge and, at the full review stage, by an anonymous reviewer, 
were extremely helpful in preparing the volume for final publication. We 
dedicate the book to the memory of Bob Deacon. 
  
Sofiya An, Tatiana Chubarova, and Paul Stubbs 









POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND WELL-BEING IN THE GLOBAL 
EAST: BRINGING THE ‘SOCIAL’ BACK IN 
Paul Stubbs, Sofiya An and Tatiana Chubarova 
INTRODUCTION 
More than a quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the beginning of the wars of the Yugoslav 
succession, this book takes stock of the diverse and divergent welfare 
trajectories of post-socialist countries across Central, Eastern and South 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It traces the impacts, in 
terms of poverty, well-being and inequality, of over two decades of 
transformation, addressing both the legacy effects of socialist welfare 
systems and the installation of new social, political and economic 
structures and, in many cases, new independent nation-states. It 
addresses different phases both of reform and of approaches to welfare, 
paying particular attention to the economic and financial crisis of the late 
2000s. The book examines the rescaling of welfare arrangements, the 
privileging of ‘economic’ over ‘social’ policies, and the financial, 
institutional and capacity constraints which, at times, have resulted in 
reforms being both ineffective and inequitable.  
THE ‘GLOBAL EAST’ 
Thinking about social welfare policies in terms of a rich and powerful 
‘Global North’ and a poorer and less powerful ‘Global South’ leaves out 
vast swathes of the world; a ‘Global East’ has, in many ways, ‘fallen 
between the cracks’ (Müller, 2017; 3). The end of communism in the 
Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe, a result of a series of 
momentous events between 1989 and 1991, neither confirmed nor 
corresponded to Fukuyama's (1992) idea of ‘the end of history.’ The 
countries which make up the zone of concern in this volume have been 
doubly marginalized, not rich or powerful enough to be part of the Global 
North, not poor or powerless enough to be part of the Global South. Their 
‘in-between’ status has fed a rather uninspiring ‘transitology’ literature 
that, in seeking to grasp the enormity of the ‘simultaneous transition to 
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democracy and to market economy’ (Dobry, 2000; 51), has constantly 
charted and re-charted the supposed ‘dilemmas’, ‘problems’ and 
‘challenges’ in the way, creating a stereotypical image of a region ‘stuck in 
eternal transition towards an elusive modernity’ (Müller, 2017; 4).  
Of course, the countries of the former Eastern bloc, the former 
Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia, are only one part of the ‘Global 
East’, a term often applied to include East Asia (cf. for example Shin et al., 
2016). Apart from experiencing decades of varieties of communist or 
socialist rule, and sharing, in time if not always in terms of its 
characteristics, a dramatic transformation, countries which make up this 
part of the Global East may seem to have very little in common. In a sense, 
of course, all regions are ‘politically constructed and subject to diverse and 
contested meanings’ (Solioz and Stubbs, 2012; 17). Moreover, the Global 
East as a whole is less ‘legible’ than the Global South, more ‘slippery’ and 
‘hard to categorize’ (Müller, 2017; 3). It seems not to ‘fit the frame’ in 
which mainstream commentators ‘think the global’ (ibid, 8), brought into 
academic scholarship only when hyphenated as ‘the ex-’, ‘the post-’, or ‘the 
former-’ (ibid, 9). It now contains countries as different from each other 
as the Central European countries who have been EU member states since 
2004 (with Slovenia in 25th place and the Czech Republic in 28th place in 
terms of UNDP's Human Development Index) and countries in Central 
Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (respectively in 120th and 129th 
place on the same index)1.  
At the same time, Müller makes a persuasive case for utilizing the 
concept of a Global East as a form of ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak, 
1988). It can serve as a kind of mobilization, a plea for ‘voice’, recognition, 
even emancipation, of very diverse entities united only in terms of their, 
greater or lesser, exclusion from dominant hegemonic practices. This 
seems to return ‘the Global East’ to where it properly belongs, deeply 
entangled in global social relations, neither ‘out of time and space’ nor 
exoticizable as a not quite fully developed ‘Other’ (Müller, 2017; 9). This 
volume, and the chapters within it, contribute, then, to new knowledge 
production about and, in many cases, from, the Global East. Insofar as the 
book is comparative, it seeks to be so without ‘a hidden referent’ (Sušova-
Salminen, no date; 17), usually that of ‘Western Europe’, seeking to avoid 
                                                      
1  http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI accessed 22 March 2018.  
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a ‘hidden Eurocentrism’ essentializing supposedly binary oppositions 
between ‘modern – traditional, industrial – agricultural, nation-state – 
empire-state, developed – backward, individualist – collectivist, or new – 
old’ (ibid.; 11). This book is, then, best seen as a work of translation 
allowing for ‘multiple sites and forms of knowledge production and 
academic practices that are more able to elaborate the widely diverse 
social and epistemic practices that comparative research witnesses’ 
(Lendvai and Bainton, 2013; 115).  
To be clear, our use of the concept of ‘the Global East’ is meant to be 
provocative in the best sense of the word, provoking a different way of 
thinking about the countries gathered together in this volume. Of course, 
not unlike the notion of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, the concept reflects a kind 
of ‘developmentalist’ approach over and above mere geography. At the 
same time, it may be that it covers too many, and too diverse, countries to 
be of analytical value beyond challenging a focus only on the North-South 
divide in social policy.  
THE FORGOTTEN SOCIAL 
Equally important as the marginalization of the Global East has been the 
marginalization of the ‘social’. Here, the marginalization refers not so much 
to the ‘social’ life of the ‘everyday’, a topic of growing interest to 
anthropologists in and of the region (cf. Verdery, 1996; Hann (ed.), 2002; 
Brković, 2017). Rather, for our purposes, it is the marginalization of ‘social 
policies’ not only in the extant literature but, also, in terms of its significance 
as a discursive field of policy making, which matters. Although many of the 
chapters that follow focus on one or more ‘traditional’ aspects of social 
policy making, whether pensions, unemployment benefits and employment 
services, social assistance and social services, here we use a looser 
definition of social policies as ‘fluid, complex, multi-actor assemblages’ 
(Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009; 674), sets of welfare arrangements and 
trajectories, ways of meeting social need and responding to social risks, and 
sets of welfare outcomes in terms of human well-being, which are 
‘constructed, contested and contradictory’ (Clarke, 2004; 5).  
In terms of what Hegel termed the Zeitgeist or ‘the spirit of the age,’ 
the Hungarian social policy scholar Julia Szalai points to how different the 
transformations might have been across the region had they occurred in 
1968 and not 1989. The confluence of the end of communism across the 
14  Paul Stubbs, Sofiya An and Tatiana Chubarova 
 
Global East with the dominance, ideologically and practically, of a 
particular kind of free market neo-liberalism served, in Polanyian terms, 
to ‘delink’ the ‘social’ from the economic and the political. The very idea 
of a ‘welfare state’ or a ‘social state’ in Baumann's terms, already closer to 
the term used in many Slavic languages, was judged as, at best, 
‘premature’ and at worst, a legacy of socialism which had to be shrunk, 
residualized, and responsibilized so as not to be an obstacle to economic 
reform. What followed was, of course, a kind of ‘mass moral engineering’ 
(Thrift, 2005; 10), initially in terms of ‘shock therapy’ with its origins in 
the mid-1980s in parts of Latin America which was, to all intents and 
purposes, ‘a political strategy for implementing radical economic 
measures’, promoting rapid economic reforms advocated by supposed 
‘technocrats’ shielded from day-to-day political processes and pressures 
and, indeed, ‘normal democratic procedures’ (Orenstein, 2011).  
The attempt to ‘bring the social back in’ throughout this volume and 
in the introductory text takes stock of and maps the very diverse welfare 
arrangements and welfare outcomes across the region in the last thirty 
years. Inevitably, although the breadth of the volume is considerable, it is 
far from exhaustive. Not all countries, sub-regions or themes could 
possibly be covered in such a volume. The book reflects the interests of 
those whose abstracts were selected for the conference in St. Petersburg 
held in June 2017 who were then willing to transform their initial paper 
into a chapter for the book. We offer the volume, then, as a snapshot or 
overview of some trends both in social policy across the region and social 
policy scholarship. It is best viewed as an invitation to discussion and 
dialogue, raising more questions than it can possibly provide answers to.  
The main focus of the book can still be discerned, however, addressing:  
 the drivers and determinants of social welfare across space and 
time in a very diverse region; 
 the development of diverse ‘welfare mixes’ based on variegated, 
and changing, roles of state, sub-state, supranational, market, 
household and ‘civil society’ actors; 
 possible welfare futures in the context of profound economic, 
demographic and geo-political changes; and 
 future priorities for research on social policy and advocacy for 
more inclusive and socially responsible societies across the 
region. 
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SOCIAL POLICIES IN THE GLOBAL EAST: THE LEGACIES 
Socialist social policies across the Global East date back to the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia in 1917 and the formation of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. Many of the other countries in the 
region came under the influence of Soviet-style socialism after the end of 
the Second World War. Socialist Yugoslavia, after Tito's rejection of 
Stalinism in 1948, developed a quite specific self-managed socialism and, 
alone in the region, introduced organized state social work from the early 
1960s (Stubbs and Maglajlić, 2012). Albania and, to some extent, 
Romania, followed more isolationist socialist policies with the latter 
becoming infamous for its inhumane treatment of abandoned children, 
and children and adults with disabilities, in ‘total institutions’. The extent 
to which different socialist societies overcame class antagonisms, or 
merely replaced the old capitalist ruling class with new political elites is, 
of course, beyond the scope of this text (for socialist Yugoslavia see Archer 
et al. (eds.), 2016). What is clear is that most continued to adhere to a logic 
of ‘productivism’, with a dominant mode of production still based on 
commodity production and exchange (Deacon, 1983; 47). They pursued 
policies designed to ‘catch-up’ with the Global North even as, in the crisis 
years of the 1970s and 1980s, the technological gap with the richer 
capitalist nations grew ever wider. Soviet social policy clearly aspired to 
become universalistic in its scope with Ramesh Mishra describing the 
socialist welfare system as the structural model of the welfare state 
(Mishra, 1981). 
Socialist social policies, notwithstanding differences across time 
and space, had a number of features in common. Crucially, unlike the 
capitalist world, socialist societies sought to guarantee full employment 
allowing for social security to be, primarily, enterprise-based, alongside 
subsidized prices for many essential goods and services and the provision 
of social housing. Social protection was deemed a necessary part of the 
industrialization process, although in many countries this led to a kind of 
three-tier system: enhanced rights for managers, civil servants and 
members of the political nomenclature; basic rights for industrial 
workers; and limited or no rights for those working in agriculture or 
otherwise marginal to the industrializing economy. Ironically, the strong 
work-welfare link meant that, as the economies of the region faltered in 
the 1980s and, even more so, as ‘shock therapy’ took hold in the 1990s, 
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under-employment and, later, unemployment, threatened the livelihoods 
of entire families and communities (Estrin, 1994). 
Socialist societies tended to guarantee access for all to education, 
including pre-school education, and health care. Processes of 
industrialization in much of the region were also associated with mass 
literacy drives and much improved health outcomes. At the same time, 
failures of centralized planning meant that the quality of services was 
uneven and cuts in response to poor economic performance in the 1970s 
and 1980s increased inequalities in access to health and education and 
led to increasing informal marketization of services. Improvements in 
health outcomes for many groups of the population that had taken 
decades to achieve were, often, rapidly eroded in the context of economic 
recession and, later, post-socialist transition. 
As some authors reflect upon in this volume, although poverty was 
a taboo topic for researchers in socialist societies, this does not mean it 
did not exist, sometimes alongside significant levels of inequality. 
Regional variations in development and, hence, in well-being were quite 
pronounced and rural poverty tended not to be a focus of policy interest. 
In addition, large families, some oppressed minorities, older people and 
anyone living outside the rigid work-eligibility of the system were 
particularly vulnerable. During the 1980s' economic crisis, as Branko 
Milanović showed in his pioneering studies of poverty and inequality, new 
urban poverty emerged for the first time since the end of the Second 
World War (Milanović, 1990). Socialist societies, albeit with uneven 
intensity, promoted gender equality, at least formally, although this 
tended to translate into a triple burden for women, encouraged to enter 
the formal labor market but expected to continue to perform caring and 
domestic labor within the household. It was the case that family 
allowances and cash and in-kind child care benefits did cushion, to an 
extent, the shocks associated with having children but, again, benefits for 
agricultural workers and those outside the formal economy were neither 
adequate in amount nor universal in their coverage (Sipos, 1994).  
Although Romania, as noted above, was particularly problematic, 
across the region state care for abandoned children, orphans and persons 
with disabilities, both physical and mental, meant, in reality, 
abandonment for life in total institutions, often in remote areas. Despite 
undergoing many changes over the socialist period, what was termed 
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‘special education’ in the United States and the UK continued to be termed 
‘defectology’ (defektologiia) in the Soviet Union and in much of the post-
Soviet space later (cf. Byford, 2017). This indicates a continued insistence 
on individualized ‘pathology’ models of disability and deviance, resisting 
trends towards more ‘social’ approaches, and, often, resulting in 
punishment and restraint at the expense of care and reintegration within 
highly bureaucratized and stigmatizing services.  
TRANSITION, SHOCK THERAPY AND SOCIAL LIBERALISM 
Social scientific research was unable to keep pace with the rapid changes 
in the social conditions across the region in the early 1990s and probably 
could not have done so even if ‘social policy’ had been higher up the policy 
agenda. One important attempt to monitor the developments across the 
region was the UNICEF TransMonEE (Transformative Monitoring for 
Enhanced Equity) project, launched under the leadership of the 
economist Giovanni Andrea Cornia as Director of the Economic and Social 
Policy Research Programme of the International Child Development 
Centre (ICDC), to all intents and purposes UNICEF's global research 
center, based in Florence, Italy. Ironically, the database and the analytical 
reports deriving, in part, from it, are much less influential today even 
though the database now covers 28 countries (Kosovo is not included) 
and over 500 social and economic indicators2. In the early 1990s, the 
alarm bells sounded by Cornia and his colleagues, on the basis of statistics 
from only a few countries in the region, pointed to a significant decline in 
welfare and well-being across the board, not only of children. Those parts 
of the region where statistics were not readily available, the conflict-
ridden post-Yugoslav space in the early 1990s, for example, suggest that 
available statistics may, if anything, have underplayed the extent of the 
crisis.  
Returning to the early reports is instructive, however, not least in 
terms of understanding what, even amongst progressive social policy 
researchers, quickly became accepted as a kind of alternative common 
sense, the prevailing wisdom of ‘global social reformists’ (Deacon et al. 
1997, 84), not only regarding the extent of the crisis but on its underlying 
causes and potential remedies. The first ICDC report, published in June 
                                                      
2  http://transmonee.org/about/ Accessed 9 April 2018.  
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1991, made the point that ‘it is not always easy to distinguish between 
problems inherited from the socialist regimes and the current reform 
programmes’ (Cornia and Sipos, 1991; 23). Indeed, it seemed to suggest 
that ‘economic and political reforms’ are both ‘desirable and essential’ if 
the region is to escape from ‘the economic, social and political decline 
which began about twenty years ago’ (ibid, 33).  
It was the nature of some of these reforms, however, that needed to 
be questioned, reflections of what the authors termed ‘the spread of neo-
liberal views which assign a greater role to market forces and charities in 
the field of health, education and social insurance’ (ibid.; 12 – 13), going 
hand-in-hand with ‘substantial cuts in public spending’ (ibid.; 19). The 
clear message was that the high social costs of reforms could ‘endanger 
the entire transition process, rip apart the social fabric and undermine the 
popular consensus on which these new, and still weak, democracies are 
based’ (ibid.; 33). There is little or no reference, of course, to synchronous 
attacks on the welfare state, linked precisely to the ‘spread of neo-liberal 
views’, in the Global North. However, for supposedly ‘objective’ reasons 
echoing Kornai's idea that these were ‘premature welfare states’ (Kornai, 
1997)—notably the lower average per capita GDP and significantly higher 
proportion of the population working in agriculture—none of Esping-
Anderson's types of Western ‘welfare regimes’ are seen as appropriate for 
the region (Esping-Anderson, 1990). Instead, what is needed, the report 
suggests, is a greater awareness of the (unintended) social impacts of 
reforms and the reconstruction of ‘social safety nets’ to protect the most 
vulnerable, no more and no less than the ‘social liberalism’ or ‘liberalism 
with a human face’ traced by Deacon et al. (1997; 69) as the dominant 
approach globally within the World Bank at the time. 
The next study, published in 1994, taking stock of ‘four years of 
transition’ is memorable, primarily, for Cornia's dramatic introductory 
Overview where he stated: 
The mortality and health crisis burdening most Eastern European countries 
since 1989 is without precedent in the European peacetime history of this 
century. It signals a societal crisis of unexpected proportions, unknown 
implications and uncertain solutions. In most of the region, the crisis has 
caused, and continues to cause, large numbers of avoidable deaths and 
threatens to erode social stability and indeed the entire transition process. 
(Cornia, 1994; v) 
 Poverty, Inequality and Well-Being in the Global East 19 
Whilst noting lots of missing data for many of the countries of the region, 
the message was that many of the same alarming trends can found across 
‘practically the entire region’ (ibid.) The crisis was constructed as having 
spread from ‘the traditionally most vulnerable groups’ with ‘male adults 
in the 25 – 59 age group’ the greatest concern, with higher than expected 
levels of premature death in the face of ‘widespread impoverishment, 
erosion of … services, and social stress’ (ibid.). Again, ‘market reforms’ are 
described as ‘highly necessary and inescapable’, echoing UK Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher's TINA (‘there is no alternative’) maxim, but 
now balanced with a need to preserve ‘the positive achievements of the 
past in education, child care, and social security’ (ibid.). Across the region, 
then, an ‘unprecedented ‘social adaptation crisis’’, if not addressed 
urgently, represented ‘a clear threat to the political viability of the entire 
reform process’ (ibid.; 6). 
The first indications of a much more variegated picture comes in the 
third monitoring report, published in 1995. Cornia's introduction still 
refers to ‘a severe welfare crisis affecting children and adolescents, an 
upsurge in mortality, equally shocking falls in births and increases in 
poverty, and faltering social protection and child development 
programmes’ (Cornia, 1995; v). However, the five countries of Central 
Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) are said 
to have halted, if not reversed, earlier deterioration in welfare and well-
being. There is even a tentative attempt at a typology in terms of four 
distinct patterns of welfare across the region, with praise for the ‘reform-
minded’ Central European countries but concern about ‘late’ or ‘reluctant’ 
reformers in South Eastern Europe, the Western CIS and the Baltics states 
and the Caucuses. For the first time, explicitly, policies for ‘transition with 
a human face’ are outlined, based on new partnerships between states 
and their ‘civil societies’, more equitable forms of economic transition and 
a raft of rather conventional labor market, family support, health, 
education and, interestingly, housing policies.  
The impact of conflicts and the crisis of forced migration are not 
given particular prominence until the two reports, from 1999 and 2001, 
both taking stock, in slightly different ways, of ‘a decade of transition’ 
(UNICEF, 1999; 2001). ‘Transition with a human face’ is, now, presented 
as being held back by two, competing, sets of views, one which promotes 
radical reform in which economic performance is the key and sees social 
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policies as an ‘optional extra’ which can be dealt with ‘when economic 
conditions allow’ (UNICEF, 1999; 1), and the other which opposes any 
reforms based on ‘authoritarian, anti-democratic mindsets’ (ibid.) that 
are a legacy of the old socialist regimes.  
In retrospect, the reports offer a complex, even contradictory, set of 
policy ideas, inscribed as more ‘technical’ than ‘political’, and supposedly 
driven by the ‘evidence’ in the form of ‘real social facts’ deriving from the 
monitoring of transition. They remain both economistic and reformist, in 
the sense that stable macro-economic balances and ‘market building’, 
including privatization policies, are seen as the sine	 qua	 non of more 
progressive and equitable social policies. Many of these echo the poverty 
alleviation and safety net ideas of the World Bank, albeit allied with a 
commitment to maintaining essential education, health and social 
services. Harsh rhetoric criticizing ill-considered, badly sequenced, and 
anti-social reform experiments tend to be downplayed as part of a ‘battle 
of ideas’, rather than as discursive assemblages for the integration of the 
Global East as a new periphery of an increasingly globalized capitalist 
world.  
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VARIEGATED POST-SOCIALIST WELFARE 
ASSEMBLAGES 
Amongst analysts of welfare assemblages in the Global East, there are 
those who seek to ‘bring institutions and political agency back in’ (cf. 
Cerami and Stubbs, 2011), engaging in a tentative and radically unfinished 
categorization of sub-regional welfare ideal types. Advocating a kind of 
‘political economy of social policy’ (ibid.; 9), understanding both ‘drivers’ 
and ‘impediments to change’ (cf. Stubbs and Zrinščak, this volume), the 
uneven impact of processes of ‘neo-liberalization’, ‘inter-scalar tensions’ 
between state and state-like actors, and the heterogeneity of ‘regulatory 
and institutional landscapes’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2015; 449; Brenner et 
al., 2010; 208 – 9), suggests a marked hybridity and fluidity, as well as 
continuing crisis-proneness, in welfare assemblages across the region. 
The extent of the ‘transition’ from state planned to marketized economies, 
as well as the specific form of capitalist social relations developed, varies 
considerably, of course.  
Across the region, then, volatility rather than settled welfare 
‘regimes’ is the norm not the exception, re-animating the transnational 
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space and leading to variegated welfare retrenchment and growing 
poverty and inequality, on the one side, and clientelistic capture, cuts in 
public spending and a growing ‘layering’ of welfare between ‘protected 
insiders’ and ‘disciplined’ or ‘abandoned outsiders’ (Jensen, 2014) on the 
other. Across the region as a whole, different international actors 
scramble for influence, provide variegated policy advice but are by no 
means all-powerful. Crucially, across the region, again in variegated ways, 
remittances from diaspora populations and foreign direct investment are 
as important in shaping welfare trajectories. Political agency, including 
but not limited to the state, also matters, albeit in very different ways 
across different parts of the region, whether in terms of pluralist 
democratic competition or the, more or less gradualist, 
institutionalization of autocratic regimes. Without lapsing into crude 
economic determinism, the nature of different countries' and regions' 
enrolment in global capitalism, whether as export- or import-driven 
economies, oil-producing or oil-dependent, and so on, also matters, not 
least in terms of framing the welfare choices available. Bringing social 
policy in the region back into the domain of political economy, not unlike 
Esping-Andersen did in his study of welfare regimes in Western Europe, 
is crucial.  
Taking stock of over a quarter of a century of transition, winners and 
losers have emerged, but who they are varies greatly from sub-region to 
sub-region. The study of social policy is, still, the study of struggles 
between elites and vested interests, on one side, and more or less 
dispossessed populations on the other, and political struggles over 
institutions, resources, rights and regulations. Although the region's 
welfare assemblages are marked definitively by temporal, spatial and, 
crucially, policy domain heterogeneity, in the following sections we 
explore what might be some of the more pronounced sets of 
characteristics, drivers and challenges, across sub-regions covered in the 
book, necessarily only in the sketchiest of terms.  
Post-Soviet Central Asian states: indeterminable welfare trajectories 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, newly independent 
Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have been undergoing major social 
transformations including the drastic restructuring of their economies, 
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polities, and welfare systems. Having departed from Soviet planning, one-
party political systems and universal welfare systems, these close 
neighbors followed divergent pathways that have led to different 
outcomes (Pomfret, 2010). During the first decade, similarly to other 
former Soviet republics, Central Asian states experienced severe and 
protracted economic depression, or ‘transformation crisis’ (Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2010). Soviet supply chains were disrupted, and consumer 
markets broken up, severely damaging industrial manufacturing. In 
addition, Central Asian states, arguably, suffered the most from the 
disintegration of Soviet economic ties, as compared to other former Soviet 
republics, and experienced a drastic reduction in GDP in the 1990s (Myant 
and Drahokoupil, 2008; Pomfret, 2010).  
While the five states took different approaches to creating market 
economies and joining the global market, from drastic liberal reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan through state-controlled reforms in 
Uzbekistan to little reform in Turkmenistan, they have seen different 
degrees of success (Pomfret, 2010). The key factor that impacted on the 
success of economic reforms has arguably been the availability of 
resources more than economic policies (Pomfret, 2010). As Myant and 
Drahokoupil (2008) have convincingly argued, the oil-driven growth of 
Central Asian economies and exports and the ‘downgrading’ of export 
structures indicate that these countries have become integrated into the 
world economy but only as peripheral members, located outside of major 
industrial networks. 
The UN Human Development Report (1999) described the socio-
economic situation in the entire post-Soviet and post-socialist region as ‘a 
human crisis of monumental proportions’. While the scope of poverty 
increased, poverty struck different social groups unequally. Regional 
inequality became the primary predictor of poverty (World Bank, 2004). 
In addition to ‘old’ categories of the poor, the ‘new poor’ emerged, such as 
low-paid and low-skilled workers (in rural areas and in the public sector), 
the unemployed, especially young people, and families with many 
children / large households; moreover, there was an increase in female 
poverty (Ruminska-Zimny, 1997). During the first decade of 
independence, Central Asian states responded to the economic crisis by 
drastic reductions in public expenditures on welfare, health care, and 
education. In line with the global neoliberal turn and an attack on the 
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welfare state, newly independent states and major international actors, 
such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and USAID that guided post-Soviet 
reforms viewed social policy as subservient to economic and political 
reforms in the region (Boenker, Muller and Pickel, 2002). Following the 
contraction of GDP and state revenues, government expenditures on social 
welfare in 1997 plummeted to 25 – 30 percent of state expenditures before 
1990 (Falkingham, 1999).  
Dramatic cuts in Soviet-era welfare benefits across the Central Asia 
region in the 1990s faced little public resistance, with few exceptions. 
While the Soviet paternalist welfare state provided benefits in exchange 
for compliance, it was also the source of the lack of political organization 
and advocacy groups that made post-Soviet reforms too easy to 
implement. Essentially, post-Soviet social policy was an effort to redraft 
the social contract between the state and citizens (Cook, 1993). For 
instance, in Kazakhstan, a major theme in the policy discourse in the 1990s 
was family responsibility for providing care for family members and the 
need to end Soviet-type dependency on the state, thus effectively erasing 
the Soviet value system and re-instating Asian / traditional ethics 
(Maltseva, 2014). Public conformity can also be linked to oil-driven 
development in ‘resource-cursed’ or ‘rentier’ states, in which a small elite 
has access to the ‘rent’ paid by foreign actors, while the majority of the 
population depend on this elite (Luong and Weinthal, 2010; Franke, 
Gawrich and Alakbarov, 2008).  
Social policy has been integral to nation-building projects with 
reforms evolving from early democratic reforms to so-called ‘super-
presidencies’ with varying degrees of authoritarianism (Pomfret, 2010; 
Schatz, 2006). The return of social policy to the nation-states' agenda in 
the 2000s and 2010s was partly preconditioned by the economic revival, 
supporting the classical argument that links the expansion of Western 
welfare states to economic growth (Myles and Quadagno, 2002; Wilensky, 
1975). More importantly, however, social policy has been an important 
tool of social control and redistribution of resources that non-democratic 
post-Soviet governments use to ensure political consent in conditions of 
uncertain market economies (Cook and Dimitrov, 2017; Forrat, 2012). 
Moreover, social policy has intertwined with the post-Soviet shift away 
from the state monopoly on welfare, as new non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have become welfare providers and policy actors 
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(Cook, 2015). NGOs in post-Soviet social policy have multiple identities 
and play contradictory roles, from an embodiment of civil society, to social 
advocates, to providers of social support, to project implementers, to a 
tool of social control employed by the state (Aksartova, 2009; Bindman, 
2017; Stubbs, 2006). Yet, the shift from the centralized welfare system run 
by the Soviet state to the provision of welfare in multiple sites, including 
the state, the emerging market, and NGOs, has been, arguably, the key 
characteristic of post-Soviet welfare transformation (An, 2017). 
All the Central Asian states continue to face many challenges that are 
affecting the majority of people living in the region. Poverty is a persistent 
problem in all Central Asian states: although the rate of absolute poverty 
has fallen, the proportion of people living below the threshold of $4.30 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per day remains high, ranging from 29 
percent in Kazakhstan through 62 percent in Kyrgyzstan to 87 percent in 
Tajikistan in 2008 (UNDP, 2014). Along with poverty, there is a problem 
of rising inequality. Rural residents, people with disabilities, the 
unemployed, large families and single-parent families are at higher risk of 
income poverty (UNDP, 2014). Regional disparities, as a result of unequal 
distribution of natural resources and unequal economic growth, continue 
to be an issue in Kazakhstan (ADB, 2016). Finally, over the past two and 
half decades, a vast gap has emerged between the Central Asian post-
Soviet states: Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in Kazakhstan of 
$11,550 makes it an upper-middle income country, while GNI in 
Kyrgyzstan is $1,210 in Kyrgyzstan and $990 in Tajikistan (World Bank, 
2015, cited in O'Brien, 2015). 
Social policy in Central Asia has received far less scholarly attention 
than welfare transformations in other former Soviet states. This feature is 
linked to the shifting global and regional geopolitics, as new regional 
categories have emerged to replace the USSR, such as the EU category of 
post-Soviet states, Russia as its own category, or the Central Asia category 
of states casually called ‘stans’, which includes five post-Soviet states along 
with Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is also a tendency to fall into one-
sided and overly simplistic assessments of the success and failure of social 
policy reforms as a function of weak institutions, corruption, 
authoritarianism, poor governance, ‘failing states’, and a threat to regional 
security, while neglecting the complexity and multiplicity of factors that 
play a role in social policy development, including post-colonial legacies 
and unequal power relationships between the emerging states and their 
Western and non-Western counterparts. 
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The Russian Federation: rising inequality in a shifting welfare landscape 
Transition brought dramatic societal changes that are well described in 
both Russian and international research and elaborated upon in this 
volume. These changes affected social policy formation and 
implementation, in many different, although inter-related, ways. First, 
ideologically, in terms of changing social values, shifting understandings 
of notions such as equality and equity, attitudes to private property, the 
promotion of the principle of individual responsibility, and the 
construction of a consumer society and changing behavior and patterns 
of consumption. Second, financially, as in much of the region, economic 
restructuring was accompanied by a significant decrease in public social 
expenditures. Health care is a good example with the share of GDP 
allocated by the state to health care having stabilized at levels much below 
those of the Northern and the Western countries, at around 3.4 percent. 
Third, institutional arrangements changed, with the development of a 
mixed economy of welfare, the emergence of a private sector, both for-
profit and not-for-profit agencies, alongside tendencies to 
decentralization and a shifting of social responsibilities from national to 
regional and local levels. 
As noted above, the results of the first wave of reforms in the Russian 
Federation were extremely disappointing; instead of improving individual 
capacities to secure personal well-being, the transition caused a 
substantial increase in the number of people in need of social protection, 
particularly rising numbers of those unemployed and the working poor. 
Nevertheless, later reforms, although not always consistent, have led to a 
particular welfare ‘settlement’ that, at least for the moment, seems to be 
more or less stable. There is an increased role for the private sector in 
satisfying social needs; state paternalism and centralized distribution and 
provision of passive social services has been replaced by a more active 
approach; and a degree of correction of the negative consequences of 
market functioning has been secured through creating basic safety nets 
for disadvantaged groups through targeted policies. 
The issue of inequality has been of particular concern throughout 
the last two decades. Russia was a relatively egalitarian society in Soviet 
times with rather low Gini coefficients, a widely used measure of 
statistical dispersion of income in a country, and, hence, of inequality. 
However, rapidly after the start of transition, Russia was sharply 
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transformed into one of the most unequal states in the world. There is a 
clear tension between the role of a welfare state in fighting poverty via 
supporting living standards and a wider commitment to fighting 
inequality. Poverty in Russia is high on the political agenda while little or 
nothing is said, much less done, at the political level to deal with 
inequality. To give some recent examples: the State Duma failed to adopt 
a law on wealth and progressive personal income taxation; and inequality 
was not mentioned in the annual Presidential address to the Federal 
Assembly. A continued faith in market mechanisms makes it politically 
risky, as well as administratively difficult, to introduce a significantly 
higher degree of redistribution into the system. 
Research studies, mainly but not exclusively sociological, have paid 
particular attention to attitudes towards inequalities, with significant 
numbers of Russians considering some inequalities as unfair. The theme 
of inequality is inexorably tied to the outcomes of large scale privatization 
that still remains a very problematic and debatable issue. Two aspects of 
inequality are particularly persistent: income inequality and regional 
inequality. In the future, unless there are significant changes to the 
direction of social policies, the situation appears unlikely to improve and 
other aspects of inequality, including gender inequality, are likely to 
become more and more in focus.  
Inequalities in healthcare is also a complex and contentious issue. At 
the most basic level, at least in principle, all citizens are still able to access 
healthcare and medical services that are free at the point of delivery, with 
state owned health services financed through compulsory health insurance 
(CHI) and taxes. However, government policies to promote ‘fees for services’ 
in publicly owned health services, in the face of the principle of ‘free health 
for all’, seems likely to increase inequality of access to healthcare and thus 
negatively affect the health of some strata of the population. 
Questions of the welfare mix, of the extent to which NGOs should 
supplement or substitute for government programs, what mechanisms 
they should use to influence government policies, and how to combine 
top-down and bottom-up initiatives are, of course, not exclusive to the 
Russian Federation but they do take particular forms in this context. The 
fact that ‘socially-oriented NGOs’ have been officially recognized, 
underscores their importance in social policy whilst, perhaps, serving to 
draw a distinction between service providers and more advocacy- and 
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rights-based initiatives. NGOs have become seen as a complement to 
governmental policies and state welfare institutions. A more empowering 
and transformative role for NGOs, over and above a broadly charitable or 
humanitarian frame is, however, still to be developed. Social policy is still 
financed mainly by the state in the Russian Federation but new ways of 
organizing social welfare open up opportunities for empowerment. The 
gender dimension of Russian social policy, although again not unique, is 
also important. Women dominate among both services users and service 
providers, although managers of services are, often, male. Women's 
activities in various spheres of NGO work, especially in the poorer regions, 
using both formal and informal networks to increase resources available 
for social welfare, are extremely important. 
South East Europe: captured policies and crowded playgrounds 
Here, South East Europe includes the EU Member States of Bulgaria and 
Romania (who joined on 1 January 2007), Croatia (who joined on 1 July 
2013), and the countries and territories of the so-called Western Balkans 
who all aspire to join the European Union one day (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia3, Montenegro, and Serbia). Throughout 
the 1990s and, indeed, beyond, parts of the region were embroiled in 
violent conflicts resulting in deaths, destruction of property and forced 
migration on a massive scale. The wars of the Yugoslav succession 
resulted in a large-scale international presence with a complex array of 
international humanitarian, security and ‘state-building’ actors all having 
direct and indirect impacts not only on people's well-being but, also, on 
welfare systems themselves (Deacon and Stubbs, 2007; 11). Although not 
facing violent conflicts, Romania and, to an extent, Bulgaria also faced a 
‘crowded playground’ (Arandarenko and Golicin, 2007) of international 
actors responding to the crisis of children and people with disabilities in 
institutional care that was in breach of their human rights and dignity. 
Although Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, at times resembling 
international protectorates, offer the most dramatic examples, all of the 
region remains impacted by a range of international actors moving from 
humanitarian relief efforts, via a large number of experimental ‘pilot’ 
projects, to a supposedly more structured and tailored support for 
                                                      
3  Throughout the book, the official name ‘Macedonia’ is used. Just prior to 
publication, this was changed to ‘North Macedonia’. 
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‘strategy development’ (cf. Maglajlić Holiček and Rašidagić, 2007). The 
conflicts meant that early transition was, either, delayed, or the 
introduction of supposed free markets, through dominant models of 
privatization, allowed autocratic and, not unusually, kleptocratic political 
elites to capture resources (cf. Mujanović, 2018). Studies in Croatia 
regarding the extent of political clientelism and its impacts on social 
welfare at the national level (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015) and, indeed, local 
level (Hoffman et al., 2017) may well be generalizable across the region, 
pointing to the difficulties of universal and / or needs-based social 
policies. Certainly, the distortion caused by welfare rights for war 
veterans, their families, and survivors, in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina (cf. 
Obradović, 2016), Croatia and Kosovo is, perhaps, the most dramatic 
example of this, with potentially long-term impacts.  
Although it is possible to trace a positive role of the European Union 
in general governance issues, with some spill-over into social policy, in the 
period leading up to accession, for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, all three 
countries face renewed economic, political and social challenges. Not 
unlike Poland and Hungary in Central Europe, an authoritarian backlash 
has seen a return to nationalism, corruption and a radical reassertion of 
Christian values in terms of support of so-called ‘normal’ families. In their 
different ways, all three countries have seen retrenchment after joining 
the European Union and with cuts in welfare as the economic and 
financial crisis of 2008 – 10 hit large sections of the population 
particularly hard.  
Across the rest of the region, similar issues suggest that European 
accession, notwithstanding ‘enlargement fatigue’ amongst the Member 
States, is likely to be a slow and extremely difficult process. A recent 
working paper, setting out alternative futures for welfare states in the 
Western Balkans, addresses some of the most important common 
challenges, including relatively low levels of development and a failure to 
‘catch up’ with peers; demographic crises of various kinds marked, often, 
by low fertility, and sometimes by population decline and significant out-
migration; population ageing; and widespread poverty, high 
unemployment and low participation rates in changing labor markets 
(Matković, 2017). High demand for support combines with a lack of 
investment or, at best, a clientelistic and rather passive approach to 
welfare. Although sometimes over-stated, the danger of the deep 
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institutionalization of an ‘ethnicized’ welfare system, sometimes going 
beyond the borders of the nation state to offer support to diaspora 
populations living nearby (cf. Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2009), is also 
worrying.  
Just as the European Union's social model for its Member States has 
moved from a broad social framework, via a prime focus on 
‘employability’ and ‘workfare’, towards ‘modernization’, fiscal 
sustainability and austerity (cf. Stubbs and Lendvai, 2016), so too has the 
pre-accession process become far less ‘social’ and far more ‘economic’, 
framing accession in terms of political governance and fiscal frugality. 
Hence, of the options Matković presents for the future, the most likely, 
pushed by the World Bank, IMF and the European Union's Directorate 
General for Economics and Finance (DG ECFIN), is that of a ‘small’ or, as 
we would term it, ‘residual’ welfare state, with continued low levels of 
social protection expenditure but more efficiently targeted towards the 
poor or, indeed, ‘the poorest of the poor’ (Matković, 2017; 49 – 50). 
However, as Matković herself recognizes, the largest part of welfare 
spending in many of the countries of the region is ‘locked-in’ to insurance-
based pension systems, the radical reform of which would be politically 
difficult and grossly unfair to those who have contributed across their 
working lives.  
 Croatia is one of the few countries in the region where a radical 
pension reform was implemented in the late 1990s, in large part because 
of the success of a powerful coalition of forces including the pension funds 
themselves, neo-liberal economists, and the World Bank. Other reforms 
have been slower to develop and implement although, ironically, the 
rather slow progress made by Croatia towards eventual membership of 
the European Union allowed for DG Employment to have some influence, 
at least discursively and technically, over Croatia's welfare reform agenda, 
through the Joint Inclusion Memorandum on Social Inclusion (JIM) and 
the Joint Assessment of Employment Policy Priorities (JAP) processes. 
The chapter by Stubbs and Zrinščak concludes that political elites' 
survival rests less on being reform-minded than on maintaining 
nationalist ideas, clientelistic networks and a kind of ‘capture’ of 
governance and resources, including social benefits.  
Captured welfare arrangements leave too few funds to meet wider 
needs. Throughout the region, there is much more attention paid to cash 
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benefits than to social services, particularly community-based services. In 
addition, although most pronounced in Bulgaria and Romania, the legacy 
of large-scale institutionalization of children and adults deemed to be ‘at-
risk’ or ‘threatening’ to the wider population, often in inhumane 
residential facilities remote from centers of population, and often for long 
periods of time, still leaves its mark on the system (cf. Pop, 2013; Ivanova 
and Bogdanov, 2013). The development of responsive community-based 
services to address old and new risks, including what is likely to be 
soaring demand for long-term care in the future, is, perhaps the key 
challenge for welfare across South East Europe. Above all, a reform agenda 
that is responsive to the case for more extensive social welfare systems in 
the future, will need to replace the fragmented, inconsistent and ad	hoc 
approach to social welfare in the current conjuncture.  
The Baltic States: diverse paths within a European future 
The transition experience of the Baltic States that were formerly part of 
the Soviet Union ‒ Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ‒ seems to differ 
substantially from the Russian case as evidenced, in part, by the fact that 
these countries joined the EU in 2004. They appear to have made 
substantial economic, political and social progress since the early 1990s 
and have, to an extent, reformed their social policy arrangements. The 
OECD considers pension reforms in this region to be more advanced than 
those adopted in most OECD countries (OECD, 2003). However, the Baltic 
States still lag behind many European countries in terms of lower social 
spending, high unemployment, modest incomes and more unequal 
income distribution, as well as having experienced significant 
depopulation.  
However, there are dangers attached to analyzing the social policy 
of the Baltic States solely from the point of view of ‘catching up’ with the 
developed EU countries. They still differ insofar as this cluster of countries 
pays most attention to coping with ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ social risks rather 
than increasing their capacity to address ‘new’ social risks (Toots 
Bachmann, 2010). The Baltic States share certain common features, above 
and beyond the simple fact that they all inherited the legacy of a common 
socialist social welfare system. In general, all three states have abandoned 
that system and have turned away from any kind of universal and 
comprehensive approach to welfare, preferring supposedly ‘competition-
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friendly’ low tax, and low welfare, arrangements. As researchers have 
pointed out, this is least pronounced in Estonia, which appears to have 
maintained more solidaristic arrangements and more universal social 
benefits compared to the residual models of Latvia and Lithuania 
(Aidukaite 2009, 2013). Lithuania's social security system is relatively 
well-financed but is targeted and means-tested with strict qualifying 
requirements while in Estonia and Latvia social benefits are income-
tested. 
Not unlike South East Europe, although there the picture was 
complicated by war-related humanitarianism, across the Baltic states the 
strong role of the International Financial Institutions, particularly the IMF 
and the World Bank, in framing social policy choices, was at first 
countered, to an extent, by the role of the European Union. Later, however, 
in the face of the economic and financial crisis, social policy choices were 
set within an EU governance apparatus framed almost exclusively in 
terms of debt reduction and austerity. In a sense, difficult political 
adjustment was followed by structural economic adjustment. In the 
future, it is very much an open question as to the role the Baltic States will 
play in debates about a ‘new European social model.’  
Central Europe: welfare contradictions in the new European ‘core’ 
Although they are rather diverse, one can take the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and, to an extent, Slovenia together as 
constituting a cluster of welfare systems marked by a sense of ‘returning 
to the core of Europe.’ The first phase of socialist transition differed rather 
markedly in each country with, in large part, both the former 
Czechoslovakia and Slovenia as part of former Yugoslavia, initially pre-
occupied with securing independence. Linkages between international 
actors and new elites, seeking to implement rapid neo-liberal reforms in 
the form of ‘shock therapy’, were often interrupted by elections lost by 
political forces most identified with the reforms resulting in, at the very 
least, a re-packaging and ‘humanizing’ of some reforms to make their 
impacts less severe (Cook and Orenstein, 1999). In any case, the so-called 
‘first wave’ of reforms, attempting stabilization through liberalization and 
privatization (Guardiancich, 2004; 41), had mainly indirect impacts on 
social welfare, with social welfare reforms themselves being a direct focus 
only of later, ‘second-wave’, reforms (ibid.).  
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Deacon and Standing captured something of the diverse possibilities 
in the early years of transition, ranging from Poland's rapid withdrawal of 
the state and development of a ‘residual’ social policy, to Slovenia's move 
towards a more traditional European ‘conservative corporatist’ 
settlement (Deacon and Standing, 1993; 159). Interestingly, they also 
went beyond narrow ‘national-cultural’ explanations to suggest that ‘the 
split of Czechoslovakia was in part a split reflecting the political choice for 
different paths of social policy reform, as well as for a different pace of 
economic reform’ (ibid.; 159 – 160), placing the Czech Republic closer to 
a residual future and suggesting that Slovakia would attempt to hold on to 
social guarantees, albeit in the face of pressure from international 
organizations. Only three years later, Standing at least, was rather more 
pessimistic, suggesting the logic of privatization combined with cuts in 
many social benefits, a tightening of eligibility criteria, and ushering in a 
‘means-tested future’, had become the new hegemony across the region 
(Standing, 1996; cf. also Cerami, 2005).  
Throughout the 1990s, pension reforms and labor market reforms 
were, perhaps, the key arenas of contestation. The decade saw significant 
demographic ageing across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), through 
declining fertility rates. At the same time, shocks of transition and 
increased life expectancy produced an increase in the ratio of pensioners 
to workers (Freyka and Sobotka, 2008). There were even suggestions that 
CEE countries tended to spend more on pensions than countries with 
similar demographic profiles, with the ‘overshoot’ on pensions spending 
creating a kind of ‘inter-generational injustice’ (Vanhuysse, 2014). Müller 
suggested the pensions debate was about whether technical changes to 
public pay-as-you-go systems, through changing benefit formulae, 
retirement ages and eligibility criteria would be enough or whether more 
radical, private pension schemes should be introduced, based on the Latin 
American or, more specifically, Chilean model (Müller, 1999). Differing 
structural conditions, constellations of actors, international and domestic, 
and technical choices were seen to interact in complex ways. In both 
Poland and Hungary, it often seemed as if the World Bank and the Ministry 
of Finance were pitted against the ILO and the Ministry of Welfare with a 
compromise reached in terms of a mixed system of Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
and a mandatory private pension scheme, resembling the more 
‘democratic-tolerant’ Argentinian model (cf. Deacon et al., 1997). 
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In both the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the ‘new orthodoxy’ 
(Müller, 2002; 135) of mandatory private schemes was resisted despite 
strong efforts from the World Bank. Slovakia was a late, but rather radical, 
reformer (Lesay, 2006) diverting a significant amount of pension 
contributions to the private pillar. Hungary was an earlier reformer, 
launching a partial privatization in 1998, introducing a mandatory private 
scheme as well as a so-called ‘zero’ or means-tested pillar for those 
without sufficient contributions (Augusztinovics, 2002). Famously, 
however, the experiment ended between 2010 and 2012 when the Orbán 
Government effectively re-nationalized private pension assets and 
abolished the private pillar, combined with significant parametric changes 
in the context of the economic and financial crisis that significantly 
reduced incomes in retirement, as well as abolishing disability pensions 
(Szikra, 2018). The Hungarian volte	 face shows the potentially 
contradictory nature of welfare arrangements, with ‘financialization’ 
originally used as the reason for reform and ‘fear of financialization’ for 
the re-nationalization. Crucially, ‘the strong anti-market sentiment 
attached to the renationalization of pensions … occurred at a time when 
strongly neo-liberal policies were being introduced such as a flat tax 
system, punitive workfare and radical cuts to social benefits’ (Lendvai and 
Stubbs, 2015; 454).  
It is not without significance that the European Union played almost 
no role in the pensions debate in the Central European countries that 
joined in the enlargement of 1 May 2004. This, broadly, coincided with 
what the EU itself would term a focus on ‘modernizing’ social protection, 
very much framed in terms of activation, responsibilization and a strong 
employment dimension. Generally, across the EU, there was a renewed 
focus on labor market reforms, nominally a translation of the Danish 
model of ‘flexicurity’ but, often, with a much greater emphasis on 
‘flexibility’ in terms of shifting the balance of power towards capital and 
away from labor, whether organized or not. The Open Method of Co-
ordination, of course, left the details of policy choices to Member States, 
so that the kind of ‘workfare’ that the new Member States opted for ranged 
from a ‘punitive interventionist-neoliberal’ policy to more ‘inclusive, high-
quality training-based activation’ (Lendvai, 2007; 35). A new wave of 
labor market reforms followed in the wake of the economic and financial 
crisis of 2008 – 9. The picture regarding CEE is mixed with Poland and 
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Slovenia, along with Spain and Portugal, EU record holders in terms of the 
share of temporary contracts among new employment contracts at over 
80 percent (Eichhorst et al., 2017; 5). At the same time, Poland and 
Slovakia, along with the South East European Member States, are among 
those countries that have the lowest coverage of unemployment benefits 
for the short-term unemployed (ibid.; 12).  
Currently, in a sense, there are two contradictory tendencies 
structuring welfare across Central Europe. States of Central Europe have 
become more a part of the ‘core’ rather than the periphery of Europe. In 
terms of Human Development Index rankings, they form part of cluster of 
highly developed countries ranked between 25th (Slovenia) and 43rd 
(Hungary) and with GNI per capita around $25,000. The other tendency 
is the combination of neoliberal austerity policies with strong national 
and populist discourses and practices. The ‘authoritarian neoliberal’ turn 
in welfare is most pronounced in Hungary and in Poland. A universalist 
‘welfare for all’ discourse is replaced by exclusionary discourses and a 
kind of divisive or ‘layered’ welfare, still redistributory in scope but taking 
highly ethnicized and moralizing forms. The seeming inability of an 
equally contradictory European Union, whose technicization of the 
integration process combined with a focus within the European Semester, 
the EU's six monthly economic governance cycle, only on debt reduction 
(cf. Stubbs and Lendvai, 2016), to challenge these tendencies is, itself, a 
kind of indictment of ‘social Europe’ precisely in part of Europe's new 
core.  
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
Although the conference from which the book derives, and this opening 
chapter, addresses social policy developments within sub-regional 
structures, we have adopted a more thematic structure for the rest of the 
book. Following our own introductory chapter, the next four chapters 
focus on poverty and inequality. Esuna Dugarova's chapter analyses the 
unsatisfactory outcomes of poverty reduction policies in Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and points to the challenges of 
balancing multiple and contradictory goals of social protection and labor 
market policies in fledgling post-Soviet states. Natalia Grigorieva's 
overview of research on inequality in Russia suggests that there has been 
some renewed interest in inequality in scientific studies in the last fifteen 
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years but little real attention to how various dimensions of inequality—
access to social services, health care, and education, gender inequalities, 
regional inequalities, and so on—reinforce each other. Tatiana 
Chubarova's chapter explores how income inequality is translated into 
inequality in access to health care in contemporary Russia, focusing on 
out-of-pocket payments and their role as a barrier to access. Natalija Atas' 
chapter confronts gaps in knowledge of in-work poverty through a 
qualitative exploration of the constant struggle of the working poor in 
Lithuania and the coping strategies they employ.  
Part Three contains four chapters that explore the role of diverse 
policy actors in institutional change. Maja Gerovska Mitev's chapter 
focuses on the role of key inter-governmental actors, including the World 
Bank, the EU and the UN agencies, in social policy and poverty reduction 
in Macedonia. Igor Guardiancich addresses the role of clientelistic social 
relations in the functioning of Kosovo's pension system, de	facto and de	
jure redesigned completely, largely by external actors, in the aftermath of 
the war and NATO intervention in 1999. Sofiya An's chapter on post-Soviet 
child welfare reforms in Kazakhstan looks into the post-Soviet child 
welfare transformation as an interplay of Soviet institutional legacies and 
transported policy ideas that lead to incremental institutional change and 
to the shifts in institutional logics. Ann-Mari Sätre shows how women's 
work and engagement can complement state policies to combat poverty, 
exploring the effects of the continuing responsibility of women for social 
welfare. 
Part Four contains four chapters that address wider issues of 
systemic change in terms of welfare trajectories and assemblages. The 
chapter by Elena Maltseva and Saltanat Janenova, a case study of the 
evolution of pension reforms in Kazakhstan, examines the role of 
endogenous and exogenous factors, such as the shifting global old age 
social security paradigm as well as the national policy makers' attempts 
to respond to multiple social, economic, demographic and financial 
pressures and to meet government development objectives. In her 
analysis of healthcare reforms in former Soviet states, Gulnaz Isabekova 
focuses on the interaction between nation-states and international actors, 
arguing that multiple trajectories of healthcare reforms result from 
different patterns of relations among transnational policy actors. The 
chapter by Noémi Lendvai-Bainton addresses the rise of authoritarian 
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neoliberalism in parts of Central Europe as prefiguring a new welfare 
paradigm, that of ‘social disinvestment’ and ‘layered’ welfare, at the same 
time as a punitive and disciplinary state plays an ever-greater role in the 
surveillance of citizens and, crucially, unwelcome others. The chapter by 
Paul Stubbs and Siniša Zrinščak shows how ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ 
structures and actors co-produce a set of welfare paradoxes or 
contradictions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Large-scale 
experimentation goes hand in hand with very limited real reform, and 
formally extensive social rights lead, in practice, to both welfare 
retrenchment and the ‘layering’ of rights in favor of some groups and not 
others.  
As ever with any edited collection of this nature, it has been 
impossible to cover all possible topics relating to poverty, inequality and 
social welfare across the entire region in an encyclopedic manner. We have 
attempted, however, to include work that points to the diversity of 
approaches to different themes, from empirical studies of poverty, 
through ethnographic studies of coping strategies, to studies of 
institutional and policy change. We worked with the chapters that were 
proposed to us without seeking, in any sense, to get a balance of works 
that focused on different aspects of social policy across the region as a 
whole. Hence, the fact that more texts on the post-Soviet space focus on 
poverty and inequality and more texts on Central, Eastern and South 
Eastern Europe address the policy process should not be read as a 
reflection of a divergence in focus amongst scholars across the region. It 
is a strength of this book, we believe, that it indeed brings together, in one 
volume, analyses of the experiences of post-Soviet welfare states and the 
welfare trajectories of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. 
AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 
Although it would be wrong to make sweeping generalizations, the 
countries of what we have termed, with considerable reservations and 
caveats, as the ’Global East’ have not achieved the kind of forward-looking 
liberal democratic social market economies that were dreamed of. All are, 
more or less, struggling in a space between a socialist past and a more or 
less authoritarian neoliberal present. Levels of wealth and economic 
development offer only partial explanations for the welfare arrangements 
that are in place. In addition, we have to look at legacy effects, at political 
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and economic struggles, including but not limited to class relations, 
differential institutional arrangements and capacities, and to the role of 
diverse sets of international actors. The differential exposure to ‘shock 
therapy’, war and conflict, and the economic and financial crisis have also 
been important in terms of the differential welfare assemblages across 
such a broad region. All of this makes searching for one or more solidified 
‘welfare regimes’ across the region a rather fruitless task. 
 In terms of research agendas, this book suggests that these are 
many and varied. There is clearly a need to consider inequality in a much 
longer-term historical context, as well as going beyond an over-reliance 
on traditional measures of income inequality, as exemplified in Filip 
Novokmet's recent doctoral thesis under the supervision of Thomas 
Piketty (Novokmet, 2017). Along with studies of agencies, institutions, 
structures and discourses, there is also a need to explore the workings of 
welfare at the micro-level, addressing day-to-day encounters between 
users and potential users of services and front-line bureaucrats. Studies 
of demographics, and of changing household structures as well as 
patterns of migration, both internal and external, need to be much more 
central to social policy research in the future. Above all, aggregate data 
provides only one form of evidence on social development and must be 
supplemented by studies of the impacts of social welfare arrangements on 
diverse populations. 
Ultimately, we need to recognize that issues of poverty, inequality, 
and exclusion both horizontal and vertical, are challenges across the 
region, so that the Sustainable Development Goals agenda of ‘leaving no 
one behind’ is highly relevant. At the same time, although mainly intended 
for less developed regions, the UN's Global Social Protection Floor 
initiative—focusing on income support, for those capable of work, 
supporting children, persons with disabilities, and older people, together 
with essential services, such as health education and social care—also 
represents a broad framework that could ‘bring the social back in’ to 
reform agendas. Above all, this book has shown that there are significant 
gaps in our knowledge and understanding of key processes in terms of 
social welfare, across the region, mirroring similar concerns across the 
globe, expressed in the 2016 World Social Science Report (ISSC, IDS and 
UNESCO, 2016). More robust research, and closer connections between 
research, policy and advocacy, are clearly needed now and in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
POVERTY REDUCTION THROUGH SOCIAL PROTECTION 
AND LABOR POLICIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 
Esuna Dugarova 
INTRODUCTION 
The chapter aims to analyze the role of social protection and active labor 
market policies (ALMPs) in reducing poverty in five former Soviet Union 
(FSU) countries—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. The focus on these countries is explained by the fact that over 
the past decade they introduced a range of ALMPs aiming at promoting 
productive employment and addressing poverty more effectively. With 
variation in scope, tools and outcomes, these measures have become a 
social policy priority in the national settings under examination. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
profile of poverty and unemployment in the countries in question. Section 
3 introduces a conceptual framework within which different types of 
ALMPs are distinguished. Sections 4 and 5 review major ongoing social 
protection and labor market programs in these contexts, respectively. The 
implications of these programs for poverty reduction are discussed in 
section 6, with some suggestions for moving forward. 
POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT TRENDS IN THE FSU COUNTRIES 
Following the collapse of the Soviet economy, the centralized social 
protection system in the countries under examination was broken. The 
Soviet universalist principle of providing social support to the population 
at large had been largely replaced in favor of means-tested assistance 
targeting the most needy groups in the Central Asian republics and more 
recently in Russia and Belarus. Responsibility for supporting these people 
shifted away from the state to families themselves who had to rely on 
mutual assistance by intensifying intergenerational transfers (Dugarova, 
2016a). 
Drastic changes in the economy and social protection in the 1990s 
resulted in sharp increases in poverty, deeply affecting the living 
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conditions of the populations in these settings. In the 2000s, however, due 
to economic growth and investments in the social sphere, poverty was 
decreasing steadily in the five countries, albeit at a different pace 
(figure 1).1  
Figure 1  Poverty rate in selected former Soviet Union countries, 1992 – 
2016, % 
 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation; National Statistical 
Committee of the Republic of Belarus; Committee on Statistics, Ministry of National 
Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan; National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz 
Republic; State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics. 
The formation of the labor force in the selected FSU countries takes place 
in the context of an increasing number of older people and shrinking 
working-age populations.2 These trends will have significant implications 
not only for the supply of the workforce but also for the provision of 
services and resources to support the ageing populations (Dugarova et al., 
2017).  
Since the late 1990s up until 2014, the unemployment rate was falling 
in Russia and Kazakhstan, while in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, it 
remained relatively stable throughout the transition period (figure 2). 
                                                      
1  The national data on poverty should be treated and compared with caution due to 
different definitions of poverty, its measurements and methodology, as well as 
population coverage in these countries. Unless indicated otherwise, all data 
provided are obtained from official government websites. 
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Figure 2  Unemployment rate in selected former Soviet Union countries, 
1991 – 2016, % 
 
Source: ILO STAT 
In recent years, due to the economic downturn there has been a reversal 
or slowdown in the poverty reduction trend in the region. Amid budgetary 
constraints, respective governments enhanced targeted support to 
selected groups while preserving basic social guarantees. To address 
poverty more effectively, the countries under examination adopted a new 
approach to social protection by introducing a range of programs that 
promote the activation of citizens' labor potential and the development of 
their economic self-reliance (Dugarova 2016a, b).  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Social protection has emerged as an important strategy to protect people 
from livelihood risks and reduce vulnerabilities, while developing human 
capital and encouraging economic growth (ILO, 2012; UNDP, 2016). It has 
been recognized by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a 
key tool in ending poverty. 
Providing decent employment is the basis of social protection and is 
often seen as an important condition for reducing poverty and a main way 
to improving the quality of life (ILO, 2012). In practice, productive 
employment is promoted through ALMPs which are used to increase 
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capacity of workers. While ALMPs are not aimed at reducing poverty 
directly, they can contribute to reducing unemployment and hence 
decrease the risk of poverty by helping jobless people find paid work.  
Bonoli (2010) provides a nuanced categorization of ALMPs and 
identifies four types. The first type—incentive reinforcement—refers to 
strengthening (positive and negative) work incentives for beneficiaries 
through, for example, making benefits conditional on participation in 
work schemes (positive) or through the use of sanctions (negative). The 
second type is employment assistance, which is aimed at removing 
obstacles to labor market participation. Relevant measures here include 
placement services, job search services (in particular labor market 
information which is usually collected in job banks), job counselling and 
coaching, job subsidies and, in some cases, help in finding (and paying for) 
suitable day care services for parents. These interventions allow 
beneficiaries to put their human capital to good use, although 
improvements in the human capital of beneficiaries can be modest, mostly 
in terms of shaping better soft skills. The third form—occupation—
includes measures such as job creation and work experience programs to 
keep jobless people active and to prevent the depletion of human capital. 
These measures are generally aimed at increasing demand for labor. The 
fourth form—human capital investment—is about upskilling, which 
includes vocational training for jobless people. The idea here is to offer a 
chance to people—who were not able to profit from the training system 
or whose skills have become obsolete—in order to ultimately increase 
labor supply. Bonoli's (2010) analysis of ALMPs is based on government 
expenditure on relevant programs such as public employment services, 
employment subsidies, job rotation schemes, start-up incentives, training, 
and direct job creation. 
The post-Soviet countries in the current study adopt different types of 
ALMPs, and the databases of governments or international organizations do 
not provide detailed and comprehensive information on expenditure data 
on various types of labor market policies and programs. Nonetheless, 
Bonoli's (2010) framework serves as a useful tool to understand the nature 
of ALMPs and analyze how they work in the countries under consideration.  
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THE SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE FSU COUNTRIES 
The social protection system has undergone considerable evolution in the 
FSU countries during the transition period. While all these countries 
reformed their social protection systems, some have remained with the 
initial mix of policies or redesigned specific programs, whereas others 
reformed the whole system or experimented with different schemes. 
Kyrgyzstan, for example, introduced a guaranteed minimum income whose 
value has been gradually increasing, rising from KGS 310 in 2010 to KGS 900 
per month in 2016, but still falling well below the poverty line (which 
amounted to KGS 2,595 in 2016). Uzbekistan revitalized and strengthened 
the traditional mahalla system, which provides decentralized benefit-
targeting using local communities as a main vehicle of social assistance to 
the poorest groups (Alam and Banerji, 1999). While Kazakhstan advanced 
substantially with pension reforms, with private pension funds accounting 
for nearly 45 percent of all contributions, public social assistance transfers 
have been generally low and poorly targeted (ibid.). 
The provision of universal welfare, full employment with work being 
both a right and an obligation, and a comprehensive range of benefits 
were an essential part of the Soviet social contract. Following the collapse 
of the Soviet economy, government support in the five countries was 
severely cut back and the national welfare systems were reorganized 
involving the decentralization of health and education, introduction of 
privatization and insurance mechanisms, and elimination of subsidy 
programs. In contrast to the Central Asian republics which introduced 
targeting in the early transition period, in Russia and Belarus the 
structure of the universalist system remained, and despite cuts to many 
benefits and in some cases means testing, all existing guarantees were 
initially preserved (Cook, 2007). Recently, however, there has been a 
gradual and steady move towards targeted assistance to selected 
vulnerable groups rather than society at large in both countries.3 Among 
priority groups for social assistance in the region are large families and 
children, people with disabilities and the elderly. 
The social protection system in the FSU countries has traditionally 
consisted of social insurance, social assistance and social services. Over 
the past decade, there has been a shift in the relationship between the 
                                                      
3  In Russia, for example, the government reaffirmed its approach to social provision 
based on targeting and means testing in the Federal Law 388 in 2015, despite the 
fact that the principle of universalism is	embedded	in the national constitution. 
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state and society in these countries (Dugarova, 2016a), which entails a 
move from ‘helping those in need’ (a passive mode) to ‘helping those in 
need if they are willing to undertake active steps to overcome poverty’ (an 
active mode). In line with this approach, one of the major social protection 
programs that is currently implemented in Russia is ‘Social support of 
citizens’ (2013 – 2020). Participants are provided with lump sum cash 
payments (amounting to RUB 36,800 on average in 2016) to increase their 
income. The support is provided on the basis of a social contract, which 
entails assisted job search, participation in public works, vocational 
training, self-employment and other activities that can help participants 
to overcome ‘a difficult life situation’. As part of the program, 65,400 social 
contracts were signed in 2016, covering 230,700 people. As a result, in 
2016 the average per	capita income of participating families increased by 
an estimated 1.4 times, and 46.7 percent of these families are claimed to 
have improved their living standards. While this kind of social protection 
mechanism has provided an opportunity to improve the living conditions 
of many low-income families in Russia, it has not been effective in 
eradicating poverty and making families self-sufficient. Most of the 
activities are oriented towards supporting families through a difficult life 
period through the provision of domestic services, food, medical 
treatment and leisure rather than developing their economic activity. 
Furthermore, in some regions, the payment hardly corresponds to the 
level of the subsistence minimum, whereas many targeted families have 
unemployed members such as children and the elderly who require care, 
and this constrains women's participation in the labor market due to 
limited state care services (Prokofieva et al., 2014). 
To increase the competitiveness of the economy and improve the 
living conditions of the vulnerable population, the Belarusian government 
strengthened the targeted system of social protection through the 2012 
Presidential Decree ‘On state targeted social assistance’ intended for low-
income groups. In 2016, 290,400 people were covered by social assistance, 
which is nearly half of the total low-income population, with the main 
beneficiaries being large and single-parent families. In view of the country's 
sparse population, the social protection of families in Russia and Belarus are 
aimed at encouraging childbirth and reducing the costs of children. A notable 
example is the Maternal Capital program in Russia (2007 – 2018) and the 
Family Capital program in Belarus (2015 – 2019). Both programs provide a 
non-cash allowance to large families with children, regardless of the family's 
income status, which can be used for improvement of housing conditions, 
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children's education or as a contribution to a mother's pension. In 2017, the 
value of the benefit constituted RUB 453,000 in Russia and USD 10,000 in 
Belarus. During the period of 2007–2017, over 8 million families in Russia 
received the benefit, the vast majority of which were used for housing. 
Since 2002, Kazakhstan has been carrying out the Targeted Social 
Assistance (TSA) program, the country's key anti-poverty program focused 
on citizens with incomes below the poverty line. As poverty has been 
declining steadily since the early 2000s, so has the number of recipients of 
the TSA. Over the past decade, the number of TSA beneficiaries decreased 
by 95 percent, from 516,900 persons in 2005 to 28,500 in December 2016. 
The government of Kyrgyzstan has also undertaken measures to support 
the most vulnerable categories of the population by implementing the 
‘Program on development of the social protection system of the population 
in the Kyrgyz Republic for 2015 – 2017.’ The number of recipients of state 
benefits has been decreasing steadily, falling from 510,600 in 2005 to 
360,200 in 2017. In view of the poverty reduction trend in recent years in 
the country, this can point to the decreasing number of people in need of 
social assistance. At the same time, it can be the result of enhanced targeting 
of benefits implemented by the government as part of the program. Within 
the framework of the state program ‘The year of the healthy mother and a 
child,’ the year of 2016 in Uzbekistan was focused on the support of families, 
mothers and children through the provision of social benefits, improving 
health services and overall living conditions of low-income beneficiaries. In 
2016, nearly UZS 7.5 trillion were allocated to the implementation of the 
program, which tripled the amount of expenditure on the 2015 program 
under ‘The year of attention and care about the older generation’ aimed at 
enhancing the social protection of senior citizens. 
It is certain that the social protection programs in question 
contributed to poverty reduction in the respective countries. However, they 
covered only a limited proportion of the population and had little sustained 
impact on poverty levels. One of the key factors that can explain poor 
outcomes is the low government spending on social protection programs. 
Russia, for instance, spent 12.1 percent of GDP on social protection in 2015, 
Belarus 13.6 percent in 2016, Kazakhstan 3.2 percent in 2015, Kyrgyzstan 
5.8 percent in 2015, and Uzbekistan 12.8 percent in 2015.4 Another factor 
                                                      
4  The expenditure data on social protection should be treated with caution, as 
countries adopt different definitions and measurements of social protection. While 
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in the poor results is the low monetary value of benefits compared to the 
income deficit of beneficiaries. A monthly childcare allowance, for example, 
in Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan constitutes around 40 percent of the 
average wage of a child carer (who is primarily a mother). In Kyrgyzstan, 
while the size of monthly benefits for low-income families has been steadily 
increasing, amounting to KGS 870 in 2016, its value is barely half of the 
extreme poverty line. Furthermore, the flawed design and administration of 
programs result in their insufficient effectiveness due to a substantial 
leakage of funds and a large exclusion of the targeted population (UNDP 
2016). Nonetheless, without social assistance the situation would be even 
worse with higher poverty rates. Despite their low generosity, social 
assistance transfers remain essential for poor families, as they can counter 
the uncertainty associated with earnings and compensate for costs, 
including those of childcare. In Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, for example, cash 
transfers accounted for 24.2 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively, in the 
structure of disposable income of the population in 2016, thus constituting 
an important source of people's livelihoods. 
LABOR ACTIVATION IN THE FSU COUNTRIES 
While the state in the FSU countries provided certain job security 
guarantees to its citizens since the early years of transition which included 
free vocational (re-)training, paid public works, assistance with job search 
and free evening schools for workers, their scope remained limited, and it 
was not until the late 2000s – early 2010s that these countries started to 
adopt ALMPs. Such an approach is aimed at activating people's labor 
potential and developing their economic self-reliance in order to improve 
their living standards and ultimately reduce poverty. 
Russia 
The Russian government launched the ‘Promotion of population's 
employment’ program (2013 – 2020) targeted at young people, 
unemployed citizens, as well as those at risk of dismissal. With a total 
estimated budget of RUB 579 billion, the program is aimed at developing 
                                                      
exact figures may vary, the scale of spending on social protection by the 
governments is clear. It should also be noted that all the data presented are 
obtained from official government websites unless indicated otherwise.  
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an effective labor market. The key services provided include vocational 
training and further professional education, paid public works, promotion 
of self-employment, temporary employment for young people, 
professional orientation, job subsidies, and assistance with relocation of 
unemployed citizens and their families to another area to obtain 
employment. In addition, the government provides financial assistance 
including unemployment benefits, stipends during (re-)training, and 
pensions until retirement age. 
In 2016, state employment services received a total of 4 million 
applications from citizens seeking assistance in job search, of which 64.4 
percent found employment. The same year 164,500 unemployed people 
underwent vocational (re-)training or upgraded their qualifications; 
83,100 people, or 2.9 percent of the total number of registered 
unemployed, received assistance in self-employment; and nearly 328,000 
contracts for temporary employment were issued, of which 86 percent 
were paid public works. 
To increase the labor productivity of the population and that of 
women in particular, the Russian government increased the availability of 
preschool institutions, enhanced flexible forms of employment, and 
vocational training for women during their childcare leave. In 2016, 
18,500 women on childcare leave completed vocational training, 
upgraded their qualifications or received support on professional 
orientation. 
Despite these positive results, there are still a large number of 
people who were not able to find a job. Since 2014 the unemployment rate 
has been growing, reaching 5.7 percent in 2016, which amounts to around 
4.3 million people. At the same time, real wages have been falling over the 
past three years. While professional (re-)training is an important source 
of replenishment of human capital in Russia, it tends to be selective, 
oriented towards skilled workers in large enterprises, higher education 
holders and young people. Yet those who are in greatest need of (re-) 
training are often not able to access it. Low technological level of 
production and weak competition reduce incentives for investing in (re-) 
training. As a result, the overall level of human capital is below optimal 
(Gimpelson et al., 2017). These trends in the Russian labor market have 
taken place amid a decline in the GDP growth rate, which has led to a 
slowdown in the growth of labor productivity. 
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Belarus 
Within the labor activation approach, Belarus has implemented the ‘State 
program on social protection and the promotion of population's 
employment for 2016 – 2020.’ With an estimated budget of BYR 23.9 
billion,  it  is designed to stimulate economic activity, improve the 
competitiveness of the unemployed, and reduce the imbalance between 
labor demand and supply. Similar to Russia, this is addressed through 
professional (re-) training, paid public works, provision of temporary jobs 
(notably to young people), assistance with self-employment, and 
relocation of the unemployed to a new place of residence and 
employment. During the period of job search or training, unemployed 
citizens are provided with financial support. The program also involves 
professional (re-)training for women (and men) on childcare leave and 
provides pregnancy and childbirth allowances. In 2016, 239,000 people 
applied for assistance with job search were registered as unemployed, of 
whom 67 percent found employment. An important element of state 
measures in the labor market is support for entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Since 2011 over 12,000 unemployed people received government support 
in the form of subsidies for business activities, agro-ecotourism, and 
crafts. 
Belarus is the only country in the post-Soviet space which 
introduced a tax on ‘parasitism’ through the 2015 Presidential Decree ‘On 
prevention of social dependency’ aimed at reducing hidden 
unemployment and illegal labor activities, and stimulating active job 
search among citizens. According to the decree, citizens who have been 
unemployed for 183 days in a calendar year must pay a tax of 20 basic 
units where one unit amounts to BYR 210,000. Tax-exempt are people 
with disabilities, minors and seniors, as well as parent(s) with a child 
under the age of seven (only if the child is not attending a preschool), a 
disabled child under 18, or three or more small children. Non-payment of 
the tax is penalized with a fine or community service. The government 
estimates that around 400,000 people, or 7 percent of the total labor 
force, can be considered ‘parasites’—that is people who do not have 
official income, are not registered as unemployed, not self-employed, not 
on maternity or childcare leave, and not in education. While the 
government justified this measure by the growing number of people in 
the grey economy (that takes place amid an economic downturn in the 
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country and the increase of insurance contribution rates), the decree 
received various criticisms from local experts and NGOs who argue that it 
undermines the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens and see it 
as state intervention in private life. This measure officially serves to 
reduce the scale of ‘social dependency’ and address unregistered 
employment; in practice it can be seen as a way to replenish the state 
treasury in view of increasing budget pressure, instead of providing the 
population with quality jobs and decent salaries. 
Kazakhstan 
In 2011, Kazakhstan adopted the ‘Employment Roadmap 2020,’ which is 
arguably the first large-scale national employment program in 
Kazakhstan aimed at improving people's incomes through sustainable 
and productive employment, particularly among low-income citizens, 
unemployed women with children and young people in rural areas. In line 
with the state objective to develop economic self-reliance among citizens, 
the key focus of the program is the creation of jobs through the promotion 
of self-employment and entrepreneurial activities and, where necessary, 
assistance in relocation to more economically active regions. The program 
also helps graduates obtain relevant work experience through internships 
up to six months in companies, which are paid by the government in the 
form of subsidies. During 2011 – 2016, about 800,000 people participated 
in the program, of whom 76 percent obtained permanent jobs, 6 percent 
received microcredits, and 20 percent underwent training. Of those young 
people who underwent an internship, 60 percent obtained employment 
after its completion. In 2016, the government replaced the ‘Employment 
Roadmap 2020’ with the ‘Program for the Development of Productive 
Employment and Mass Entrepreneurship (2017 – 2021)’ which enhances 
measures to ensure employment with further emphasis on 
entrepreneurship. These include the provision of professional education 
and training in line with labor market needs; financial support of 
entrepreneurial projects and teaching entrepreneurial skills; assistance in 
finding employment through professional orientation, public works, job 
subsidies, and internships for young people. In 2017, the estimated state 
expenditure on the program was KZT 40.3 billion. The state has played a 
key role in generating jobs (mainly in the public sector) by accounting for 
20 percent of the increase in employment in 2010 – 2015. 
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Despite the positive developments, the labor market as a whole 
remains unstable and unequal in Kazakhstan. Four key factors account for 
this. The first one is the poor quality of labor resources. For instance, the 
share of the labor force with higher education was only 37 percent in 
2015. The second factor is unproductive employment. Of the self-
employed—who constituted 2.2 million people in 2015—16 percent were 
unproductively employed, with the majority engaged in low-productivity 
agricultural activities with poor incomes. A third problem is related to 
regional and demographic imbalances. The southern part of the country 
is more densely populated and has a larger share of working-age 
population compared to the northern one, which reflects the unequal 
distribution of labor resources. Lastly, generation of jobs in the economy 
is not sufficient. The main sector that generated jobs and contributed to 
economic growth in 2010 – 2015 was the service sector. In particular, 
trade contributed almost a third of the total economic growth during this 
period, another 15 percent was provided by transport services, and 13 
percent by information and communication. The production of goods, 
however, contributed only 17 percent to the growth of the economy and 
is gradually decreasing. 
Kyrgyzstan 
A distinctive feature of Kyrgyzstan's labor market is the mass 
outmigration of its workers triggered by the lack of adequate job and 
income opportunities and low living standards in the country. An 
estimated 350,000 to 500,000 Kyrgyz citizens carry out labor activities 
abroad throughout the year, with primary destinations in the region being 
Russia and Kazakhstan. In contrast to other FSU countries under 
consideration, remittances from external labor migration constitute an 
important source of income for families in Kyrgyzstan reaching up to 18 
percent of disposable income in some parts of the country, with the 
volume of these transfers increasing from 0.2 percent of GDP in 2000 to 
30.1 percent of GDP in 2016. 
In 2013, Kyrgyzstan introduced the ‘Program to promote 
population's employment and regulate internal and external labor 
migration until 2020,’ which includes (re-)training programs that teach 
skills and professions to meet demands in the labor market, temporary 
employment through paid public works, the provision of microcredits to 
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support small and medium-sized enterprises, business incubators, and 
job search assistance. 
Despite these measures, the results are quite poor. While the official 
unemployment rate in the country stood at 7.7 percent in 2016, some 
analysts estimate that in reality it reaches up to 30 percent (Fakhrieva 
2017). In 2015, the total number of unemployed people amounted to 
192,200 people (that is, 7.6 percent of total labor force), with only 50,700 
people, or 26.4 percent, having found employment. One of the key 
problems in Kyrgyzstan's labor market is its labor surplus. In recent years, 
for example, the growth of the working-age population exceeded the 
growth of employment by more than two-fold, while labor supply 
exceeded demand by nearly 30 percent. Thus, it appears that a large 
number of unemployed are competing for a very limited number of jobs, 
many of which are low-paid and low-skilled. Although the number of 
unemployed per one vacancy constitutes on average 14 people, there are 
around 15 percent of unfilled vacancies every month. This indicates that 
despite excess supply in the labor market, the jobs offered remain 
unattractive to jobseekers. The situation is further exacerbated by 
widespread informal and part-time employment. The share of the 
employed in the informal sector as a percentage of the total employed 
population amounted to 71.7 percent in 2015. 
In the context of the demand-deficient labor market, the Kyrgyz 
economy faces a big challenge of creating the necessary number of quality 
and well-paid jobs. In fact, while productivity growth is mainly driven by 
the small formal sector, job creation in Kyrgyzstan has primarily occurred 
in the large informal economy (Schwegler-Rohmeis et al., 2013). As the 
Kyrgyz population is projected to increase further, low wages and lack of 
decent jobs will continue to cause external labor migration. Seeing labor 
migration as a form of employment, the government of Kyrgyzstan 
integrated it into its state policy to make use of global employment 
through expanding employment opportunities for Kyrgyz citizens in 
domestic and international labor markets. However, as international 
markets, both in the FSU and beyond, experience economic downturn and 
uncertainty, incomes from external labor migration will likely fall as a 
result, thus affecting the living standards of the population back in the 
home country. Furthermore, while Kyrgyzstan has relatively high labor 
force participation rates, it also has some of the largest shares of working 
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poor, migratory and vulnerable employment in the region, which raises 
concerns about the quality and quantity of employment opportunities 
(UNDP, 2016). 
Uzbekistan 
Similar to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan saw a rapid growth of the working-age 
population which determined the growth of its labor force and thus 
increased the demand for new jobs. In particular, the labor market in 
Uzbekistan features a significant proportion of young people, with half a 
million graduates every year in need of employment. Since 2009, the 
government of Uzbekistan has consistently implemented the ‘Program on 
job creation and employment provision,’ particularly for vulnerable 
groups including youth and those living in rural areas. In 2017, the 
program was focused on creating 345,300 new jobs; supporting 
entrepreneurship through loans from commercial banks; providing 
seasonal and temporary jobs, as well as paid public works; and promoting 
self-employment particularly among women, people with disabilities and 
returning labor migrants. Special attention has been given to the 
employment of graduates who account for over 500,000 people. In line 
with this, in 2018 the government introduced the program ‘The year of 
support of active entrepreneurship, innovative ideas and technologies’ 
with a view to improving living standards through creating new jobs by 
entrepreneurs. The new elements of this program include exempting 
relevant enterprises from all types of taxes and allowing people to work 
in any region of the country regardless of their residency status. 
In 2016, around 726,000 people obtained employment, of whom 60 
percent were graduates. Furthermore, as a result of the government's 
emphasis on the development of small businesses, farming enterprises 
and various forms of home-based work, nearly 350,000 people were 
provided with relevant jobs in 2015. In particular, entrepreneurial 
activities—seen as a driver of Uzbekistan's economic growth—produced 
over 300,000 jobs, accounting for 78 percent of total employment in 2015 
and thus contributing a major part to the country's regional development. 
In 2016, the amount of credits allocated to support small businesses alone 
amounted to UZS 15.9 trillion. Furthermore, as part of growing private 
entrepreneurship, in recent years there has been a rapid development of 
home-based work, including crafts and family businesses. This is viewed as 
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particularly suitable for women as it allows them to earn an income and 
provides protection under labor law, while enabling them to fulfil their 
domestic and childcare duties. In 2015, home-based work contributed to 
the employment of more than 200,000 people, the majority of whom were 
women. 
Despite steady and substantial employment generation, the labor 
market in Uzbekistan is characterized by several weaknesses. The level of 
unemployment in Uzbekistan remains higher than in other FSU countries 
under examination. In its efforts to create jobs ‘at any cost,’ the 
government of Uzbekistan has not paid due attention to their stability. A 
large part of these jobs is generated in financially unstable sectors such as 
agriculture and textiles, which does not allow the self-financing of new 
jobs (CER, 2013). In 2014, for example, the number of people engaged in 
irregular employment amounted to 4.4 million people, which included 
temporary jobs and unregistered businesses, while only 55 percent of 
780,000 jobs created in 2014 had a fixed (stable) contract. Furthermore, 
the number of new jobs is not sufficient to absorb the annual increase of 
the working-age population. In fact, the level of the employed population 
relative to the working-age population has been decreasing gradually over 
the past two decades, falling from 82 percent in 1991 to 67 percent in 
2011 (CER, 2013). Finally, while home-based work has provided income 
opportunities for many women, it has not addressed the structural causes 
of women's lower economic activity and competitiveness. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
While social protection and labor activation programs implemented by 
the respective governments have contributed to improving living 
conditions of the population, poverty is still widespread in these 
countries, especially among large families with children, young people, as 
well as those living in rural areas, who remain at the highest risk of 
poverty. In Russia, for example, the number of people with income below 
the subsistence minimum constituted 19.8 million in 2016, an increase 
from 15.4 million, or 28.6 percent, in 2012. In Kyrgyzstan, over 67 percent 
of the total low-income population resided in rural areas in 2015. 
While unemployment is an important cause of poverty, it is not the 
most critical one. In fact, the majority of those living below the poverty 
line in the region are employed. In Russia, for example, 61.2 percent of the 
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low-income population was employed in 2016. In essence, three major 
problems can be identified with regard to the nature of employment in the 
FSU countries amid governments' efforts to generate jobs. Firstly, many of 
these jobs are low paid, which is not sufficient or effective in providing 
adequate support to vulnerable families and lift them out of poverty. The 
low pay could be attributed to the redundancy of jobs and / or to the low 
value of minimum wages in relative terms. In Russia, for example, the 
minimum wage accounts for about 20 percent of the average wage (RUB 
7500 vs. 36750 in 2016), and nearly 5 million people received a salary 
below the minimum wage in 2017. Together with weak enforcement, this 
implies that minimum wages are unlikely to be binding, which allows 
companies to maintain low-paid jobs and thus contribute to wage 
dispersion (World Bank, 2005). 
At the same time, financial assistance does not compensate for low 
earnings and is not enough to help the unemployed in the FSU countries. 
While passive labor market measures such as unemployment benefits can 
be an important instrument to support those without income, their level 
is inadequate. In Russia, for example, the minimum size of unemployment 
benefits amounted to RUB 850 and the maximum size to RUB 4,900 in 
2016 (without increase since 2009). The low value of unemployment 
benefits provides little incentive for the unemployed to register, which can 
explain the relatively low official unemployment rate in these countries.5 
The coverage of the unemployed is also limited, accounting for only 1.7 
percent in Kyrgyzstan and 5.8 percent in Kazakhstan (ILO World Social 
Protection Database). 
Moreover, women in these countries tend to be more vulnerable to 
poverty than men due to lower participation in the labor market, gender 
wage gap (which in Russia and Kazakhstan, for example, amounts to 
around 30 percent), higher unemployment (notably in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan), and continuous burden of unpaid domestic and care work 
particularly in rural areas. In addition, the shortage of preschools 
undermines women's participation in the labor market and can result in 
                                                      
5  The official unemployment rate may not necessarily reflect the real extent of 
unemployment. A large number of people can be engaged in shadow and illegal 
employment. In Russia, for example, an estimated 18 million of economically active 
people were working illegally in 2015.  
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significant losses of welfare and increase the risk of poverty (Dugarova, 
2016a). 
Another issue with jobs that contributes to persistent poverty in the 
region is their low quality and low productivity. In Central Asia, the rural 
economy is still quite large, and a significant proportion of the working 
population is employed in the informal sector concentrated in agriculture. 
In Kyrgyzstan, for example, around 70 percent of the active labor force is 
employed informally (Gassmann and Trindade, 2016). In Russia, 13.5 
million people, or 18.5 percent of the total number of employed, were 
estimated to be engaged in the informal sector in 2015. In fact, Russia has 
one of the highest rates in the number of average annual hours worked 
per worker in Europe (amounting to 1974 hours in 2016),6 but labor 
productivity is almost half the European average, which can primarily be 
attributed to inefficient production and the use of outdated technology 
amid the lack of qualified personnel and limited funding. 
From this it follows that activation of labor potential alone is 
unlikely to raise people out of poverty, while stimulating labor demand 
without paying due attention to the nature of jobs is insufficient to address 
the needs of vulnerable groups. Amid the economic downturn and 
deteriorating living standards in the region, labor market policies should 
aim not only to protect existing jobs or generate new ones, but more 
importantly they should support incomes which would allow workers to 
maintain their earning ability and ensure a decent quality of life. 
To address poverty and unemployment in these countries more 
effectively, it is important to strengthen policy linkages between social 
protection and labor market policies. From the labor market perspective, 
this foremost involves ameliorating the quality of jobs, which implies 
adequate income, security in the workplace, and social protection for 
workers and their families. It also includes improving employment 
programs through better coordination between professional (re-) 
training and the demands of the economy and labor market, and 
developing better gender-sensitive policies such as flexible forms of 
employment, paid paternity leaves, and promotion of shared 
responsibility within the family. From the social protection point of view, 
more efforts are needed to expand the coverage of social assistance 
especially for vulnerable groups, and increase the level of social benefits, 
                                                      
6 https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS accessed 30 January 2018. 
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including unemployment benefits. In addition, it is essential to scale up 
care service provision by improving access and quality of social services 
for children and the elderly, especially in view of the growing ageing 
populations in all these FSU countries. Finally, to increase effectiveness of 
both labor market and social protection interventions, it is vital to allocate 
more fiscal resources, which should be seen as an investment into human 
capital and economic development. 
In the context of ongoing economic uncertainty at the national, 
regional and global levels (Dugarova and Gulasan, 2017), it is particularly 
important to ensure that the negative effects of the economic downturn 
would not have a persistent impact on people's livelihoods. All these 
measures should therefore be treated as part of a comprehensive social 
protection system, which plays a critical role in reducing poverty, protecting 
the population against existing risks and improving the quality of life. 
In view of the active labor market programs implemented by Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the model in these 
countries under Bonoli's (2010) typology of ALMPs, can be considered 
hybrid. Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan focus on human capital 
development through (re-)training and skill upgrading, and on 
employment assistance such as job subsidies in Russia and microcredits 
in Kyrgyzstan. Belarus is the only country here that uses sanctions as 
negative incentives to make people work. All these labor market measures 
seem to be primarily oriented towards increasing labor supply and 
improving the quality of workforce, while adapting it to existing jobs. 
Instead, the countries could consider focusing on increasing demand for 
labor. This can be done through the creation of good quality jobs within 
the productive sectors of the economy that could ultimately improve labor 
productivity. Somewhat in contrast to Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, the 
main element of the labor market model of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is 
occupation. It places emphasis on creating jobs and supporting 
entrepreneurship, while aiming to increase labor demand in order to 
accommodate a relatively large share of young populations. The 
promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment, however, may not 
constitute a sustainable solution to problems in the labor market amid 
economic slowdown. In all these national settings, it is crucial to ensure 
that everybody, regardless of their work situation, age, location or income 
level, has access to basic income security and essential goods and services 
to which they are entitled. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY IN SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC 
STUDIES IN RUSSIA, 2000 – 2015 
Natalia Grigorieva 
INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the social reforms of the late twentieth century, Russia went 
through the transition from a planned economy (the USSR) to a market 
economy (Chubarova et al., 2012, 2013). The collapse of the old social 
structure of Russian society in the course of transformation led to 
dramatic changes in social stratification. New social groups emerged, such 
as entrepreneurs, and the unemployed; at the same time ‘old’ ones 
remained, while their roles and status changed. As a result, Russian 
society was structured on new grounds with new social problems 
emerging, making it necessary to also develop new areas of research 
(Grigorieva, 2016). 
One of the most striking post-Soviet developments is the emergence 
of inequality and, consequently, studies of it. Concepts of equality and 
inequality are fundamental to the social sciences, with generations of 
researchers studying various aspects of inequalities. The main focus of 
these studies has been the question of how justified are the inequalities 
existing in different types of societies. Policy relevant research has asked 
what governments can do to minimize inequalities, and how life chances 
can be equalized, ensuring that all can lead a decent life corresponding to 
their abilities and aspirations (Gorshkov, 2013). Recently, the influential 
World Social Science Report (WSSR, 2016) highlighted significant gaps in 
research on social inequalities worldwide, whilst emphasizing the 
enormous potential of social science research in the quest for sustainable 
development and social progress globally. 
This chapter addresses the state of research on inequality in Russia, 
focusing on its main priorities and challenges. A review of the literature 
sheds light on the current state of analytical work and the main gaps, from 
an inter-disciplinary perspective, that need to be addressed in future 
research. The study reviews diverse publications—including 
monographs, research reports, and articles in scientific journals—
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devoted to problems of inequality in Russia between 2000 and 2015. The 
chapter focuses primarily on research on income inequality, disparities 
between regions, and gender inequality. It also briefly discusses research 
on public opinion and media interest in inequality. 
REVIEWING THE LITERATURE 
An initial literature review found some 211 texts, published between 
2000 and 2015, authored by Russian researchers, and which had 
inequality as a main topic, chapter, section heading or keyword. Journal 
articles, books and book chapters, working papers and project reports 
were found using internet-based search engines including Russian 
databases. From the initial search, 47 texts contained the word ‘inequality’ 
in their title, but the content did not reflect inequality as a subject, so they 
were discarded. In the end, 69 texts were chosen which focused on the 
aspects of inequality noted above. 
The texts chosen fall into three broad categories. The first category 
includes theoretical studies	 of socio-economic equality, discussing 
income-based, regional and / or gender-based inequalities using a new 
approach, including those with a focus on the construction and 
forecasting of income and consumption of the population (Shevyakov, 
2002, 2004, 2008) or on the identification of the causes, contributing 
factors and consequences associated with new socio-economic 
inequalities (Rimashevskaya, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2010). A number of texts 
in this category developed new methodological insights into the 
relationship between economic inequality and economic development in 
the context of general economic theory (Anisimova et al., 2016; Shkaratan, 
2012, Greenberg et al., 2004; Kislitsina, 2005). In many ways, these 
fundamental studies formed the foundation for the work of other authors 
who used their theoretical, conceptual and methodological insights in 
their own work (cf. Bobkov, 2014, 2016; Lyubimov, 2016 and others); 
these studies also tend to be amongst the most cited articles on the topic 
of inequality within the Russian scientific citation index. 
The second category is composed of primarily empirical studies	
carried out by teams of researchers from leading research and higher 
education institutions, including: the Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, the Institute of Independent Social Policy, Lomonosov 
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Moscow State University, the Higher School of Economics (University), the 
Institute of Socio-Economic Population Problems of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences and others. These institutions are under the leadership of 
research specialists whose names are well known in the Russian scientific 
community, such as Gorshkov, Zubarevich, Kalabikhina, Rimashevskaya, 
Tikhonova, Chubarova, Yarskaya-Smirnova and others, including the 
author of this chapter. Of particular importance here are four large-scale 
research projects, all of which include an extensive meta-review of the 
relevant literature. Two focus on gender-based inequalities and two are 
major sociological surveys devoted to the study of poverty and inequality. 
The ‘Gender Problems in Russia in National Publications 2004 – 2014’ 
project analyzed 835 books and reports, and addressed the legal 
framework on gender equality and its implementation. 
The third category includes broad studies of social transformation 
whose main focus is on changes in social structure, and processes of social 
disintegration that include inequality as one of the themes (Golenkova, 
2001; Lokosov, 2002, Gofman, 2004). Studies here analyze the 
transformation processes at the national (Gorshkov, Tikhonova) and 
regional (Zubarevich, Shabunova, Narskaya) levels. There are a number of 
regional studies of inequality, focusing on one or more Russian regions. 
However, the results of these studies are not widely known, as they are 
mostly published in regional journals that are not easily available 
nationwide. Some of these are included in the analysis (Dylnova, 2004; 
Narskaya, 2014; Shabunova et al., 2012). 
There are very few texts which focused on health care inequalities 
(Chubarova and Grigorieva, 2012, 2013, 2015; Rimashevskaya et al., 2005; 
Kislitsyna, 2005), educational inequalities (Liberman, 2002; Osipov, 2006; 
Ivanova, 2007; Konstantinovskiy, 2010), or on inequalities in access to 
social services (Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2012). As discussed above, the rest of 
this chapter concentrates on four aspects of inequality deriving from the 
extensive literature review. The first topic discussed is that of income 
inequality, with around 80 percent of the sample concentrating on this. The 
second topic discussed is regional inequality, given that Russia is a very big 
country divided into 85 regions which differ substantially from each other 
in socio-economic development, ethnic composition, and so on. The third 
topic is the relatively new area of research on gender inequality, first 
addressed in the literature in the mid-1990s. Finally, the fourth topic is 
research on public perceptions and media portrayals of inequality. 
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INCOME INEQUALITY RESEARCH: FROM INCOME DIFFERENTIATION 
TO SOCIAL INEQUALITY 
One of the most important aspects of modern research on inequality in 
Russia is income inequality. Research has shown that incomes have been 
falling in recent times and that the most significant negative trend 
concerns income from wages. The second main component of income—
pensions—has also been decreasing. During the 2000s, poverty in Russia, 
measured in real monetary incomes, was decreasing, at least according to 
official statistics, while inequality grew. 
On the whole, a consensus is emerging amongst researchers that it 
is not income inequality per	se that is the main challenge but the way in 
which socio-economic disparities hinder development. Using the Theil 
index (Theil, 1967), it is possible to unpack inequality into different 
components including the part of inequality which is a result of inequality 
between regions. The Thiel index is also well suited to distinguishing 
between within-group and between-group inequality. 
A conference presentation in 2012 used the Thiel index to chart 
between-group inequality by different components between 1992 and 
2010. It found that regional differences, i.e. place of residence, was 
consistently the greatest contributor to inequality, growing rapidly in 
importance from 1995 and reaching its peak in 1998 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1  Factors of inequality in Russia 1992 – 2010 
 
Source: Ovcharova (2012)  
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Research shows that, in the early 2000s, the most significant growth in 
real income occurred amongst rich or super rich Russians so that the 
growth of incomes did not contribute to the prosperity of Russian society 
as a whole. Moreover, the income gap between the richest and the poorest 
continued to grow such that the pre-crisis years (before 2008 – 2009) 
were marked by economic growth in favor of the rich. According to 
Rosstat, between 2000 and 2007, the income gap between the richest and 
poorest deciles of Russians increased from 13.9 times to 16.7 times 
(Milovzorov, 2008). In the crisis years (2008 – 2010), the decile 
coefficient index stabilized at the level of 16.6 times, and in subsequent 
years fell slightly to 16.2 times in 2013. Figure 2 shows similar large 
variations by quintile group.	
Figure 2 Dynamics of real incomes by 20% income groups, % to 1991, 
comparable prices 
 
Source: Ovcharova L. IISP 
A landmark study, ‘The Rich and Poor in Modern Russia,’ conducted by The 
Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Science in 2003, used a 
sample of 2,118 people drawn from 11 regions, as well as Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. A representative quota sample of respondents from 11 socio-
economic groups were interviewed, and the survey was conducted in 58 
settlements, covering megacities, regional centers, district cities and villages. 
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In Russia, poverty is measured in absolute terms via subsistence 
minimum, namely the per capita consumer basket, the level of consumer 
prices for food and necessary services, and the inflation rate are taken into 
account. The country average is fixed by the federal government in 
accordance with the federal law, while regional averages are fixed by 
regional governments. The subsistence minimum is reviewed every six 
months. In Russian regions, the subsistence minimum may slightly differ 
from the country average. In accordance with Rosstat's methodology, 
‘income poor’ include those whose per capita household incomes are 
lower than the subsistence minimum, calculated for certain population 
categories (working age, elderly, children). 
In this study, poverty was determined based on respondents' listing 
of the main poverty characteristics (deprivation poverty) to include poor 
nutrition, inaccessibility of new clothing, poor housing conditions, 
inaccessibility of quality medical care, inability to get good education, 
meet priority needs without debts, free time, etc. (Tikhonova 2014; 7 – 
19) 
A follow-up study ‘Poverty and Inequality in Modern Russia: 10 
Years Later’ was conducted in 2013. The total sample included 1,900 
people from 21 regions including an experimental group of 300 people 
selected according to the poverty criterion. The main goal of both studies 
was to assess the real scope, causes and indicators of poverty in Russia, 
the attitude of Russians towards poverty in general, towards different 
groups of the poor, and towards social inequalities. These two studies, 
conducted ten years apart, provide the most reliable results in terms of 
scale and sample size, and allow for an analysis of trends over time. 
The main contribution of the authors of the studies was to suggest 
that any assessment of living standards must include assessment not only 
of well-being, but of deprivation as well, including lack of access to a 
generally accepted set of consumer goods. Goods possessed and 
hardships experienced together give a real picture of people's standard of 
living (Tikhonova, 2013). A standard of living index should include not 
only what people have but also what they do not have. The studies showed 
how the polarization of poverty and wealth is one of the most acute 
manifestations of social inequality in contemporary Russia. 
In terms of trends, the later study showed changes in the 
comparative significance of the main types of social inequalities; overall 
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they deepened, with an increased awareness of the problems of inequality 
by the general population and its prioritization alongside poverty 
alleviation. Although not a particularly sensitive indicator, and relating to 
two different entities, the extent of the ‘shock’ can be seen by the fact that, 
in 1990, based on Human Development Index (HDI) rankings, the USSR 
was in 26th place, with a HDI of 0.920 (National HDR, 1990; 129), whereas 
by 2013, the Russian Federation was in 55th place, with a HDI of 0.788 
(Human Development Index 2013). 
REGIONAL INEQUALITY 
By land mass, Russia is the largest country in the world, occupying one-
seventh of the total world land mass, at 17,098,246 sq.km. The Russian 
population at the beginning of 2017 was 146,838,993, ranked 9th in the 
world. It is composed of 85 regions that are divided into Republics formed 
on a national basis (22); by oblast (46), or by krai (9)1, together with three 
cities of federal significance, one autonomous province and four 
autonomous districts. Russia is built on a combination of regional and 
national-territorial principles as a voluntary association of its members. 
This association was formalized in the Federal agreement signed on 31 
March 1992, and later incorporated in the 1993 Constitution. In 2000, in 
an attempt to improve the effectiveness of the federal government, nine 
federal administrative districts were formed that do not have the status of 
territorial subjects. In addition, Russia is a complex, multinational, state, 
inhabited by a number of nations and ethnic groups. 
Researchers have noted significant disparities in the development 
of Russian regions as well as a low level of interregional cooperation 
(Khakimov (ed.), 2002; Lapina, 2006; Larina, 2006; Vereshchagina, 2008; 
Bochkaryova 2009; Zhuravskaya, 2010; Chirikova, 2011; Zubarevich, 
2013; Chubarova et al., 2015) These disparities grew further in the 1990s 
as the differences in the social and economic situation across the regions 
increased. In the early 2000s, the federal government undertook a 
number of measures to prevent their further growth. In terms of the level 
and depth of regional differences, Russia exceeds levels found not only in 
developed countries but also in some developing countries (Novikov, 
                                                      
1 The terms oblast and krai are sub-national scales of governance, the differences 
between them being more historical than administrative.  
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2013). The ratio between maximum and minimum regional GDP is 25.4 
(Tsimbalist, 2009). 
The literature addresses regional inequalities through diverse 
theoretical lenses. Among the indicators utilized by researchers to assess 
levels of inequality by region are: life expectancy; incomes and 
expenditures; GDP per capita; the ratio of the subsistence minimum to 
average monthly wage; regional financing of social programs; population 
dynamics; economically active and employed population; and levels of 
migration. The uneven distribution of population is often mentioned by 
researchers as one of the main factors influencing regional development 
(Bochkaryova, 2009; Podgornay, 2012; Novikov, 2013) According to 
official statistics (Rosstat) in Russia the average population density is 
about 8.4 people / sq. km. The lowest population density is in Chukotka 
(0.1 person / sq. km), the highest in Moscow (4,554.1 people / sq. km). 
The search for better living conditions and unregulated processes of 
population resettlement have led to the swelling of the metropolitan area; 
as a result, one in every eight citizens live in the capital or in the wider 
Moscow region (Novikov, 2013). 
Zubarevich considers the concentration of economic advantages in 
certain regions to be the main cause of economic inequality (Zubarevich, 
2005, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2015). Among such advantages, she distinguishes 
first order factors (richness of natural resources, favorable geographic 
location) and second order factors (levels of human capital development, 
favorable institutional environment, agglomeration effects, and so on). 
Income inequality in Russia largely depends on region (Figure 3); as 
noted above, the incomes of those living in a rich region can exceed the 
incomes of those living in a poor region by 25 times (Grabar, 2013). 
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Figure 3 The Gini coefficient for regional inequality  
 
Source: Zubarevich and Safronov (2013:20)  
At the same time, researchers have noted a decline in regional inequality 
since the mid-2000s. However, negative institutional factors have 
weakened this trend. The literature notes that regional policy instruments 
are ineffective in overcoming regional inequality and need to be 
strengthened (Vereshchagina, 2008; Boochkareva, 2009; Zubarevich et 
al., 2013; Novikov, 2013). 
GENDER INEQUALITY IN RUSSIA 
Gender studies began to develop in Russia in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, when the first feminist groups and independent women's 
organizations emerged, and the first publications and translations of 
articles by foreign authors on gender issues were published in scientific 
journals. A laboratory for gender studies was opened in the early 1990s 
(the word ‘gender’ was first used in the official name), at the Institute of 
Social and Economic Problems of Population of the Academy of Sciences 
of the Russian Federation, and, from this base, the Moscow Center for 
Gender Studies was established in 1994. This saw not only the birth of a 
new research stream in Russian social science, but also the 
institutionalization of gender studies as similar centers were opened in 
other regions (Ivanovo, Tomsk, St. Petersburg and elsewhere). There 
followed a real boom in gender-related publications with the first review 
of publications on gender studies emerging in 2004, entitled ‘Gender 
Problems in Russia (in National Publications 1993 – 2003)’. The text 
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analyzed 1,248 publications published in Russia during the period in 
question. A period of active promotion of gender issues followed, in terms 
of research, training and advocacy in the political arena. 
A follow-up survey of publications on gender equality in Russia, 
entitled ‘Gender Problems in Russia in National Publications 2004 – 2012’ 
analyses 835 publications and discusses gender equality across numerous 
domains: legislation and law enforcement practice; education; access to 
healthcare, health standards and life expectancy; employment; politics; 
and domestic violence. Each chapter includes recommendations on 
promoting gender equality in the given field. 
Both surveys were conducted according to the same methodology 
and are based on a comprehensive analysis of documents and 
publications on the status of women and men in various spheres of life, 
assessing gender inequality as measured by a number of indicators in 
health, education, employment, the labor market, legislation and politics, 
providing a complete overview of gender inequalities in Russia for a 20-
year period. 
The studies found no significant change in key areas of gender 
equality in the two periods (see Table 2). The situation improved in 
demography (life expectancy of women and men, maternal mortality and 
abortions) but worsened in the field of political institutions promoting 
gender equality. 
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Table 1 Changes in various areas of gender equality in 2004 – 2012 





Law enforcement practice 0
Education Access to education 0
The content of education 0
Health Female and male expectancy of life +
Gender gap in expectancy of life 0




Health of women of special groups 0
Employment and 
poverty 
Segregation and discrimination 0
Hazardous jobs for men 0




The role of institutions for gender 
equality 
–
Domestic violence The prevalence of violence 0
Notes:  
0 = no significant changes 
– = the deterioration of gender equality;  
+ = the improvement of gender equality 
Source: Kalabikhina I. (ed.) Grigorieva, N., Lukhovitskaya, E., Davtyan, M. (2012; 79). 
Income inequality between women and men, gender segregation in the 
labor market, and women's poverty are the most developed areas of 
research in gender inequality (Rimashevskaya, 2003, 2010; Kalabikhina 
(ed.), 2012; Kislitsina, 2007). Research documents a significant gender 
wage gap in various regions of Russia. For example, the gap in pay for men 
and women in the country is on average 35 – 40 percent for work of equal 
value2. However, the Rosstat data show that in some regions, such as the 
Republic of Ingushetia, the salaries of men and women are approximately 
equal. In Moscow, women receive on average three-quarters of the wages 
of men. The biggest difference in salaries is in the regions of the Far East, 
                                                      
2  Rosstat (2016) ‘Women and Men in Russian Federation’. http://www.gks.ru/ 
bgd/regl/B16_50/Main.htm (In Russian). 
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where women on average receive only half of male wages. Women in 
Russia have a high level of education—about 60 percent of students in 
higher education are women—however, this does not allow them to easily 
overcome gender differences in the labor market. 
To understand and assess the problem of gender inequality in 
Russia, researchers suggest more studies on topics such as: 1) de	jure and 
de	 facto rights of women and men; 2) the persistence of gender 
stereotypes on women's role in society; 3) analysis of the distribution of 
gender roles in the socio-economic sphere; 4) analysis of gender issues at 
the macro-level; and 5) gender aspects of law enforcement practice3. 
There seems to be a correlation between research and publications 
on gender issues and political and legislative cycles. For example, 2003 
was the peak year of active legislative work with the draft law ‘On state 
guarantees of equal rights and freedoms of men and women and equal 
opportunities for their implementation in the Russian Federation’ 
submitted to the State Duma. However, after a successful first reading, the 
draft was put aside for many years. The theme of gender equality then 
shifted to the margins of social research until a second peak between 2010 
and 2012; this was just before the second reading of this, by now 
significantly modified, law in 2013. However, at the last moment, the 
second reading was postponed indefinitely. After the adoption of the 
National Strategy for Women for 2017 – 2022 in March 2017, another 
increase in the number of publications on gender issues is observed 
although the phrase ‘women and men’ rather than the term ‘gender’ is 
more often used in publications and public debates. 
                                                      
3  Gender studies are based on the premise that all social phenomena and processes 
have a gender dimension. At the macro level, large public structures and social 
relations are studied, for example, ‘group – society’ or ‘personality – society.’ At the 
meso level intergroup relations are studied, for example, ‘group – group’; at the 
micro level, researchers focus on people's interactions with each other. In any 
social context, elements of all levels are combined. Everyday communication 
between family members takes place at the micro level. At the same time, the 
family is a social institution that is studied at the macro level, where it is connected 
with the labor market, the legislative system and social classes. 
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PUBLIC OPINION ON POVERTY, JUSTICE AND INEQUALITY AND MASS 
MEDIA IN RUSSIA 
The studies of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences (2003, 2013), noted earlier, also document changes in attitudes 
towards the poor in modern Russia. Between 2003 and 2013, the share of 
those who did not care about the poor has grown threefold while the 
number of those who treated them with sympathy, or even with respect, 
decreased by 150 percent. At the same time, the public tended to associate 
poverty with drunkenness and drug addiction or general risk behavior, 
that is, personal behavior. An analysis of public opinion on causes of 
poverty and state policy towards the poor shows that people are more 
concerned with the consequences than the causes of poverty (Gorshkov 
and Tikhonova (eds.) 2014; 157).	
What social and economic inequalities are currently perceived by 
Russians as the most painful for society as a whole, and for them 
personally? The results of sociological research show that income 
inequality is the major concern (47 percent and 71 percent of 
respondents, respectively, across the two studies), followed by inequality 
of access to medical care (38 percent and 47 percent) and housing 
conditions (28 percent and 38 percent). Interestingly, if inequality in 
access to good jobs is discussed, respondents consider it more important 
for them rather than for society as a whole (32 percent and 28 percent). 
This problem of inequalities in employment is acute for the poor in 
modern Russia, especially those of working age (VCIOM, 2013). 
The answers of respondents who are in poverty show that a strong 
percentage is not opposed to significant differences in income if they 
result from differences in talent or effort (31 percent of respondents). At 
the same time, 42 percent of respondents in this group believe that 
inequalities will exist in any society and recognize this as fair (Gorshkov 
et al., 2014). The results of the study suggest that the poor is not a 
homogeneous group when it comes to evaluating inequality. Equality and 
inequality are evaluated positively or negatively depending on the notion 
of justice. It is assumed that if inequality is just, then it must be preserved, 
but it is necessary to eliminate inequality that is unjust. 
In the framework of the project ‘Construction of Inequality in the 
Rhetoric of Social Policy’ (2013), the authors analyzed how social 
inequality and social policy are presented in print media in contemporary 
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Russia. In total, 1,205 publications between 2005 – 2012 dealing with 
poverty and inequality were selected. The peak year of relevant 
publications in the sample was in 2008 with a subsequent decline back to 
levels of interest found in 2005 (Figure 5). According to the authors, the 
frequency of referring to the topic of inequalities is closely correlated with 
election campaigns, and hence with increased or decreased attention to 
the issue by the country's leadership. In addition, interest in the topic of 
inequality tends to grow during a period of economic recovery and 
decrease during crisis times. Some researchers explain this in terms of the 
paradox of public consciousness, with poverty more acutely recognized 
when a country is growing in terms of wealth (Yarmiev, 2008). 
Figure 5 Distribution of publications on social inequality, 2005 – 2012, 
the number of units per year 
 
Source: Iarskaia-Smirnova E., Prisyazhnyuk D. (2013; 172)  
Most often, the blame for social inequality in Russian media rests with the 
state (59 percent of the sample), followed by businesses (16 percent) and 
individuals (16 percent). The authors note that many problems are 
associated with ineffective government, ‘anti-social’ business policies, 
corporate egoism, and with the fact that some groups of citizens have not 
been able to adapt to a market economy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has offered an overview of research publications on 
inequality in Russia over the period of 2000 – 2015. More specifically, this 
analysis mapped out research focusing on income inequality, regional 
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inequality, and gender inequality in Russia as well as publications on 
public and media attitudes toward poverty and inequality in Russia. 
It is emphasized in the research that the steady increase in incomes 
of a certain part of society is not related to efficiency growth in the 
economy, and is not in any way a measure of the prosperity of the country 
as a whole nor its regions. Differentiation is manifested not only in the 
polarization between the immensely wealthy ‘top’ and low-income 
‘bottom,’ but in growing social stratification based on sphere of activity, 
profession, and place of residence. Unfair distribution of income leads to 
unequal access to goods and services for different social strata, directly or 
indirectly contributing to inequalities in health outcomes, access to 
education and to a decent life. 
This overview of Russian research on various aspects of inequality 
shows that income inequality has attracted the most attention. There is a 
general consensus that in the early 1990s there was a sharp increase in 
income differentiation as a result of Russia's transition to a market 
economy. Researchers record an increase in income inequality for various 
social groups in the period 2000 – 2015. The peculiarity of the Russian 
situation is the fact that in the period 2010 – 2015 incomes grew, but 
inequality in income also increased. 
Income inequality is a cross-cutting theme for all the studies 
analyzed in this chapter. Researchers have drawn attention to the fact that 
incomes depend, to a large extent, on place of residence and the level of 
socio-economic development of a given region. These studies point to the 
need for active policies aimed at reducing regional differences and 
achieving more equitable access to public services. In contemporary 
gender studies, the issue of income inequality between men and women 
has grown in importance as a research theme. Researchers agree that 
there have been no significant changes in gender inequality in the period 
from 2004 to 2012 compared to the decade from 1993 to 2003. 
Surveys of public opinion demonstrate changes in the attitudes of 
the general public toward poverty and inequality, as Russians have 
become less sympathetic toward the poor, while their acceptance of 
inequality has grown over time. Many Russian respondents acknowledge 
the very existence of income inequality, but on condition that high 
incomes are the result of personal efforts and professional achievements. 
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Such inequality is considered fair by respondents. But they are critical of 
the wealth that was obtained as a result of privatization in the early 1990s. 
Studies on the representation of inequality in the mass media 
demonstrate that heightened interest depends on political cycles, 
electoral campaigns, and the socio-economic situation in society. In most 
news items, the state tends to be blamed for social inequality and at the 
same time is primarily held responsible for its alleviation. Between 2000 
and 2005, there was a major focus on linking social inequalities with 
ineffective social policies. Between 2006 and 2012, social inequality in 
Russian society tended to be explained more in terms of corporate greed, 
and is associated with individual behavior. Such studies are very 
important because the mass media are influential in framing the 
evaluation of social policy and the public's notions of social justice. 
Overall, a review of publications on equality and inequality in Russia 
for the period between 2000 and 2015 shows that few studies go beyond 
a focus on income and wealth. Not enough attention has been paid to 
inequalities in the social sector, in access to health care and education and 
to health and educational outcomes. Thus, it is important to promote an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of inequalities, and to this end, to 
draw on the results of studies across the different social science 
disciplines, as well as research by those for whom the study of inequalities 
is not the main topic, but one that is relevant to their work. This is 
necessary to provide evidence to government to develop more effective 
policies for sustainable development, given the significant challenge that 
high inequality presents to Russian society and the Russian state. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
INEQUALITY OF ACCESS TO THE HEALTH SYSTEM IN 
RUSSIA: THE CASE OF OUT-OF-POCKET PAYMENTS 
Tatiana Chubarova 
INTRODUCTION 
At present, inequality is high on the health system research agenda, 
including perspectives for future research which were set out in the latest 
World Social Science Report (2016). It is important to expand knowledge 
on inequalities in health care in order to inform public policy decisions. 
The focus on out-of-pocket-payments (OOP) is justified as they constitute 
a significant and growing share of health care financing in Russia. The aim 
is to use the data available to clarify the role of OOPs as financial barriers 
to access to medical treatment in the Russian health system, taking into 
account its specific features, both financial and institutional.  
In this chapter, a brief overview of inequality of access to health care 
from a conceptual perspective is presented, which aims to provide a 
methodological basis for the study and to define research questions. The 
main features of the organization and financing of the Russian health care 
system are outlined to show how the public / private mix works in the 
Russian context. OOPs are then discussed in more detail and the available 
evidence is analyzed to evaluate their impact on inequality of access to 
health care. Some tentative conclusions are suggested to inform public 
policy decisions. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
The data available documents rising inequalities on a global scale, to say 
nothing about the dramatic increase in income inequality observed in the 
former USSR and Eastern European countries that experienced transition 
from a centrally planned to a market economy. Research on inequality is 
traditionally dominated by income issues; however, there is a growing 
consensus that inequality is a multi-faceted phenomenon and recent 
debates have shifted to other dimensions, namely opportunities, power, 
education and health care (WB, 2006; Aaberge and Brandolini, 2014). It 
is generally accepted that there is likely to be a link between inequality 
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and access to health care (Davis, 1991; Kislitsina, 2003). However, the 
literature mostly focuses on inequalities in health status according to 
income, demonstrating that poor people generally have worse health 
status than the better-off (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2015). A substantial 
correlation has been confirmed between income inequality, educational 
inequality, and health inequality (Deaton, 2003). There is also strong 
evidence that without specific government policies, greater economic 
inequality leads to worse health outcomes. 
High income inequality in Russia is a well-documented fact 
(Kislitsina, 2003; Gerasimova, 2014). However, much less is known about 
other types of inequality, such as inequality of access to health care, and 
its causes and consequences. The aim of the present study is to single out 
how inequality manifests itself in Russian health care, paying special 
attention to financial barriers to access. The chapter tries to establish a 
connection between OOP and access to health care, to understand if the 
recent growth in OPP in Russia is leading to increased inequality in access 
to health care. 
The chapter is based on a number of methodological premises. 
Firstly, it adheres to the ‘determinants of health’ approach stating that 
health status is, to a large extent, determined by social and economic 
factors. It suggests that inequalities in the health system mainly result 
from the unequal distribution of health determinants between people 
occupying different social positions in society. Secondly, inequality in 
health care must be discussed vis‐a‐vis equality, implying equal access to 
available care for equal needs and the same quality of care for all (Leenan, 
1985). Health policy should aim to reduce or eliminate those inequalities 
that result from the distribution of health determinants that are 
considered both avoidable and unfair. In public policy, the aim of the 
health system is usually formulated as securing equality rather than 
eliminating inequalities. 
Thirdly, access can be defined as the ability of a citizen to timely 
receive appropriate medical treatment according to need, and is very 
much dependent on the organization and financing of the health care 
system. Measuring access to health care faces a number of methodological 
challenges that have been widely discussed by researchers. The 
population coverage, the content of the health package, cost-sharing, 
geographical and organizational barriers and the level of utilization of 
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available services are commonly used in research as the key indicators of 
access. Availability and affordability (cost) are considered as the most 
common reasons for variations in access to health care (Goddard and 
Smith, 2001). Access is often defined negatively as ‘the absence of 
barriers’—territorial, financial and cultural. Financial barriers imply that 
access is dependent on the ability to pay rather than need. 
The fairness of any financial contribution and financial risk 
protection are two basic concepts that are used in analyzing financial 
barriers to access. The fairness of financial contribution reflects the 
redistributive effect of health care finance, meaning differences in 
payments for health care as a share of income for various income groups. 
Financial risk protection indicators are developed within the framework 
of WHO Universal Health Coverage (UHC) monitoring to measure the 
incidence of catastrophic health expenditures (the number of households 
of all income levels who suffer financial hardship because of relatively 
large health payments in a given time period). UHC monitoring also 
measures impoverishment, when OOPs push a household below the 
poverty line. 
OOPs are defined by WHO as direct payments made by individuals 
(or households) to health care providers at the time of service use. It 
includes non-reimbursable cost sharing, deductibles, co-payments and 
fee-for service (WHO). The OECD definition of OPPs also notes that they 
are ‘paid directly by private households, irrespective of whether the 
contact with the health care system was established on referral or on the 
patient's own initiative’ (OECD, 2001). 
User fees have been introduced in the public sector for a number of 
reasons, including symbolism, preventing abuse, deterrence and 
prioritization (Glennester, 1992). OOPs are often referred to as barriers 
to access to medical treatment. First, there is a danger that they lead to a 
refusal or delay in receiving medical treatment with resulting negative 
consequences for people's health. According to OECD data, unmet need as 
an indirect indicator of financial barriers to access is higher amongst the 
poor compared to rich people (OECD, 2015). Second, in theory, there 
should be a shift in health financing towards those who use services more, 
namely to low income households as they have lower health status and 
greater needs. However, research on equity in health financing and 
delivery in low- and middle-income countries over the past decades 
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indicates that the rich tend to benefit more from the health system than 
the poor and that the burden of financing also falls more on the rich 
(Asante et al., 2016). In addition, poor people might not seek medical care 
if they have to pay for it. As a result, the share of medical expenditures in 
poor households' budgets is lower that it would be if all their health needs 
were met. This suggests that the impact of OOPs on equality of access 
depends considerably on the institutional context. 
In this context one of the most debated issues is the expansion of fee 
for services in publicly owned health services. Some researchers suggest 
that an increase in OOPs is inevitable under the conditions of budgetary 
restraint and stress their positive role as an expression of choice, with 
those with the ability and willingness to pay receiving better quality 
services (Kochkina et al., 2015). However, this implies that services 
rendered in state-owned health services free of charge are of an inferior 
quality and ignores the fact that people will find ways to pay for medical 
treatment for a number of reasons (uncertainty, pain, life threatening 
conditions, caring about family members) even if they do not truly have 
the ability to pay. Other experts suggest that increases in OOPs coupled 
with low public spending and the restructuring of the health delivery 
network is likely to hamper access to medical treatment for the low-
income population. 
The idea of a public-private mix stresses the importance of engaging 
all stakeholders and enhanced collaboration among them in various 
settings. In modern health policy, it is accepted that private money can be 
attracted into the health system to meet the challenges it faces globally—
population ageing, rapid advances in technology, including new drugs and 
information technology, rising patients' demands and expectations, and 
so on. However, some prepayment mechanisms are necessary to secure 
redistribution from the rich to the poor (WHO, 2010). 
This chapter is based on official statistics from the Russian 
statistical agency (Rosstat) on health outcomes and health finance, 
including household expenditures on medical treatment by income 
deciles, and international statistical databases, mainly WHO and OECD. 
Survey data includes the Rosstat comprehensive survey on population 
living conditions, two rounds of which were conducted in 2011 and 2014. 
It provides information on health services' utilization, infrastructure and 
expenses as well as population health status. Public opinion surveys on 
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health issues are also conducted by independent agencies, such as the 
Levada center. 
Data availability and its quality is one of the main limitations of 
health inequality research, as some health data is discontinuous and 
subjective (O'Donnell et al., 2008). Official statistics in Russia are 
incomplete and fragmented, so the bulk of information comes from 
surveys on population living conditions that include sections on health 
status and health services, as well as on payments for medical treatment. 
However, only a few surveys contain information on respondents' income 
to allow us to establish a link between income and access to health care. 
In addition, reports from NGOs that are actively involved in health issues 
were studied to gain more qualitative insights into the health system, 
including a review of patient organizations' websites. 
OOPs AND THE NEW PUBLIC-PRIVATE MIX IN RUSSIAN HEALTH CARE  
The Soviet health care system was known around the world as the 
Semashko model. It was a budget-funded system based on a network of 
state-owned health services provided to the population free of charge at 
the point of delivery. Transition to a market-based economy led to 
dramatic changes in the health system, with the main trend being the 
introduction of compulsory health insurance (CHI) and the emergence of 
a private sector in health care finance and delivery. However, universal 
access to timely and quality medical treatment was declared as the main 
aim of health policy in Russia and the right to free health care was 
guaranteed in the 1993 Constitution. 
At present health care in Russia is financed from two sources, public 
and private.  
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Table 1 Selected health expenditures indicators in Russia 




5.36 5.42 5.21 6.83 6.88 7.07
Total government 
health finance, % 
total health expen-
ditures 















34.52 40.35 42.01 34.17 43.75 53.12
Private OPP, % 
private health 
expenditures 
64.66 74.70 82.39 94.39 94.92 95.92
Private OPP, % total 
health expenditures
16.89 29.97 31.32 43.30 42.55 45.85
Private prepayment 
plans, % private 
expenditures 
6.0 8.06 8.24 4.58 4.3 3.50
Source: WHO, World health statistics, respective years. Date of retrieval: 17.03.2017	
As can be seen from Table 1, public expenditures, which include budget 
appropriations and compulsory health insurance (CHI) contributions 
amounted to only 3.5 percent of GDP in 2014, or 52 percent of total health 
expenditures. Two comments are necessary here. The role of regions in 
health financing is set to increase. In 2014, federal budget expenditures 
on health amounted to 0.7 percent of GDP while expenditures of the 
consolidated regional budgets reached 1.8 percent of GDP. 
The CHI system is a rather complex financial and organizational 
arrangement. Money comes from employers' contributions (5.1 percent 
of payroll) for those employed, and from payments of regional 
governments for those who are not employed (pensioners, children, the 
disabled, the unemployed). Special CHI funds were created in regions that 
collect money and distribute then to health services to cover their 
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expenses via health insurance organizations. Low public expenditures on 
health have resulted in people having to mobilize private means. These 
include private voluntary health insurance and out-of-pocket payments. 
In Russia, the share of private spending on health is quite significant. In 
2014, it accounted for almost 48 percent of total health expenditures. 
Private expenses in Russia mostly consist of OOP, i.e. people paying cash 
at the moment of receiving medical treatment. The share of OOP in private 
health expenditures increased to 96 percent in 2014 compared to 65 
percent in 1995. As a result, they amounted to about 46 percent of total 
health expenditures in 2014, a rise from about 17 percent in 1995. The 
increase in private health expenditures has not been accompanied by the 
development of prepayment mechanisms, for example voluntary private 
health insurance (PHI) is underdeveloped in Russia. Its share in health 
financing was only 3.5 percent in 2014, showing a declining trend. PHI is 
typically provided by large foreign and domestic employers as a 
supplement to public entitlements. 
The health care delivery network is dominated by public providers 
(mostly health centers) although the number of private providers both in 
primary and hospital care is gradually increasing, especially in urban 
areas and in certain segments of health care (laboratory tests and 
diagnostics, dentistry, plastic surgery, obstetrics). For example, the share 
of private hospitals in the total number of hospitals increased from about 
two percent in 2010 to three percent in 2014. The number of private 
hospital beds grew even faster—from 4,000 in 2010 to 11,000 in 2014, an 
almost threefold increase. Starting from the beginning of the 2000s, the 
Russian federal government put substantial financial and administrative 
efforts into modernization of the public health delivery network to secure 
effective use of resources, improve quality of care and save on 
administrative expenses. Reforms included network restructuring, a 
reduction, via closure or consolidation, in the number of hospitals and 
changing patient flows, together with promoting modern technologies 
including IT. However, the impact of these measures on access is 
controversial as the spatial factor is important in Russia where the share 
of the population living in rural and remote areas is quite high. 
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ОOP IN THE RUSSIAN HEALTH SYSTEM: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
In Russian official discourse the term ‘OOP’ is not used. Direct patients' 
payments to health care providers are divided into two streams, namely 
official payments via cashier both in public and private settings (platnye	
meditzinskiye	uslugi, or services rendered for fee) and informal payments 
in the public sector both as a condition to get a particular treatment, and 
as a gratuity (a voluntary payment, usually after treatment is received). 
Informal payments are often referred to as ‘envelope’ money, referring to 
cash handed over in an envelope. Informal payments became widespread 
in Russia in the early 1990s leading to the formation of a ‘shadow health 
economy’ (Lewis, 2007). Payments include institutional or individual 
payments to suppliers, in kind or in cash, made outside official channels 
or paid for services that should be covered by the health care system. 
Envelope money was typically paid directly to a doctor and / or to other 
medical staff. The dramatic drop in public spending coupled with low 
salaries made these payments quite common in the 1990s and early 
2000s (Shishkin et al., 2007).  
At that time, official payments were charged only in private health 
services that emerged in the course of transition and covered the full cost 
of treatment. The situation changed when state health services became 
actively involved in provision of medical treatment for money. 
Government regulations stipulate what types of medical treatment can be 
subject to fees in state health services, namely treatment not covered by 
the program of state guaranteed free medical care that is annually 
adopted by the government starting from 1999 and funded through CHI 
contributions and the state budget (taxes). In addition, fees are paid when 
a patient does not have a CHI policy or is not officially referred to a 
hospital from a health center; when treatment is provided anonymously, 
or when the patient is a foreign citizen not otherwise covered. In addition, 
patients may opt to pay for additional services that are not included in the 
medical and economic standards (MEAs) for particular diseases. 
It should be noted that when patients pay for treatment this does 
not mean that they are no longer eligible for free health care. A common 
practice is partial payments meaning than a patient may get some 
procedures free while paying for others, most often lab tests and 
diagnostics. Paying for better quality medical devices, especially for 
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surgery, than those that are provided through CHI is also quite 
widespread in Russia. There are several requirements that a state health 
service should fulfill to be able to charge fee for service, including: 
obtaining informed consent from a patient, informing a patient about 
possibilities to receive free care, having a license for the treatment in 
question, signing an appropriate agreement and providing a receipt. 
In early 1990 the provision of medical services rendered for a fee 
was regulated primarily by the norms of the civil law as fixed in the Civil 
Code and consumer protection legislation. The first special regulation—a 
federal government decree—adopted in 1996 still failed to regulate the 
conditions under which services could be provided for a fee. It was stated 
that the regulation applied to all health services regardless of form of 
ownership. The Fundamentals of Citizens' Health Protection were 
adopted in 2011 and included a special section on fee for service. It 
stipulated that people can pay a fee for any services they wish. Following 
this law, more detailed rules on rendering services for a fee were adopted 
in 2012. Prices in state health services are fixed by the relevant 
government bodies while private health services are unregulated in this 
matter. Revenues received go to the health service that can dispose of 
them at its discretion. However, in 2015 a limitation was imposed 
prohibiting spending more than 60 percent of the money raised from 
charging fees on salaries. 
To provide fee-based services and taking into account the demand 
and availability of resources, a health service can organize a separate 
structural unit as well as open new staff positions or invite consultants 
from other organizations. The competition between the public and private 
sector for patients' money is quite strong, especially in big cities. 
Imperfect competition on the part of state health services should also be 
mentioned as state health services with a good reputation attract patients 
that prefer them to private clinics that are relatively new and less well-
known. 
OOP AND INEQUALITY OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 
Assessing the link between OOP and inequality of access to health care in 
Russia is a difficult task, as there are factors that contribute to reducing as 
well as widening inequality. The main factor that works against inequality 
of access is that every Russian citizen is covered by compulsory healthy 
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insurance (CHI). The network of state-owned health services that provide 
health care free at the point of delivery is well developed. Surveys 
conducted by different agencies (Levada	tsentr, 2016) demonstrate that 
the majority of respondents still seek medical treatment in the public 
system. It can be argued that OOPs increase patients' choice and give them 
the possibility to gain faster access to health care, to overcome waiting 
lists and visit specific doctors for whatever reason. However, according to 
the 2000 WHO World Health Report (WHO, 2000), Russia was in the 185th 
position on the list of countries ranked by the index of fairness of financial 
contributions. The increase in private payments in health care indicates 
that public money is not enough to fully cover the population's needs. 
Though universal access is guaranteed at least politically and legally, the 
public system is not adequately funded, and it is likely that people 
experience problems with access to free medical care. OOP should be 
discussed from the standpoint of the ability to pay rather than as a social 
right. In Russia, OOPs are increasing against the background of high 
income inequality and high levels of poverty. 
The Gini coefficient reached its peak of 0.421 in 2007 and then 
slightly decreased to 0.415 in 2015. The ratio of the highest to the lowest 
income deciles followed the same dynamic, 16.7 and 15.7, respectively. 
Also, the Gini is quite high for the distribution of wages. It shows that there 
are significant differences in the socio-economic status of households. The 
number of people living in poverty is also quite significant. The lowest 
level since the start of transition was in 2012 at 10.7 percent of the 
population with the rate increasing to 13.3 percent, or about 20 million 
people, by 2015. However, as poverty in Russia is measured relative to a 
subsistence minimum, fixed by the government via consumer basket, the 
real numbers are likely to be higher. The number of the working poor is 
also quite significant—in 2015 more than 10 percent of those employed 
received wages lower than the subsistence minimum. 
According to a selective observation of the behavioral factors 
affecting population health status conducted by Rosstat in 2013, 
indicators of self-assessment of health status vary considerably by income 
group. Seventy percent of respondents with high incomes compared to 
only 18 percent of respondents with low incomes rated their health status 
as ‘very good’ or ‘good’. Accordingly, only seven percent of respondents 
with high incomes compared to 32.9 percent of those with low incomes 
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consider their health ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. A similar tendency can be traced 
in relation to morbidity. Only 18.6 percent of respondents with low 
income compared to 52.6 percent with high income noted the absence of 
disease. For all ten types of diseases included in the survey, the proportion 
of respondents with low incomes who had a particular disease, is higher, 
and in some cases quite significantly so, being most pronounced in 
relation to diabetes, being 5.6 times higher amongst those with low 
incomes compared to those with high incomes. 
Official statistics also show an increase in medical expenditures in 
Russians' household budgets. The share of health care in total household 
expenditures increased from 2.5 percent in 2005 to 3.6 percent in 2014. 
The highest rises were recorded for expenses on medical devices and 
medication, rising from 1.3 percent to 2 percent, and on ambulatory care, 
rising from 0.7 percent to 1.3 percent. The share of hospital expenses 
slightly decreased in 2014 to 0.3 percent, having been about 0.4 percent 
from 2010 to 2013. The share of medical treatment in the total volume of 
services rendered for fee is also growing, from 4.8 percent in 2005 to 6.4 
percent by 2014. This indicates that the scope of medical treatment 
provided for fee is growing faster than total paid services. In per capita 
terms in current prices it increased for the period of 2005 – 2014 by over 
four times (see Table 2). 
Table 2 Fee for service medical treatment in Russia 
Selected	indicators	 2005	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	
Services rendered for fee, 
total, mln rbls  
109756 250474 286058 333895 416227 474432
Services rendered for fee, per 
capita, total, rbls 
15828.8 34606.2 38756.4 42156.2 48272.8 51115.7
including medical treatment 764.7 1753.4 2001.0 2331.6 2900.4 3247.5
Share of medical treatment in 
total fee for service, % 
4.8 5.1 5,2 5,5 6.0 6.4
Source: Rosstat, 2015 (a), 2015 (b). 
Official statistics indicate that on average Russian households of all 
income groups have an experience of paying for health care at some point. 
Rich people spent a bigger share of their household expenditures on 
medical care than the poor—3.3 percent for the 10th decile compared to 
2.5 percent for the 1st decile in 2014. 
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The data on per	 capita household expenditures on services by 
income groups show that rich people spent more both in absolute and 
relative terms. The share of medical treatment in total expenditures on 
services of the 1st (lowest) decile increased for the period in question from 
1.14 percent to 1.2 percent, and of the 10th (highest) decile from 5 percent 
to 7.4 percent. The ratio of health expenditures on medical treatment of 
upper to low income deciles increased from 33 times in 2004 to 43 times 
in 2014. In absolute terms, per capita household expenditures on medical 
treatment of the rich are growing faster than the poor—they increased by 
6 times for the 1st decile and by 8.5 times for the 10th decile. 
Sociological research suggests that the growth of OOP might mean 
not only an increase in the average bill but also growth in the number of 
people who end up paying for medical care. According to Public Opinion 
Foundation (FOM), in 2015 46 percent of respondents noted that they had 
to pay for medical treatment, an increase from 2007 (42 percent). 
Accordingly, the proportion of respondents who did not pay declined, 
from 57 percent to 53 percent, respectively (Public Opinion Fund, 2015). 
Interestingly, in the 2015 survey, the majority of those who paid did 
it officially, through a cashier at a health service—34 percent of 
respondents mentioned that they always paid officially while 6 percent of 
respondents said they paid officially more often than informally. In the 
2007 survey the numbers were 25 percent and 6 percent, respectively. 
This means that more than 75 percent of those respondents who paid for 
health care did it officially. 
The number of respondents who paid only informally decreased 
from 4 percent in 2007 to 2 percent in 2015 as well as the number of those 
respondents who said that they paid more often informally than 
officially—7 percent and 3 percent respectively. This means that official 
fee for service is becoming more widespread while informal payments are 
gradually decreasing. At the same time, 29 percent of respondents paid 
when visiting state health services, and 22 percent when visiting private 
ones. 
The possibilities of alternative means of funding medical care are 
limited. Only 6 percent of Russians have voluntary health insurance. 
Approximately the same number of Russians (7 percent) have the 
opportunity to regularly go to private clinics. In other words, only 13 
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percent of the population uses paid medical services. Among the high-
income group this share reaches 23 percent. 
Sociological research reveals the following paradox: the majority of 
respondents (75 percent) go to public health services but think that quality 
care can be obtained only if one pays. In the Levada center survey, 86 
percent of respondents admit that only those who have money can get high-
quality medical care in Russia. This opinion is shared by respondents of all 
groups, regardless of the wealth or size of the settlement. This indicates a 
belief that there is a strong link between the quality of medical care and 
money spent, however; steps towards increasing mandatory official 
payments are not accepted by the bulk of the respondents (Levada 2016, 
21). 
Two rounds of the comprehensive Rosstat population survey on 
standards of living, undertaken in 2011 and 2014, provide information on 
respondents who consider the need to pay as an obstacle to obtaining 
medical care (see Table 3). 
Table 3 The reasons for not seeking medical assistance in health 
services and receiving medical care from other sources if there 
is a need for medical treatment 
	 2011	 2014	
Did not seek medical treatment in health services in case of 
need, % of all respondents  
42.7 33.6
Including, the necessary treatment could be obtained only for fee
all respondents, % 5.7 11.0
urban population 6.1 11.0
rural population 4.5 11.0
working age 5.7 10.0
young people (16 – 26 years) 5.1 7.4
elderly 5.9 12.5
working people 5.3 9.8
Source: compiled by the author based on: Rosstat. Comprehensive survey of 
population living conditions, 2011 and 2014. 
The survey data shows that the proportion of those who did not seek 
medical help, because necessary treatment could be obtained only for 
money, almost doubled from 2011 to 2014, especially in groups such as 
the rural population and the elderly. However, in general, the number of 
people who did not seek necessary medical care decreased for the period 
in question from 42.7 percent to 33.6 percent Substantial financial 
problems arise in access to medicines—in 2011 95.2 percent of 
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respondents bought drugs at their own expense while 17 percent of 
respondents noted the lack of funds for the purchase of drugs. 29.5 
percent of respondents failed to complete a course of treatment or went 
through it only partially because they were asked to pay for treatment for 
which they had no money. 
However, an increase in OOP per	 se need not result in increased 
inequality. As mentioned above, people do not necessarily need to pay for 
medical treatment as they can seek care in the public sector that is well-
developed in Russia. According to survey data, more than 75 percent of 
Russians obtain medical treatment in state polyclinics / hospitals. 
However, the lower the income, the more often free medical care is sought 
in state owned health services—80 percent of respondents from the 
group with a low-income status compared to 66 percent of the higher-
income group. 
It is argued here that institutional barriers are important to 
understand the relation between OOP and inequality of access. There is a 
big concern, supported by evidence from the field, that state health 
services might increase inequality of access by using highly bureaucratic 
management procedures and providing medical staff with a perverse 
stimulus to make patients pay for services that should be provided free of 
charge. When both for free and fee for services are provided in the same 
facility, by the same doctors, using the same equipment, it is likely to 
tempt medical personnel to ‘force’ a patient to pay, especially for 
laboratory tests or tertiary care. When somebody pays to overcome a 
waiting list, s / he is just jumping over the heads of fellow taxpayers which 
is unfair to those on the waiting list. 
As public funds are scarce, OOPs are considered by both health 
authorities and medical personnel in health services as a source of 
additional funding. For a patient it is often very difficult to evaluate his / 
her medical need. Thus, patients can be easily manipulated into paying to 
receive medical treatment as soon as possible. An information problem 
should also be mentioned, as in many cases people do not know exactly 
what should be provided free under CHI. In a situation of discomfort and 
uncertainty, they often are ready to pay for that which should be provided 
free.  
The role of the primary care doctor (terapevt) as a gate keeper was 
strengthened in the course of the recent health reforms. This is a rationing 
mechanism that also pushes the patient towards paying for medical 
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treatment. To visit a consultant, a patient needs to be referred by a 
terapevt, otherwise s / he can get access only for a fee. Recently a norm 
was set that a doctor should allocate about 12 minutes per patient. 
Together with increased administrative load, such a brief visit limits the 
time a doctor spends with patients and, often, that is not enough, 
especially in the case of a patient with multiple health issues. 
The situation of ‘exit’ seems to be relevant in the Russian context as 
people prefer to opt for fee-for-services as they are more responsive to 
their needs (although this does not automatically mean a better quality) 
instead of fighting for their rights for free treatment. Under the present 
system they might complain to either a special government agency 
(Roszdravnadzor) or their CHI company. Both have special mechanisms, 
first of all financial, to deal with such problems. However, people prefer to 
pay or to change polyclinic rather than complain or fight for their rights. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The general conclusion is that the increase in OOP in the Russian health 
care system is likely to contribute to widening inequality in access to 
health care. However, the analysis demonstrates that the situation is 
complicated, as there are also factors that mitigate inequality. Health 
financing indicators are indirect, and much depends on institutional 
context, and the organization of the health care system in the country. 
Against a background of high income inequality and low public spending, 
the expansion of fee-for-service in state-owned health services is likely to 
contribute to inequality of access via the formation of a two-tier health 
system: good care for the rich and lower quality care for the poor. The role 
of individual health finance seems to be institutionalized, an important 
consequence of which is that virtually no redistribution happens in health 
financing. This undermines the basis of social solidarity, where the rich 
pay for the poor and the healthy pay for those who are ill. 
In Russia quality health care is often considered as a service for 
those who can pay rather than as a citizen right. Well-off people in Russia 
de	 facto are opting out of free health care thus contributing to the 
deterioration of the quality of treatment provided for free. Free medical 
care is shrinking and losing its potential to become a leveling force in a 
divided society. It is suggested here that the state should introduce 
mechanisms to control private health expenditures. Several policy options 
have been discussed in the course of public sector reforms, yet the choice 
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has not yet been made. As it is unlikely that public health financing will 
increase substantially in the near future, developing prepayment schemes 
(voluntary or employer-based insurance) might help to ease the burden of 
costs of direct payments and to level inequalities in access to health care. 
However, as recent Russian government initiatives show, inequality—
unlike poverty—is not openly mentioned among strategic social and 
economic priorities. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
THE HIDDEN REALITY OF DAY-TO-DAY STRUGGLES OF THE 
WORKING POOR IN LITHUANIA 
Natalija Atas  
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the problem of in-work poverty (also referred to 
as working poverty) because it represents a modern form of poverty that 
is rapidly becoming one of the most pressing issues not only in Lithuania, 
but across all capitalist countries. According to the most recent Eurostat 
statistical data, 9.5 percent of employees in the European Union (EU27) 
were living at-risk-of-poverty in 2014 (in comparison to 8.3 percent in 
2007). This means that millions of men and women are currently facing 
the risk of poverty despite being active members of the labor market. The 
financial crisis of 2007 – 08 has influenced the surge in working poverty 
rates since cuts in working hours, lower salaries and suspension of pay 
were common practices of employers and institutions in dealing with the 
crisis (Gottfried and Lawton, 2010). In 2010, at 12.6 percent, the level of 
in-work poverty in Lithuania had not only reached a record high but also 
was one of the highest in the EU (Eurostat, 2017). Women were 
disproportionally affected by the increase (14.3 percent of working 
women faced risk of poverty in comparison to 10.6 percent of men). Even 
though in the following years, the level of poverty among working people 
in the country decreased, as this study will reveal, it had a destructive 
impact on the lives of those affected. 
Despite a growing body of literature analyzing statistical patterns, 
characteristics and causes of in-work poverty (Lohmann, 2008; 
Ponthieux, 2010; Frazer and Marlier, 2010; Fraser et al., 2011; Maitre et 
al., 2012; Meulders	and O'Dorchai, 2013; Pradella, 2015), the knowledge 
about the day-to-day realities of the working poor is largely neglected by 
scientific communities across Europe. Nevertheless, as Sidel (1992; xxiv) 
once sensibly said about statistical accounts of poverty, ‘statistics are 
people with the tears washed off.’ Therefore, in order to gain a 
comprehensive and accurate understanding of in-work poverty, it is 
necessary to look at what hides behind these statistical trends. This could 
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not only facilitate a scientific understanding of what it means for an 
employed person to live in poverty, but also help to track the individual 
and structural roots of this problem. Hence, this chapter	addresses	gaps 
in in-work poverty knowledge existing in the literature, on both national 
and regional levels, by depicting first-hand experiences and realities of 
lives of those who live in working poverty in Lithuania. It aims to discuss 
strategies that are commonly applied among the working poor in order to 
manage their hardship. A concept of strategy in this context refers to a set 
of predetermined actions that help the poor to manage their income and 
spending disparities. Poverty here is understood in terms of relative 
deprivation as initially proposed by Townsend (1979; 31): 
Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty 
when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the 
activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or 
are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they 
belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the 
average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary 
living patterns and activities. 
This chapter will begin with an overview of the literature on first-hand 
experiences of poverty. Next, it will introduce the qualitative 
methodological approach that was utilized to obtain data for this study. 
The following sections will present empirical data depicting first-hand 
accounts of challenges and strategies related to employment, spending, 
prioritizing and borrowing that enable employed people living in poverty 
in Lithuania to make ends meet. It will reveal how in-work poverty is 
reflected in people's lives and, consequently, affects their daily 
experiences.  
This chapter demonstrates that poverty represents a daily struggle, 
one that manifests itself in a number of ways and requires a relentless 
response.  
FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCES OF POVERTY 
Numerous studies have revealed that there is a clear pattern of poverty 
experience shared by different groups of people. To begin with, being poor 
does not only mean lack of fiscal or material resources, but also being 
disadvantaged in areas of health, education and housing conditions is a 
part of the overall poverty experience (Ellwood, 1999; Toynbee, 2003; 
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Munger, 2007; Shildrick et al., 2012). People living in hardship often 
emphasize that in order to lead a dignified life they require four key 
necessities, namely: education; health; housing; and employment (MRC, 
2006). In other words, people see poverty as more than material 
deprivation. Nevertheless, material deprivation defined as ‘having 
insufficient physical or material resources—food, shelter and clothing—
necessary to sustain life in either an absolute or relative sense to some 
prescribed standard’ is always at the epicenter of poverty (Baldock et al., 
1999; 129). Poverty affects all three core dimensions of human life, that 
is, individual, family and social.	 Concerns about the management of 
household budgets and areas related with housing and nutrition are often 
identified as the most pressing among those who live in poverty 
(Kempson, 1996; Farrell and O'Connor, 2003; Attree, 2004). Furthermore, 
this constant hardship and struggle not only creates an immense 
psychological pressure, but also may lead to some other health issues 
(Sharpe and Bostock, 2002; Gould, 2006). Finally, stigma has been 
identified as a by-product of poverty that has a significant effect on 
people’s lives (Beresford and Croft, 1995; Riggins, 1997; Oliver, 2001; 
Pickering, 2001; Lister, 2004). 
A number of studies conducted in the UK showed that people living 
on low incomes were pressured to adopt specific ‘survival’ strategies in 
order to cope with their challenging living circumstances (Dean, 2007; 
Green, 2007; Power, 2007; Maynard and Clewett, 2009; Lister and Strelitz, 
2008; Patrick, 2014). The strategies enabling people to keep their heads 
above water are complex and versatile, but often range between 
conditions of living in shortage and living in debt (Kempson et al., 1994; 
McKendrick et al., 2003). The first strategical pattern, cutting back on 
expenses in order to make ends meet, is inevitably adopted by everyone 
who lives in poverty. Often people have to cut back not only on social 
activities, but also on the necessities, such as food and heating, in order to 
avoid the stigma of debt. Careful budgeting is an essential part of 
managing on a low income. Individuals not only have to prioritize their 
purchases, but also be aware of ways and means in order to make budget 
purchases. This involves a great deal of researching, planning and 
accessing the budget products which requires substantial time and effort. 
Constant detailed planning can be a demanding and time-consuming 
activity that for some may became a full-time occupation (Kempson et al., 
1994; McKendrick et al., 2003). Therefore, setting up priority areas and 
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distributing income according to these expenses is an initial step of 
managing the low income for many. Leisure and recreation activities are 
usually not making it even to the bottom of the list (Ghate and Hazel, 
2002). Purchasing food and paying utility and housing bills are considered 
to be the most pressing expenses that are the top priority for many low-
income families. However, many have to compromise even with these two 
essentials. 
The second strategy, applied by people experiencing poverty, is 
borrowing. This kind of debt manifests as ‘bank overdrafts, credit and 
store cards, kinds of debt including rent, council tax and utility bill arrears, 
overpayments of tax credits, catalogues, social fund loans, loans from 
family, friends and children, and high interests doorstep loans’ (Hooper et 
al., 2007; 25). Debts taken on to pay basic household bills are most 
common; however, low-income families might turn to borrowing and 
debts for a number of other reasons (Kempson, 1996). People are falling 
into debt in order to cover the cost of basic necessities, such as food, 
clothing and utility bills. Unexpected expenses and late or cancelled 
benefit / tax credits are other reasons why some people fall into debt. 
Besides, some people fall into debt in order to improve their quality of life 
and to maintain living standards prevailing in their community. For 
instance, the study showed that some extra money was needed by many 
in order to afford such social necessities as ‘a large TV, Sky, birthday and 
Christmas presents, a car, a holiday, to have friends around’ (Hooper et al., 
2007; 25). Inability to maintain living standards and behavioral patterns 
accepted in society creates a psychological tension that sometimes can be 
momentarily relieved by taking on a debt. Some families do not have any 
extra money to participate in religious and cultural celebrations and, 
therefore, have to make a Hobson's choice between falling into debt or 
seeing their children denied their rights of being a part of such celebrations 
(Maynard and Clewett, 2009). 
Although the above-mentioned strategies enable people to make 
ends meet, and normally are the only ways of managing life with a low 
income, they also place a number of constraints on people. All of the above 
strategies have one common feature: decision-making. Although making 
decisions is a normal feature of everyone's life, for people who live with 
rather limited options it can be a very frustrating and stressful experience 
for a very simple reason: with a limited income you are faced with only 
very limited choices. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The data in this chapter derive from analysis of 36 semi-structured 
interviews conducted with the working poor of Lithuania. The field work 
was conducted in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, in 2012. This research 
followed a purposive sample procedure (Maxwell, 1997). The study 
participants were selected in the following way: a) the individual had to 
be employed for more than 6 months; b) the person's income had to be 
below the official at-risk-of-poverty threshold that is measured across the 
EU Member States as 60 percent of median equivalized income. Lithuania 
has one of the lowest at-risk of poverty thresholds in the EU. In 2012, the 
poverty threshold for two adults with two children younger than 14 years 
was just below 5.50 Euros per year, which made it the third lowest poverty 
threshold in the EU (Eurostat, 2017b). In other words, the selection criteria 
of the participants mirrored the ‘in-work poverty’ statistical indicator 
utilized by the European Commission (European Commission 2009; 11). 
Semi-structured interviews were used in the study in order to maximize the 
flexibility of the interviewing process (Saidman, 1998; May, 2002). 
Demographic characteristics of participants revealed the following 
patterns. Of the 36 research participants, only 8 were male. On the one 
hand, this can be explained by fact that after the group of people who 
could have been identified as working poor was accessed, the selection 
process transformed to convenience (or availability) sampling ‘where 
respondents selected simply because they are close at hand, or easy to 
access’ (Pole and Lampard, 2002; 35). In other words, anyone who lived 
in in-work poverty and agreed to participate in the research was included 
in the sample (regardless of their other characteristics). Also, it must be 
noted that, due to the domestic gender division of labor, women living 
with a male partner were more likely to be the ones responsible for 
collection of food donations. However, at the same time, the over-
representation of women in this sample is not random as in-work poverty 
among women at the time of research (in 2012) in Lithuania was more 
widespread than among men (Eurostat, 2017). 
Without exception, all sample members were part of families with 
children. There were two household types in the sample, namely married 
couples and lone mothers. To be more precise, there were 18 married 
people, 16 single mothers (including those divorced or widowed) and 2 
cohabitating couples. Predominantly, families consisted of 1 – 3 children, 
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with only a few larger families. The sample included people with four 
educational backgrounds: secondary, vocational, technical and higher. The 
majority of the people with vocational and technical qualifications were not 
working according to the level of their qualification. Just a few people had a 
higher education and were in the minority compared to other groups.  
CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES FOR MAKING ENDS MEET 
Employment strategies  
Managing living on a low income is a significant challenge—and one that 
requires strategic thinking, a high level of organization and time 
(McKendrick et al., 2003; Dean, 2007; Green, 2007). However, time is a 
commodity that working individuals lack. Combining work and executing 
poverty survival strategies requires extra effort on the part of employees. 
Regardless, the participants of this study proved to be very resourceful in 
developing their survival strategies. The priority strategy for the majority 
of the participants was attempting to maximize their earning potential. A 
common practice that enabled participants to make ends meet was taking 
on additional jobs in order to increase their overall income. A number of 
participants had more than one job, at one point or other, during the last 
few years. Additional work usually took the form of unregistered 
employment. However, having additional employment does not always 
mean a notable increase in living standards, as one of the participants had 
noticed, ‘There was a time when I had three jobs. But it didn't provide me 
with good money. Although, at that time, I could eat meat 3 – 5 times a 
week. Now I am not able to do that.’  
Participants occasionally made an attempt to improve their position 
in the labor market. Some of them spoke about their effort to improve 
their skills or to gain new qualifications. However, they emphasized the 
insufficiency of qualification courses offered by the Labor Exchange. A 
forty-six year-old mechanic said:  
I was registered as a job seeker and I was offered to attend a course to improve 
my qualification. I have done it, but I can't say that it was very useful. Yes, I got 
a certificate. But it did not give me much in the way of skills. 
A participant, who had been trying to gain some new skills, after her 
technical qualification became irrelevant in the contemporary labor 
market, told about her struggle to gain some relevant skills that would 
help her to increase her employability: 
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I don't want anything extraordinary; I understand my abilities, as I am 
considered an unqualified worker. To be honest, I even am hiding my technical 
qualification because I was told that I will not get any additional training if I 
have any qualification. Therefore, I had to hide from the Labor Exchange the 
fact that I graduated technical school in order to be able to attend any course. 
Once I attended sewing course. But this course did not give me such skills that 
would enable me to do this type of job professionally. I was not able to become 
a tailor, because my speed is not as it supposed to be in order to work in factory; 
and my vision is not the best. And now, I can't take any courses for two years, 
because I was enrolled in the previous one. 
Her experience shows that there are some systematic obstacles 
preventing people getting a new set of skills. On the one hand, there are 
some eligibility restrictions preventing enrolment in the free training 
courses offered by the Labor Exchange. On the other hand, these courses 
do not always provide the outcome expected initially, that is, of gaining a 
specific skill that is in demand in the current labor market.  
Lack of satisfactory jobs was often identified as a key aspect 
preventing a change in working position. Workers emphasized that low 
pay often comes with a high work load and distant job location: 
Offers are not good, they are offering positions where you have to work a lot, 
but the wage is very small. You have to work night shifts and double shifts too. 
Or they are offering jobs far away and you have to travel a long distance. 
Therefore, you will spend all your money on travelling. (Male, builder) 
Furthermore, single mothers were often pushed into part-time 
employment as they had to compromise between childcare and income 
because of inflexible working hours. Therefore, they had limited options 
for a full-time employment that could fit around their childcare 
responsibilities. It was an especially common problem. One interviewee, 
like a number of other single mothers, reported that she was forced to stay 
in part time employment because she did not feel that she had another 
choice: 
I am working part time, because I am always asking them to offer me a job that 
starts at 8am because I need to send my son to school. And they only offer me a 
full-time position that starts at 6am. And I can't start at 6am. And everywhere 
in agencies they are offering this time. Women that are my age, and have 
children are not able to start their work at 6am. Many are working 4 hours on 
one site, having a break, and going to another site. When I am in a bus, I can see 
all these women with grey faces, you can see them immediately. It is not a life. 
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Part-time employment for the single mothers inevitably meant immense 
financial restraints. Very often it jeopardized their livelihood. Therefore, 
people in this situation were looking for alternative means of support.  
Unofficial employment that supplements the official part-time 
employment is a very common strategy of coping. Jobs such as ‘cleaning 
the houses of rich people’ were one of the most common unofficial 
earnings. Unofficial employment is considered advantageous because it is 
tax-free. Also, it allows flexibility in a working schedule, which is a major 
issue for many working lone mothers who struggle to adjust their working 
schedules to the working hours of the institutions that their children 
attend during the day, especially school (majority of participants of this 
study had children attending schools and not child care facilities). 
Although such income has immediate financial benefits and is absolutely 
essential for survival of the families, it has serious negative consequences. 
Several respondents admitted that they have insufficient official work 
experience, as a significant part of their employment was unregistered. 
This will affect their prospect of a pension and financial wellbeing after 
retirement. Although, interviewees realized it, they did not feel like they 
have another choice, as they are focusing on fulfilment of the immediate 
needs of their families. 
Spending strategies: decisions, dilemmas and day-to-day sacrifices  
The pattern of spending across the sample was very similar. Spending on 
food and utility bills was often said to consume the total income of a 
household. Respondents often described their spending in the following 
way: ‘we are paying bills first, and everything else is going on food.’ It was 
repeatedly emphasized that during the winter season a significant part of 
total income is devoted to covering heating bills. Respondents who are 
renting property said that they are legally prevented from receiving 
compensation for heating even though their revenue for family members 
is below	 the	established national	poverty line. Families with school age 
children also identified the constant financial pressure experienced from 
the school related expenses and clothing needs of children. Neglecting the 
needs of adults of a family is a common approach taken by participants. 
Indeed, often parents, normally on their own cost, have to make harsh 
choices with regards to items that are conventionally considered 
necessities (Kempson, 1994; Middleton et al., 1997; Women's Budget 
Group, 2008). Commonly parents, particularly mothers, prioritize their 
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children's needs, especially in terms of providing adequate nourishment 
and clothing. Often, they decide to go without personal necessities in 
order to ensure that needs of their children are satisfied (Ghate and Hazel, 
2002). Attitudes such as ‘our biggest concern is our children, we are not 
important anymore’ or ‘I would rather buy nothing for myself, but I will 
get what is necessary for the children’ were dominant across the 
interviews within this study. Frequently, interviewees expressed 
uneasiness about their inability to satisfy their children's needs:  
It is more difficult when we need to buy clothes, then usually we are going to 
Humana (second hand shop) and buying something there. Even though our 
children are already at this age that they don't want to wear second-hand 
clothes, we are buying it there anyway. Then we are lying that we bought it from 
a good shop. (Female, name withheld, shop assistant) 
Items such as clothing for adult family members were as a rule identified 
as luxury items that were only occasionally purchased and exclusively in 
second-hand shops. Moreover, meeting basic needs for food was a 
constant struggle for those interviewed. Respondents also often had to 
compromise on their nutritional intake. A man who was working as a 
system administrator said: ‘we are limiting our food expenses as much as 
we can. We are buying discounted things. We are buying the cheapest 
products.’ Such limited spending on food rations is negatively affecting the 
nutritional needs of the participants: 
When I am in a shop, there are some products that I even will not look at 
because they are out of reach for us. I just look what have a bigger discount. We 
are not able to buy fruits as often as we want. I even was not able to buy cheese 
not so long ago, although my children really wanted it. We are eating modestly. 
Just basic, but it is enough for us. If I could, I would pay more attention to quality 
of the food. We became sort of vegetarians. We buy fish just at big celebrations. 
We would buy it more frequently if we could. (Female, teacher) 
Poor nutrition is likely to affect all people who live on a low income for 
more than a few months (Dowler et al., 2001; Seeley and Lobstein, 2004). 
Spending on food is considered to be the most flexible part of the 
household budget by many. Therefore, it is the most vulnerable part of 
household expenditure. Restricted food budgets for many mean poor diet 
and inadequate nutritional intake, either caused by intake of cheap, low 
quality food or a reduced quantity of consumed food, or both (Beresford 
et al., 1999; Seeley and Lobstein, 2004).  
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Furthermore, poverty has a strong impact on housing conditions 
(Reynolds et al., 2008; Tunstall et al., 2013). Low income leaves people 
with limited housing options. Moreover, it constrains people's ability to 
sustain their accommodation. The main concerns regarding housing 
repeatedly brought up by people living with low income include 
availability of affordable housing, a low quality of accommodation, 
inadequate living space and inability to pay housing costs (MRC, 2006).	
Similarly, in order to survive with given incomes, participants of this study 
had to compromise on the quality of housing. Commonly, respondents 
gave up conventional comfort in order to reduce spending on rent and 
bills. Some chose accommodation without facilities that are considered 
normal in the society, such as water and centralized heating systems. 
Others even decided to move to summer houses with very limited 
facilities, usually located out of the city, in order to minimize their 
spending on utilities and housing. 
Nevertheless, the ability to control the amount spent on some 
facilities, such as centralized heating, is essential for many. The winter 
season in the country usually starts in October and finishes in April. For 
people on low incomes, who live in accommodation that is connected to 
the central heating, this period of the year is the most challenging. A single 
mother who was working as a cleaner said, that ‘the most important thing 
is that we are able to control heating in this flat. Therefore, we are not 
using heating in order to save money. Otherwise I don't know what we 
would do.’ Fuel poverty was a big issue among the cohort. Many had to 
choose accommodation of poorer quality because they hoped to reduce 
their heating expenses. Another strategy of coping with high utility costs 
was merging households with close relatives, such as parents or siblings. 
However, this was often just a temporary solution. A number of 
respondents expressed dissatisfaction and concern about their housing. 
The poor quality of accommodation was one of the biggest concerns for 
many families in the sample. A full-time sales assistant, who lives in a 
home of four, said that her accommodation is not only unsatisfactory 
visually, but also endangers the health of her child. She revealed that: 
Furniture and kitchen equipment need to be renewed. We didn't have any 
redecoration for 20 years. It is in a pretty bad condition right now. Our roof is 
constantly leaking, it is cold, and my daughter is coughing all the time. 
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Parents expressed concern over raising children in their current 
accommodation because of its poor state. Factors such as structural 
defects, excess dampness and mold, insufficient insulation and excess 
cold, were commonly defined as the main issues. A male participant, who 
is working full-time in a private company, described the dreadful 
condition of a rented studio where he is living with his wife and two 
children aged six and one and a half: 
We even wanted to invite someone from television to look at our living 
conditions. But they refused to come. We have a horrible window, but we can't 
afford to change it. And the wall is horrible, mold everywhere. I don't know 
what to do, where to go to seek help. Our living situation is very harsh, and we 
are raising our children there. 
People reported their inability to invest in any form of home repair. Even 
though some faults in a house may be significant and may cause some 
health hazards, respondents have to make a sacrifice in order to make any 
change. One female participant spoke about the dilemma that she had to 
face on a daily basis. She had to choose whether to prioritize spending on 
food or maintenance of her house:  
My family needs more space. We are living in a one room apartment. My 
younger son needs to prepare his homework, so does my older one. The flat is 
in a wooden house, no one else is living in that house. Therefore, I have to heat 
it on my own. Heating is getting too expensive; to eliminate mold also costs 
money. And then you have to choose between buying means to eliminate mold 
or buying food to top up the empty fridge. And you don't know what to do. 
Therefore, maintenance of the house requires money and the quality of 
accommodation is very poor. And renovation is an unreachable option for us 
although we really need it. We have been renting this accommodation for a long 
time.  
When personal means are not enough 
With a few exceptions, the majority of the participants disclosed that they 
were not able to devote any of their family income to saving, even for 
emergencies: if someone from us would die, we even wouldn't have 
money for funeral, because we have absolutely nothing’ (Nurse Assistant, 
mother-of-one). Due to an absence of money set aside, low-income 
families often turn to borrowing and, therefore, tumbling into debts. For 
many participants of this study falling into debt was one of the most 
unpleasant experiences that could happen to them. Borrowing money, 
especially from non-family members, meant personal defeat and 
symbolized the last step before falling into ‘real’ poverty. Therefore, most 
116 Natalija Atas 
 
people tried to do everything in their power to avoid it. Consequently, 
some extreme savings techniques were a better option for many. Families 
chose to limit their family's intake of food instead of borrowing money. 
One of the participants said that ‘we had better eat less in order to avoid 
debts.’ A lone mother of two children who worked as a part-time manager 
revealed that she had to undermine the quality of even the most essential 
food products: ‘you are going to shop and looking for the cheapest 
products. When I am going to shop, I am never buying fresh bread, always 
discounted one. Because paying 2.50 litas (Euro 0.72) for a piece of bread 
is too expensive	for us.’ 
However, even though some people tried to minimize their spending 
as much as possible, they had to borrow money at the end of the month as 
their wages ran out. For some participants, it was a common practice to 
borrow some money a week short of the pay date in the end of the month 
and then give it back after getting their salary at the beginning of the next 
month. One interviewee called this situation ‘a vicious circle.’ 
Nevertheless, the people who were not able to survive by their own means 
and therefore had to borrow money often called it a ‘horrendous’ 
experience. It was disclosed that without extended family support, many 
would not be able to scratch out a living. Occasional or periodical support 
from family members, predominantly retired parents, is a common support 
structure identified during interviews. This support can be financial, but 
more often it is expressed through food or living arrangements. Food is 
commonly received from relatives living in villages where they are growing 
their own food. Other ways of dealing with the situation is the merging of 
the households of older and younger generations. There were some 
examples when younger families had to move in with their parents, usually 
retired mothers, in order to reduce their spending on housing and utility 
bills. 
The majority of interviewees identified the assistance from the Food 
Bank1 as the last resort that they approached in order to make ends meet. 
For many their decision to come to the Food Bank was determined by their 
limited income and inability to keep up with rising food prices. Some 
people reported that their household faced hardship after one of the 
breadwinners lost their job, had to downgrade to a part-time position or 
                                                      
1  Food Bank is a charitable NGO, collecting food donations and distributing them to 
people in need. It has been distributing food to a number of locations across 
Lithuania. 
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experienced a wage cut. Some said that the only thing that prevented them 
seeking help from the Food Bank earlier was lack of awareness of its 
existence and their eligibility for this support. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted that in-work poverty represents, or is, a 
struggle—and one that manifests itself in a number of ways. 
Consequently, in order to face this struggle, people living in poverty have 
to develop a strong agency emerging through robust willingness, 
resilience and resourcefulness. Nevertheless, their agency is often 
constrained by structural obstacles that prevent them from improving 
their living conditions. Working people who struggle to make ends meet 
appear to have rather pessimistic life outlooks. If some unemployed 
people may have hope that their life could improve once they find a job, 
working individuals often feel that they have exhausted their options. 
Therefore, individuals who participated in this study were rather 
skeptical about the potential for improvement of their well-being—and 
maybe rightly so. They had jobs, they worked hard, budgeted carefully, 
spent wisely (and rather modestly) but none of these things mattered. 
Although they exercised their agency to full measure, this failed to 
improve their chances of progression, and, therefore, did not count. They 
were convinced that they would not receive any substantial outside help 
because they did not matter. 
Qualitative analysis of realities and issues faced by the working poor 
takes this study to the heart of the phenomenon as it sheds light on issues 
that are rarely discussed and often concealed by statistics. It illustrates 
challenges faced by this group of people and shows the ways they deal 
with and adapt to the resulting situation. And, most importantly, it gives 
voice to a group of people that rarely get heard either in academic or 
political sphere in Lithuania. However, this study does not go without 
limitations. Even though interviews conducted for this study provided an 
important and unique understanding of experiences of those living in in-
work poverty, the interviewing process also had its shortcomings. Due to 
time, financial and access restrictions, the researcher was not always 
successful in building ‘a level of trust so that the participant feels safe 
enough to share’ (Dickson-Swift et al. 2007; 338). It is likely that some 
respondents withheld some relevant details that could potentially have 
contributed to an even better understanding of the issue. Even though 
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some authors have argued that lack of a closer relationship may actually 
increase the level of disclosure (Brannen, 1988; Patai, 199; Reinharz, 
1992), the author of this chapter believes that such strategies as 
organizing an introductory meeting prior to interviews or follow-up 
interviews could have helped to improve the quality of data obtained. 
Furthermore, whilst the sampling strategy (purposive-convenience) used 
in this study contributed to gaining access to people belonging to the 
group of the working poor, unintentionally, it excluded certain 
representative voices within the group (e.g. younger and older workers). 
In other words, every person who was identified as working poor and who 
agreed to participate in the research was included in the sample 
regardless of their demographic characteristics. Consequently, some 
demographic groups were not adequately represented. Future 
researchers would benefit from using quota sampling, which is 
characterized by more inclusive properties and would help to reveal 
experiences of people with a wider range of characteristics (such as age, 
gender, marital status, etc.). Also, future studies could expand the focus of 
the questionnaire and include a wider spectrum of questions, bringing up 
such themes as the way the working poor construct their identities or 
define and conceptualize poverty. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
IGOs' STRATEGIC FRAMEWORKS AND POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION IN MACEDONIA1 
Maja Gerovska Mitev 
INTRODUCTION 
The role and impact of international governmental organizations in the 
social policies of South East Europe has been widely discussed in the 
academic debates. Most notably, Deacon and Stubbs conclude that ‘no 
analysis of social policy is complete without the role of international 
actors being understood’ (2007; 238). In this respect, the case of 
Macedonia has been frequently added to this type of analysis, confirming 
that ‘the policy of excessive use of external financial and technical support 
prohibited customized and country specific reforms and agendas’ 
(Gerovska Mitev, 2007; 145). While such impact could be detected more 
on the central governmental level, international authority has been less 
visible in the local governance in Macedonia (Pickering, 2010). An earlier 
attempt to depict the type of influence of international organizations in 
social policy in Macedonia shows that it is more a regulative and 
institutional type of influence rather than the cognitive and discursive 
shifts that can be indicated (Gerovska Mitev, 2006). The analysis below 
focuses more on direct visible impacts in relation to International 
Governmental Organizations' (IGOs) impact on poverty reduction and 
measuring systems, in order to provide a general assessment about the 
effectiveness of specific IGOs' policy mechanisms and approaches to 
poverty and social exclusion. 
POVERTY TRENDS IN MACEDONIA 
Poverty as a socio-economic phenomenon has been on the rise since 
Macedonia's independence in 1991. More visible poverty reduction 
trends have been noticeable as of 2012, although the latest chosen 
methodology used for poverty measurement may not provide a realistic 
                                                      
1  Throughout the book, the official name ‘Macedonia’ is used. Just prior to 
publication, this was changed to ‘North Macedonia‘. 
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outlook. Systematic and comprehensive periodization of poverty trends 
and poverty profiles in Macedonia for the period 1991 – 2017 are 
hampered due to changes in methodologies and survey instruments of 
poverty measurement. 
In the period 1991 – 1996, the State Statistical Office did not 
measure poverty. For this period, there are World Bank assessments, 
which determine poverty as consumption below 60 percent of median 
annual adult equivalent. According to these estimates, poverty increased 
significantly in the period 1991 – 1996, from 4 percent of the population 
in 1991 to approximately 20 percent in 1996. More particularly, poverty 
increased sharply between 1993 and 1995, mainly because of a decline in 
real consumption. The incidence of poverty increased further between 
1995 and 1996, and analysis indicates that as real consumption remained 
roughly constant over this period, the main reason for poverty growth was 
growing inequality in the distribution of income (World Bank 1999, ii). 
The composition of poor people also changed during the transition 
period. In 1990, the majority of the poor resided in rural areas, in mixed 
(43 percent) or agricultural households (32 percent). In 1996, this 
changed, and although poverty was still predominantly rural, those with 
non-agricultural source of income represented the majority among the 
poor (66 percent). Additional groups that were affected by poverty during 
the first years of transition included: unemployed / social assistance 
beneficiaries; households headed by the employed; and younger 
household heads. Also, the number of children has a strong impact on the 
poverty status of a household. In particular, households with three or 
more children have the highest poverty rates relative to households of 
other family size and composition. These households comprised almost 
half of all the poor in 1996. Common factors among those experiencing 
poverty in this period were: low education attainment, labor force status, 
poor living conditions and vulnerable health status (ibid.; iii).  
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Figure 1 Growth of Poverty and Inequality, 1993 – 1996 
 
Source: World Bank, 1999 
According to the World Bank assessment (1999) the rise in inequality in 
the early transition years is a result of movements in the upper tail of the 
distribution of wages. The main reason behind growing wage inequality 
is the emergence of the private sector. Wages were far more unequally 
distributed in the private sector than in the public sector. Within each 
sector, education (though less so in the private sector) and inter-industry 
and occupational wage differences are also important in explaining the 
growing wage inequality (1999; 25). 
Official calculations of poverty in Macedonia have been initiated in 
1996, and the State Statistical Office has provided poverty data, based on 
the expenditure method, since 1997. During 1997 – 2010, the poverty line 
was defined as 70 percent of median equivalent expenditures. The choice 
of measuring poverty as 70 percent of median expenditure (not 
comparable with the international standard of 60 percent of the median) 
was a peculiar arbitrary policy choice at the time, which might have been 
connected also with the small sample of households obtained through the 
Household Budget Survey. According to Novkovska, the reasons for using 
expenditure rather than incomes as the basis for poverty calculation in 
Macedonia included: 
great variations in households' income, especially when salaries are received 
with delays up to few months; social transfers not reported by the households; 
households whose head works abroad, do not report the incomes received as 
private transfers; expenditures show greater stability over time; in the current 
social-economic conditions, the households' incomes are insufficient to cover 
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Throughout this period, poverty was on continual rise, reaching its peak 
in 2010 and 2011, with more than one-third of the population living 
below the poverty line. Most affected by poverty were: households with 
three and more children (with a poverty rate of 55.8 percent in 2010); 
children aged 0 to 6 (37.9 percent in 2010); children and households 
living in rural areas (43 percent and 47.1 percent respectively); as well as 
those without education or incomplete primary education (62.3 percent 
and 49.6 percent respectively). The alarming fact remains that during 
2004 – 2008, five years in which the country experienced continual real 
GDP growth of 4.7 percent to 6.4 percent, poverty decreased only 
negligibly, by 1.3 percentage points. This confirmed not only that 
economic growth does not benefit everyone in the society (already 
acknowledged by the rising income inequalities data), but also that the 
prevailing national economic approach—seeing growth as a panacea for 
unemployment and poverty issues—should be redefined and 
reconstructed.  
Figure 2 Relative poverty rate and poverty gap, by years* 
 
Source: State Statistical Office, MAKStat database, accessed April 2017 
*Source for calculation of relative poverty is Household Budget Survey. Poverty line is 
defined as 70 percent of median equivalent expenditures. Change between 2001 and 
2002 is mostly due to changes in the survey instrument and sampling methods (i.e. the 
introduction of daily recording sheets).  
The latest phase of poverty measurement in Macedonia started in 2010, 
when the State Statistical Office initiated the Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC), and changed the methodology for poverty 
measurement from expenditure to income-based (60 percent of median 
national equivalized income). This change was inspired by the country's 
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national statistical methodologies with the EU ones. However, the 
introduction of this measurement was very convenient for political 
reasons as well, as the income data showed lower poverty levels. While 
the new method showed a different poverty rate (21.5 percent in 2015), 
poverty profiles remained the same. Currently, the most vulnerable 
categories include: households of two adults with three or more 
dependent children (52.2 percent); unemployed people (39.7 percent); 
and those with children aged 0 – 17 (28.6 percent). 
Figure 3 At risk of poverty rate, 2010 – 2015, percent of the population 
 
Source: State Statistical Office, MAKStat database, accessed April 2017 
*Source for calculation of at-risk-of-poverty rate is Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions.  
Despite different methodological approaches used for measuring poverty, 
all of them seem to capture the same poverty profiles. However, increased 
statistical capacity to identify and measure poverty according to different 
methodologies is not fully utilized in the policy process. Despite well-
defined and identified statistical categories (at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion), they do not seem to be translated into targeted or tailor-made 
policy measures.  
NATIONAL POLICIES ON POVERTY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
Social policy creation in the first decade of Macedonian independence 
(1991 – 2000) was not evidence-based, and was predominantly focused 
on generic goals and declarative descriptions. During this period, social 
policy and social protection measures were not based on strategic 
documents nor on identified targets for improving the social profile of the 
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with the international financial organizations was among the leading 
reasons why certain prioritization and goals in the social sector were 
identified. Hence, some of the social objectives in the first transitional 
period included: 
placing key social sector programs on a long run fiscally sustainable path, 
increasing labor market efficiency by reducing labor market distortions 
inherent in social sector programs and the labor code, as well as reducing 
poverty by improving the quality of social sector programs and their targeting 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 1998)2.  
However, all this was not accompanied with quantifiable targets and 
impact assessments. One of the major obstacles towards this end was the 
lack of poverty data from the national statistical office based on 
harmonized international methodologies. In general, the main national 
instruments for tackling poverty were the social protection transfers, 
including social financial assistance, permanent financial assistance, as 
well as pensions. However, as these ‘passive’ transfers were not part of a 
more comprehensive or integrated policy approach for poverty 
alleviation, they have either negligibly improved poverty among 
vulnerable populations, or even created a ‘poverty trap’ for many of its 
beneficiaries.  
A first step towards more quantifiable and measurable social goals 
was the introduction of the poverty line in 1996. This again was done as 
part of the wider international support, and more particularly through the 
World Bank, which stated that ‘to equitably and efficiently target the poor, 
the borrower needs to establish a poverty line’ (World Bank, 1995; 9). 
First poverty calculations showed worrying results, with poverty 
reaching up to one-third of the population in the years 2002 and 2003. 
However, these calculations provided a good base for the creation of the 
first Anti-Poverty Strategy in the country in 2001. Of course, preparation 
of this Strategy did not result only from the sudden political will to tackle 
growing poverty trends, but was also an obligatory requirement for all 
countries using the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was a 
comprehensive document, involving a multi-disciplinary approach, as 
well as perceptions of people living in poverty. However, the document 
                                                      
2  Letter signed by the Minister of Finance and Minister of Labour and Social Policy 
accompanying 1998 Social Sector Adjustment Credit Project for the World Bank.  
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was adopted at the end of the term of the Government in power, and was 
not sufficiently addressed in the following years.  
The second decade of Macedonian independence is associated with 
an increase in strategic documents, operational and action plans, namely 
the soft legislation for tackling poverty. The Government adopted one more 
Poverty Strategy (the National Strategy for Reducing Poverty and Social 
Exclusion 2010, and its revised version in 2013). The newer strategic 
approach increased the focus from poor to socially excluded people. As in 
the past, the main shortcoming of these strategic documents was lack of 
precise budget allocations for their implementation. In Macedonia, the 
strategic documents in relation to poverty only serve to identify and update 
poverty profiles and trends. Direct measures for tackling poverty rely solely 
on the traditional social protection system, comprised of social financial 
assistance (the amounts not being sufficient to lift people out of poverty), 
and limited and underfinanced social service provision. 
On the whole, the Macedonian approach towards tackling poverty 
may be identified as strongly economically determined, as during the last 
two decades it was predominantly based on expectations that economic 
growth would deliver more jobs and hence reduce poverty. Even an 
examination of the latest budget items stipulated as anti-poverty 
measures shows that they are placed in the category—active labor market 
support. Lack of innovation and integrated policy approaches between 
the educational, health, employment and social protection systems left 
national anti-poverty policy without clear prioritization or goals. In 
addition, dependence on the international governmental organizations' 
(IGOs) financing as well as their political support, led to implementation 
of external policy proposals that were not rooted in the tradition, capacity 
and expectations of the social protection system. As a result, anti-poverty 
policy in Macedonia may be characterized as sporadic, inadequate and not 
evidence-based, producing continuing high rates of people experiencing 
poverty and ongoing social exclusion.  
IGOs' INSTRUMENTS AND AGENDAS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON 
POVERTY IN MACEDONIA 
National approaches to poverty and social exclusion showed a lack of 
capacity to look beyond the economic paradigm of poverty alleviation. 
Also, there was no readiness for innovation or social experimentation. 
This vacuum of comprehensive approaches related to poverty policy 
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brought the IGOs into play. While there is a large number of international 
agencies that have contributed with different support mechanisms to 
alleviating poverty, social inclusion and inequality in Macedonia, this 
chapter focuses only on three international actors whose instruments 
have continuously and substantially dominated the national social policy 
agenda. Their impact on poverty policy in Macedonia may be seen 
through: the introduction of direct financial transfers targeted towards 
low income families; support for the introduction of internationally 
harmonized methodology for poverty measurement; and setting of anti-
poverty goals on the national agenda. 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) and its impact on poverty among vulnerable 
households in Macedonia 
The implementation of the CCT program was initiated in 2010, as part of 
the World Bank Loan (IBRD, Loan no. 7735-MK). Among a number of CCT 
programs suggested by the World Bank (World Bank, 2007), the 
Government decided to go only with the CCT program for secondary 
education. Among others, this was convenient for them as a support tool, 
for the initiative of making secondary education obligatory, which was 
introduced in 2008 / 09. The CCT program is aimed at students in 
secondary education who come from households that are receiving social 
financial assistance (minimum income). The payment of 1,000 denars per 
month (or 12,000 denars per year) is given on the condition of regular 
attendance of at least 85 percent of the time during the school year. Monthly 
CCT in general is very low, considering real costs of schooling (i.e. transport, 
books, equipment, etc.). However, taking into consideration that the amount 
of social financial assistance is very low as well, this represents an 
important top-up for the beneficiary households with children in secondary 
education. As a comparison, the amount of the monthly CCT represents 20 
percent of the social financial assistance for a three-member household, and 
10 percent of the monthly minimum net wage. Hence, it is not much, but for 
some families it may represent important financial support. Personal 
stories of CCT beneficiaries indicate that this money was mostly spent for 
their school supplies, clothing, food and school excursions, which increased 
their confidence and most importantly decreased the family burden for 
these costs (World Bank, 2015).  
During the first years of its implementation (2010), there were 
around 9,100 children benefiting from this program, while in December 
2016 this number dropped to 4,348 beneficiaries. The decline corresponds 
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with the general decrease of the households' beneficiaries of the social 
financial assistance. According to the Bank's internal documents in 2016, 
this program had been evaluated as satisfactory, as it reached almost all of 
it targets. However, from Table 1, it may be seen that the attendance rates 
are little above the required level of 85 percent, enrolment is around 75 
percent (although secondary education is obligatory), and that not all 
eligible households (only 84 percent) have participated in the program.  
Table 1 Beneficiaries and Performance indicators of Conditional Cash 














Source: World Bank, 2016 
After seven years of its implementation, some important outcomes 
challenge the CCT program, particularly in relation to its visible impact 
among vulnerable students in secondary education. According to the 
comprehensive evaluation of the CCT program in Macedonia undertaken 
by Armand and Carneiro: ‘the CCT was successful in its central goal of 
improving secondary school enrolment among poor adolescents’ (2016; 
20). However, the evaluation also showed that the CCT program had: 
‘limited impact on school attendance, very mild impact on poverty as 
measured by household expenditure, and no significant effect in terms of 
relative school performance, defined as the end-of-the-year average 
grade of the students’ (2016; 40). These important results show that 
while on the micro level the CCT program may have improved the 
educational attainment among some beneficiaries, in general it has not 
contributed toward decreased poverty rate nor improved educational 
performance among children from low income households.  
These results are also in line with similar international evidence (Table 
2). CCTs as a policy program have been widely used and implemented in Latin 
America. In relation to educational outcomes, the evidence shows that the 
program has been effective in increasing school enrolment and school 
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attendance, as these were the explicit conditions and objectives of the 
program design. However, as indicated by Lomelí (2008), CCT is less 
successful in relation to effects on actual learning. Other studies have also 
shown that CCTs are unable to document positive results on learning, and 
that without effects on learning and quality of education, CCTs cannot be 
considered efficient (Villatoro, 2005; Morley and Coady, 2003). 












positive effect on 
learning. 
RPS* (up to 30 
percentage points 
increase in school 
enrolment; 
increased school 
enrolment of 22% 
among cohort aged 
7 – 13) 
No effects on school 
learning 




positive effect on 
learning 
FA* (up 5% rural, 
13% urban increase 
in school 
attendance) 
No effects on school 
learning 




positive results on 
school leaving, no 
positive effect on 
learning.  
PROP (increase in 
school enrolment of 
12% in transition to 
secondary, more for 
girls and for high 
school) 
PROP—Less 
significant effect on 
school enrolment in 
primary education 
because subsidies are 
concentered on the 
groups already in 
school; No effects on 
school learning 
Macedonia Strong impacts on 
school enrolment of 
children in 
secondary school 
age, but not impacts 
on school 
attendance. 
Strong impacts of 
paying the mother 
vs. the head of 
household on food 
expenditure at the 
end of the second 
year of the program. 
No significant effect in 
terms of relative 
school performance, 
defined as the end-of-
the-year average grade 
of the student divided 
by the average grade of 
all students in the 
same school program.  
Source: Lomelı́ (2008), Armand and Carneiro, 2016.  
*Red de Protección Social (RPS), Familias en Acción (FA), Progresa/Oportunidades 
(PROP) (Social Protection Network (RPS), Families in Action (FA), Progress / 
Opportunities (PROP). 
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The context and the baseline indicators in Macedonia differ from those 
where the CCT program was previously implemented. A report 
commissioned by the European Commission on the impact of CCTs on 
children indicates that: 
even if there might be a need for conditional transfer, when engaging in policy 
transfer, policy makers need to be careful in addressing differences in the 
institutional context, cultural context and policy context of these programmes in the 
country of origin and the country of destination (European Commission, 2014; 89). 
Taking into consideration the local profile of poverty among children, as 
well as social protection system specifics (i.e. take up, coverage, etc.), it 
may be argued that lack of a more visible impact of the CCT program in 
Macedonia is due to several factors: a) its explicit focus on social financial 
assistance households (instead of involving also community-based 
targeting); b) conditioning only the school attendance (instead of adding 
school performance as well); and c) low benefit, which does not lift 
households out of poverty. 
Other international organizations such as the EU and UNICEF were 
not visibly critical to the implementation of the CCT program in 
Macedonia, and have not provided alternative recommendations or 
proposals.  
Further redefinition of the CCT program or its replacements with a 
similar program is worth considering. Having in mind that the social 
assistance does not cover all people living in poverty or all low-income 
households, educational grants could be provided by schools who would 
apply for them, on behalf of enrolled children from low income families. 
In addition, municipalities can also play a role in this, providing assistance 
to those socially vulnerable households whose school-aged children are 
not in education. Also, a condition on school performance should also be 
attached, as to incentivize students to achieve more than just attending 
school. The top-up CCT benefit could also increase each school year, thus 
improving the household's chances to escape the cycle of poverty.  
In general, the CCT program is one of the most direct instruments 
related to poverty reduction the World Bank has applied in Macedonia. 
The majority of the Bank's projects in the social sector in Macedonia were 
focused on legislative and administrative reforms, thus having more 
macro impact on the general welfare agenda (i.e. pension reform with the 
introduction of the compulsory second fully funded pension pillar, 
unemployment assistance and redefinition of the criteria and duration of 
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its receipt, and the health sector). The main value of the CCT program in 
Macedonia may be seen in its integrated character (combination of social 
assistance plus education grant). Further restructuring of social 
assistance schemes in Macedonia should consider such an integrated 
approach, where low income households would benefit not only from a 
singular financial transfer, but from a ‘package’ based on their needs 
(basic benefit plus housing, health, education or similar grants or 
services). 
European Union 2020 agenda and its impact on measurement and renewed 
strategic approach towards poverty in Macedonia  
Macedonia gained the status of a European Union (EU) applicant country in 
May 2004, and candidate country in December 2005. During this period, a 
greater alignment of national legislation and policy approaches towards the 
EU style of tackling poverty was initiated. The contribution of the EU may 
be seen in extending the policy approach on poverty with a focus on 
improving social exclusion. This was particularly important for Macedonia, 
as official documents usually perceived poverty mainly through monetary 
and economic constraints (i.e. National Strategy for Economic Development 
of Macedonia, 1997). The first steps towards a different policy approach 
were undertaken as a result of the participation in the EU exercise of 
preparing a Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM). This is when Macedonia 
started to widen the strategic approaches towards vulnerable categories, to 
include not only those on low incomes, but other groups as well. Hence, in 
2004, Macedonia adopted the National program targeted at socially 
excluded groups, which, albeit somewhat arbitrary, defined four 
categories as socially excluded: drug users and their families; street 
children and their families; victims of family violence; and the homeless. 
These categories were identified on the basis of lacking more systematic 
and targeted support from the social protection system (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy, 2004). During the period 2005 – 2009, and in 
consultation with the European Union, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy prepared the National Strategy for Reducing Poverty and Social 
Exclusion (2010). This Strategy was revised and adopted three years later 
(2013), mainly to comply with the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. 
At the same time, the government also aligned its official poverty 
measurement methodology to correspond with the one used at the EU level. 
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Hence, as of 2010, the State Statistical Office undertook the Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC), on the basis of which it produced data 
related to poverty and social exclusion. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
previously used expenditure approach of measuring poverty may be more 
relevant for Macedonia, as a country with a significant share of informally 
employed (around 19.9 percent in 2015, according to the 2016 publication 
of LFS), the newly introduced poverty measurement methodology, as well 
as the obligation to regularly provide data to Eurostat, improved the 
quantitative and disaggregated data on poverty and social exclusion. The 
data was also used as a basis for the revised National Strategy for Reducing 
Poverty and Social Exclusion (2010 – 2020), where the national poverty 
target was set to be at or below 21.5 percent, to be achieved by 2020. 
However, the Strategy does not clearly indicate whether the target refers to 
those actually living in poverty and social exclusion, or to people living at 
risk of poverty.  
The contribution of the European Union may also be seen in its 
persistence in prioritizing poverty more visibly on the national agenda, 
both in the country economic pre-accession documents (i.e. Economic 
Reform Programme) and in the social policy pre-accession documents (i.e. 
Employment and Social Reform Programme). Also, in a context where 
access to data from official and administrative sources is complicated due 
to complex bureaucratic procedures, but also due to lack of timely and 
disaggregated data provision, the obligation to submit statistical data to 
Eurostat provides national researchers and policy advocates with a 
significant tool for comprehensive and evidence-based analysis. Hence, on 
child poverty, the State Statistical Office provides public data related only 
to children's gender and age, and also poverty among some household 
types (State Statistical Office, 2016). More disaggregated data related to 
child poverty may be easily accessed through Eurostat, which provides 
data on poverty among different household types, as well as according to 
different variables (income poverty, material deprivation, poverty and 
social exclusion, as well as children in (quasi-)jobless households. 
   
138  Maja Gerovska Mitev 
 










Source: Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_peps03 
&lang=en Accessed April 2017 
On the basis of Eurostat data for people living at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion by household type in 2015 (Table 3), it may be seen that in 
Macedonia, most at risk are children living in single parent households, 
whose poverty rate is 71.2 percent, closely followed by households with 
two adults and three and more children (65.9 percent). In addition, almost 
half of children aged 0 – 17 are at risk of poverty or social exclusion (Table 
4), while one third of children are affected with severe material 
deprivation. 
Table 4 Children (0 – 17) and whole population who are at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion (AROPE), at risk of poverty (AROP), severely 
materially deprived (SMD), or (quasi)-jobless (QJ), 2015, % 
  Children	0	–	17	 Whole	population	
AROPE AROP QJ SMD AROPE AROP QJ SMD
EU 26.9 21.1 9.3 9.5 23.7 17.3 10.6 8
MK 46.1 28.6 18 31.6 41.6 21.5 17.4 30.4
Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/da 
ta/database?node_code=ilc_mdm Accessed April 2017 
Comparison between different risks that children are facing (Table 5) 
shows that children in Macedonia are mostly affected by the risk of severe 
material deprivation (12.8 percent), followed by the risk of income 
poverty (7.3 percent). The risks faced by the children in the whole of the 
28 EU countries differ, as most at risk in the other EU states are those 
living at risk of income poverty (11.6 percent), followed by the risk of 
living in jobless households (3.7 percent). Also, while 9.4 percent of all 
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children in Macedonia suffer from all three problems (income poverty, 
material deprivation and living in jobless households), only 2.7 percent 
are faced with all three risks in the EU 28. 
Table 5 Intersections of Europe 2020 Poverty Target Indicators 
 
EU27	 MK	
Children (0 – 17) at risk of poverty but not severely materially 
deprived and not living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
11.6 7.3
Children (0 – 17) at risk of poverty, not severely materially 
deprived but living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
3.7 3.8
Children (0 – 17) at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived 
but not living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
3.0 8.0
Children (0 – 17) at risk of poverty, severely materially deprived 
and living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
2.7 9.4
Children (0 – 17) not at risk of poverty, not severely materially 
deprived but living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
2.1 3.4
Children (0 – 17) not at risk of poverty but severely materially 
deprived and not living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
3.1 12.8
Children (0 – 17) not at risk of poverty but severely materially 
deprived and living in a (quasi-)jobless household 
0.7 1.3
Children (0 – 17) neither at risk of poverty, nor severely materially
deprived nor living in a (quasi-) jobless household 
73.1 53.9
Children (0 – 17) suffering from ‘only’ one problem 16.8 23.5
Children (0 – 17) suffering from exactly two problems 7.4 13.1
Children (0 – 17) suffering from all three problems 2.7 9.4
Source: Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_pees0 
4&lang=en, and http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do 
Finally, the EU can also be credited for insisting on extending the focus on 
poverty policies in Macedonia from cash to include also community-based 
services. 
Notwithstanding the fact that ‘EU pressure is not sufficient to transform 
informal institutions and behavioral practices’ (Borzel, 2011; 13), it may still 
be argued that the EU accession process has provided additional sources of 
guidance and support towards a more comprehensive social policy 
orientation. More particularly, through the pre-accession instruments and 
processes, such as the former JIM exercise, as well as the Employment and 
Social Reform Program (ESRP), the EU is supporting more anticipatory, 
transparent and integrated social policy governance in the country. While 
such support is still not yielding the desired results, nonetheless it has 
encouraged more visible and straightforward political commitment towards 
comprehensive and integrated tackling of poverty and social exclusion.  
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United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and poverty setting in 
Macedonia  
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs—agreed in 2015) as well 
as the previous Millennium Development Goals (MDGs—agreed in 2000) 
offered national leaders an additional platform and further opportunities 
to commit to ending poverty. However, it is worth nothing that the MDG of 
eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, and the official measure for its 
assessment on the global level (i.e. less than US $1 a day) was not the most 
appropriate measure for the countries from the European continent. Also, 
the MDGs have been criticized as a retrenchment due to the ‘focus on 
targeting the poorest of the poor’ (Deacon, 2007; 77). 
Adoption of the first National Report on the Millennium 
Development Goals (2005) came at the time when Macedonia was using 
the expenditure method for poverty calculation. Hence the poverty target 
for Macedonia to be achieved by 2015 was set at 9.5 percent, which was 
simply constructed as halving the poverty rate from 1997 (19 percent). 
Regardless of the fact that the poverty target might not have been carefully 
planned and developed, it is important to note that this was the first 
document in which there was a quantified goal to reduce poverty. 
Previous documents, such as the National Strategy for Economic 
Development of Macedonia (1997), as well as the National Strategy for 
Poverty Reduction in the Republic of Macedonia (2002) did not identify a 
national poverty target, according to which progress could have been 
planned and measured. The second National Report on Progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals (2009) acknowledged the 
shortcomings in the setting of the poverty target in 2005, and 
recommended a redefinition ‘at an ambitious, but achievable level’ 
(UNDP, 2009; 24). Due to the change in poverty measurement 
methodology, progress towards achievement of the national MDG target 
is not possible. Although poverty has not been halved, it did decline by 5.5 
percentage points in the period 2010 – 2015. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN 
Agency with the mandate on a global level to monitor the progress 
towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Yet, the 
UNDP country office in Macedonia has not succeeded in pushing this 
agenda more vigorously on the national level. While the UNDP country 
office was more successful in relation to self-employment and activation 
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support of Governmental policies, they have not been as visibly successful 
with their poverty and social inclusion portfolio.  
The SDGs, agreed in 2015 and due to be achieved by 2030, enhance 
the previous MDG framework by adding more goals and targets. Deacon 
and St. Clair (2015) noted that, in relation to poverty, the most important 
addition relevant for the policy context may be SDG target 1.3: ‘Implement 
nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, 
including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and 
the vulnerable’ (UN, 2015). This explicitly provides a number of 
opportunities for restructuring the social protection system, including the 
introduction of the national adjusted basic income, accompanied with 
social protection support.  
The first phase of national consultations related to the SDGs has 
resulted in a Report on ‘Gap Analysis in Addressing the Sustainable 
Development Goals into the National Strategic Documents of the Republic 
of Macedonia.’ This preliminary document (November 2016) indicates 
that the ‘SDG targets 1.2; 1.3; 1.4 and 1.5 are a priority, while the SDG 
target 1.1 needs localization of the global indicators’ (Government of 
Republic of Macedonia, 2016; 6). 
However, this preliminary document does not provide data related 
to allocated resources for achieving the identified challenges and targets, 
nor do any other publicly available documents. Analysis undertaken by 
Chongcharoentanawat et al. (2016) for five low and lower-middle income 
countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America, show that budget 
implications for achieving the SDGs in the areas of income poverty, health 
and education will have a different magnitude in different countries. In 
addition, they find that, ‘high expenditure does not equal high outcomes, 
as efficiency also plays an important role’ (2016; 19). 
Overall, the UN strategic framework for poverty reduction through 
the MDGs has been beneficial for Macedonia in relation to advocating and 
pushing forward a measurable target of the poverty policy. The renewed 
SDG agenda, particularly SDG 1.3, provides additional external impetus 
for instigating much needed restructuring of the traditional social 
protection system in Macedonia, along the principles of ensuring 
adequate incomes and integrated social service provision. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The case of Macedonia shows that IGOs have a significant contribution to 
make towards promoting, incentivizing and supporting instruments, 
measurements and goal-setting for countries to tackle poverty and social 
exclusion. In countries where the welfare state does not have a strong 
tradition, and where economic conditions are limited, initiatives coming 
from IGOs related to social measurement and target-setting encourage 
more measurable and accountable social policy making. On the basis of 
this, we can identify an additional form or dimension of global social 
policy making, a ‘global social measurement,’ that is complementary with 
the other three global social policy mechanisms identified by Deacon—
regulation, redistribution and rights (Deacon with Hulse and Stubbs, 
1997; Deacon, 2000). 
On the whole, national approaches to tackling poverty and social 
exclusion in Macedonia have failed to prioritize identified poverty 
profiles, and have been unsuccessful in making the welfare system more 
effective in tackling poverty. Lack of clear poverty priorities and goals led 
towards the adoption of instruments offered by the IGOs that were not of 
highest priority for tackling poverty, nor did these instruments have much 
identified impact on poverty. The main factors that have contributed 
towards the lack of success of different IGO instruments in improving 
poverty trends in the country could be described as their limited coverage 
and design, low benefit level, the lack of integration with the general social 
protection scheme, a lack of enforcement on the national level, as well as 
the fact that most of them are partial solutions. Therefore, countries with 
higher poverty rates require a policy of prioritization of the most 
impoverished categories, rather than sustaining generic or non-
integrated poverty instruments. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
BETWEEN MODERN DESIGN AND OLD POLITICAL HABITS: 
THE KOSOVAR PENSION SYSTEM UNDER THREAT  
Igor Guardiancich 
INTRODUCTION 
Kosovo falls within the broader family of Mediterranean welfare states 
that are characterized by GDP per	 capita levels lower than in most 
advanced political economies, relatively underdeveloped social 
protection, a higher proportion of the population at risk of poverty, and 
higher levels of economic inequality. 
These states share common socio-economic and historical idiosyncrasies: 
Late industrialization, labor market segmentation and a large shadow economy, 
a recent memory of colonial rule or non-democratic regimes and weak central 
states with ineffective public bureaucracies have implications for the funding, 
structuring and functioning of welfare states (Gal, 2010: 283). 
They are, moreover, characterized by three dominant cultural traits: a 
prominent role of religion, the traditional family and patron-client relations. 
All of these are present in Kosovo. However, due to the presence of 
the international community following the conflict with Serbia in 1998—
99, under the aegis of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) acting as an international civilian administration, 
several social security institutions have been externally imposed.  
One of them is the multi-pillar pension system, designed by 
consultants funded by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), with involvement from representatives of UNMIK, 
the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, the UK's DFID (Department for International Development) 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO).  
Its zero pillar—a universal non-means-tested basic pension for the 
whole resident population aged 65 and above—is an administratively 
very simple system, created to supplant the country's adverse labor 
market conditions. Its universal character is unique within the 
Mediterranean cluster. Here, pension schemes usually display extreme 
fragmentation (for example, in Italy there were dozens of micro-schemes), 
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itself the result of clientelistic party competition, which thrives on the 
targeting of specific groups in exchange for political gain (Ferrera, 1996).  
As the international community gradually withdrew after Kosovo 
declared independence in 2008, so-called benefits clientelism, i.e. the 
exchange of monetary rewards for political support (Taborda, 2017), 
started affecting all publicly financed sectors. A number of special pension 
schemes have proliferated, and benefits to narrow constituencies, in	
primis the independence war veterans, have ballooned. These represent 
one of the most burdensome legacies of the Yugoslav wars that several of 
the countries involved in the conflicts still have to bear (Bartlett, 2013; 
Guardiancich, 2013). 
Consequently, the new schemes and soaring benefits attracted harsh 
criticism from the IMF (2015; 2016), which demanded cutbacks to comply 
with the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) agreed in 2015. Despite the early 
admonishments, the Ministry for Labor and Social Welfare proposed to 
partly dismantle the universal basic pension in order to free up resources 
to finance these additional schemes. The draft legislation included the 
introduction of means testing (and, possibly, a separate administrative 
unit), which would weaken the pension system's Beveridgean objectives. 
As retrenchment of welfare schemes is often a politically risky affair 
(Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1994), this contribution explains why such a 
universal and efficient scheme has been targeted to free up resources. 
Drawing on up-to-date literature on blame avoidance and employing 
official documents as well as interviews with practitioners, the study 
shows that the low political salience of Kosovar basic pensions makes 
them vulnerable to potential cuts. By definition, the universal scheme can 
be used for benefits clientelism only at a high cost (by disbursing rewards 
to everyone) and with uncertain results (as there is no or excessively 
widespread targeting). Consequently, they represent a ‘path of least 
resistance’ to free up readily available resources (Bonoli, 2012).  
This chapter argues that the Labor Ministry's planned intervention 
is unnecessary, potentially harmful to the poorest strata of the elderly 
population and out of touch with Kosovo's socio-economic reality. In 
response, the author recommends a radical change in reform strategy.  
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THE KOSOVAR PENSION SYSTEM: GENESIS, DESIGN AND EVOLUTION 
There are several reasons why Kosovo underpinned its multi-pillar 
pension reform with a universal non-means-tested pension. Specific 
problems relative to the Yugoslav pension system and the conflict 
rendered the existing institutions unusable (Gubbels et al., 2007). More 
importantly, the unfavorable labor market conditions hardly allowed for 
the ab	ovo introduction of contributory pensions. Finally, a lack of trust in 
Kosovo's newly established political institutions prompted the 
international community to lock in the reforms as quickly as possible. 
Starting with the historical legacies, Kosovo inherited unviable 
retirement institutions. The Serbian 1990 Labor act for extraordinary 
circumstances dismissed 145,000 Kosovar Albanians from civil 
administration posts, public services, and economic enterprises. The 
Yugoslav pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system covered fewer than half of the circa 
110,000 persons over the age of 65. Moreover, during the conflict, not only 
almost half of the population was displaced, but also the Serbian 
authorities stopped paying benefits to ethnic Albanians. Finally, during 
the NATO intervention, a cruise missile and the ensuing fire partly 
destroyed the contributory records of working age Kosovars.  
The extremely precarious situation of the labor market affected the 
pension system's design (see Table 1). Given the low employment and 
high unemployment rates, few regularly contribute to the social security 
system and many suffer from contributory gaps. 
Table 1 Labor market indicators for Kosovo (2012 – 14), in % 
  2012	 2013	 2014	
Employment	rate	total	(20	–	64)	 29.7 33.0 31.3
Employment	rate	men	(20	–	64)	 46.6 51.5 48.4
Employment	rate	women	(20	–	64)	 12.4 14.9 14.5
Unemployment	rate	total	 30.9 30.0 35.3
Unemployment	rate	men	 28.1 26.9 41.6
Unemployment	rate	women	 40.0 38.8 33.1
Source:	Eurostat. 
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The magnitude of the phenomenon increases when own-account and 
family workers are included in the picture (some 31.8 percent of all 
employed persons in Kosovo in 2014, according to Eurostat). These 
groups often lack social security coverage and proper labor and fiscal 
records. 
In sum, Kosovo has a large informal economy, which provides the 
means for self-subsistence to the population but limits the access to 
formal types of social insurance and reduces government revenues. 
Several reasons account for the large levels of informality (Krasniqi and 
Topxhiu, 2012).  
First, the demographic composition of the population is anomalous 
in the European context. According to the 2011 census (KAS, 2013), over 
47 percent of the population was younger than 25, leading to an estimated 
35,000 new job seekers each year, which the labor market cannot absorb 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). Hence, in the late 2000s, social security did 
not cover up to two-thirds of workers.  
Second, the characteristics of post-socialist transition economies 
(the rapid distancing from self-management and low salaries in the 
formal economy) generate informality. The Kosovar informal sector's size 
was estimated at 27 – 35 percent of GDP in 2004 – 2006 (Schneider, 
Buehn and Montenegro, 2010). 
Finally, Kosovo witnessed large-scale outflows of working-age 
people due to the conflict and economic difficulties. So, remittances and 
visits by members of the diaspora support families, seasonally boost 
consumption, but at the same time make it difficult to identify households 
in need and distort the structure of fiscal revenues (Feher et al., 2016).  
In sum, the autonomous province had too fragile welfare institutions 
to build upon and a dysfunctional labor market. Additionally, Kosovar 
leaders were not eager to re-implement the Yugoslav pension system, as 
it was associated with the repression of the Milošević period. Under such 
conditions, the international community designed a set of original social 
policies: the basic pension was the first law passed by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in the newly created Kosovo 
Assembly. 
The UN administration had very little trust in the newly established 
Kosovar institutions, including the PISG (Héthy, 2005). The IMF feared 
that the reforms would have been probably debated, delayed and altered 
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had Kosovo not been under international governance (Gubbels et al., 
2007). Hence, legislation was passed before a Kosovar government was in 
place, thereby ensuring independence from local political involvement 
(Cocozzelli, 2009). 
On the one hand, the international community's concerns were not 
unfounded: despite the efforts to develop a responsible and accountable 
administration, only those parts insulated from political influence did not 
suffer from low competence or develop extensive patronage networks 
(Skendaj, 2014). Similarly, it was expected that pensions, once the 
authority was definitively transferred to the PISG, would have become 
vehicles for benefits clientelism. On the other hand, the hasty adoption 
generated tensions between social welfare reforms that are still 
unresolved. 
The current design 
The current pension system is the result of several amendments, the latest 
one through the 2014 Law no. 04 / l-131 on pension schemes financed by 
the state. Originally, the multi-pillar design was simpler, a textbook 
version of what was advocated by the World Bank (1994) in the 1990s. It 
consisted of a first pillar comprising a universal basic old-age pension and 
a disability pension narrowly focused on total and permanent disability, a 
second mandatory fully-funded defined-contribution contributory pillar, 
managed by the Kosovo Pension Savings Trust (KPST) and voluntary 
private third pillar schemes. 
Focusing on state-financed pensions, the 2017 budget covered 12 
different schemes, meaning that the system's fragmentation has been 
rising in recent years. This trend fits perfectly with what the literature on 
the clientelistic political competition in the Mediterranean welfare cluster 
predicts (Ferrera, 1996; Gough, 1996). Additionally, two schemes are not 
yet active (the work disability pension and the family pension) for 
budgetary reasons. The IMF (2015) has been extremely critical of their ill-
conceived design and unsound targeting. Table 2 gives a succinct 
description. 
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Table 2  Selected Kosovar old-age and disability pension schemes 
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Source: Feher et al. (2016; 32). 
Two old-age pension schemes constitute, together, the Kosovar zero pillar 
(using more recent World Bank terminology, see Holzmann and Hinz, 
2005). The basic age pension is still a tax-financed universal flat benefit, 
covering all citizens aged 65 and over, who do not qualify for other budget-
financed schemes and who are residents of Kosovo. 
Individuals have to report to an office designated by the Ministry at 
least every six months to qualify for continuous benefit receipt. The 
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare administer the plan. Between its 
inception in 2002 and the end of 2015, the scheme has become more 
generous (benefits increased from 28 to 75 Euro / month) and 
beneficiaries climbed from 93,000 to 132,000. 
Until 2015, the Ministry of Finance annually determined the pension 
benefit, based on the minimum consumption food basket. Indexation was 
unsystematic (neither linked to prices, wages or GDP) and conditional on 
the budget. With the Law no. 04 / l-131, the Finance Minister is still in 
charge and again determines the amount depending on the budget and 
 The Kosovar Pension System under Threat 153 
the inflation rate. The cost of the program in 2015 was a bit less than 2.1 
percent of Kosovar GDP, that is, circa 11 percent of total Government's 
expenditures and circa 40 percent of all expenditures on social 
contributions and benefits, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3  Selected national and government accounts 
 2010 2011 2012	 2013 2014 2015
GDP	(million	€)	 4,402.0 4,814.5 5,058.7 5,326.6 5,567.5 5,771.5
GDP	per	capita	(€) 2,480 2,672 2,799 2,935 3,084 3,258
Govt	revenues	(%	
of	GDP)	
25.9 27.2 27.3 25.5 24.2 29.6
Govt	expenditure	
(%	of	GDP)	
27.7 28.3 28.6 28.0 27.2 27.9
Social	protection	spending
—as	%	of	GDP	 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.3 5.1 5.3
—as	%	of	govt	exp. 14.1 12.9 13.7 15.3 18.7 19.0
Source:	KAS (2016). 
The contributory pension was introduced in 2007 (Decision of the 
Government no. 13 / 277), in part due to the pensioners' dissatisfaction 
with a basic pension that does not take into account previous 
contributions (arguably some of the old records are intact) (Loxha, 2012). 
It is budget-financed and targeted to citizens aged 65 and over with at 
least 15 years of contributions prior to 1999 into the social security 
scheme of Yugoslavia (Table 4). 
Here as well, benefits and beneficiaries increased over time. In 2008, 
it amounted to a top-up of 35 Euro / month over the basic pension 
disbursed to circa 28,000 pensioners. In 2015, the over 40,000 eligible 
individuals were entitled to a flat benefit of 140 euros, with the same 
residence and administrative procedures in place as for the basic pension. 
The total budgetary cost amounted to almost 1.2 percent of GDP. 
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Table 4  Basic and contributory pension indicators 
	 Basic	age	pensions	
Year	 No. retirees Monthly rate % of per capita GDP Annual budget (mio €)
2010	 109,585 €45 21.8% 63.641
2011	 107,145 €45 20.2% 61.192
2012	 113,043 €50 21.4% 69.204
2013	 117,042 €60 24.5% 87.340
2014	 125,883 €75 29.2% -
2015	 132,000 €75 27.6% -
	 Contributory	pensions	
Year	 No. retirees Monthly rate % of per capita GDP Annual budget (mio €)
2010	 30,641 €80 38.7% 30.900
2011	 32,415 €80 35.9% 31.670
2012	 34,722 €101 43.3% 42.038
2013	 36,015 €112 45.8% 49.413
2014	 38,651 €140 54.5% -
2015	 40,365 €140 51.6% -
Source:	KAS (2016). 
In 2014, there have been several changes to the contributory pension. 
First, various non-contributory periods count towards eligibility, such as 
years of work in the parallel health, education and other sectors in Kosovo 
between 1989 and 1999. Second, all eligible beneficiaries are granted an 
extra 25 years of notional earnings history, rewarded with a 0.5 percent 
increase per service year. So, the benefit increased to 158 Euro / month as 
of 2016. Third, there will be benefit differentiation according to the 
individual beneficiary's education attainment to restore some of the lost 
earnings-related nature via a proxy. 
International comparison 
Given Kosovo's status as a lower-middle income country and labor market 
problems, the situation begged for a different approach to its pension 
system than in the rest of the post-socialist countries. Kosovar reforms are 
part of a wider trend, where contributory pensions are combined with 
non-contributory ones (the basic pension), to increase coverage in 
developing countries with large informal labor markets (ILO, 2017). 
Universal non-means-tested pensions are perceived to have many 
advantages over targeted ones. They are	‘probably the best way to provide 
poverty relief to the elderly. Considering the difficulty of identifying who 
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among the elderly is poor, the principal merit of the program is that its 
universality avoids the targeting issue’	(Holzmann and Hinz, 2005; 95).  
Such unconditional schemes are, however, rare (see Willmore, 
2007). Kosovo is the only transition post-socialist country that adopted 
one. Additionally, the basic pension stands out in international 
comparison due to a number of features. If the qualifying age is average 
(it ranges from a low of 60, e.g. in Mauritius, to 75 in Nepal), Kosovo is the 
only country where current residency is the only additional requirement. 
Elsewhere, the prospective beneficiary has to demonstrate to either have 
resided there for a number of years, to be a citizen or both. 
Regarding the coverage, the Kosovar basic age pension has slightly 
expanded in the past few years, thereby paying benefits to circa 7.4 
percent of the population in 2015. This is relatively high in international 
comparison: in the mid-2000s, only New Zealand and Mauritius 
registered more beneficiaries.  
In terms of costs, the Kosovar basic age pension has been often 
depicted as excessively generous. Initially, benefits totaled 45 percent of 
per	capita GDP, higher than the recommended and non-distortionary 15 – 
20 percent (Palacios and Sluchynsky, 2006). However, the benefit being 
adjusted ad	hoc, its value has fluctuated substantially; at times, it has not 
distanced itself excessively from the recommended values (see Table 4). 
With regards to administrative costs, Kosovo's plan, despite being 
the least expensive per member in absolute terms, is relatively inefficient 
when costs are adjusted for income (Sluchynsky, 2009). That is surprising, 
given that operationally it is the simplest program: a) it pays a flat benefit 
to an easily discernible group; b) the civil register identification is the sole 
and sufficient proof of identity, age and residence; c) disbursement of all 
payments happens through an automated centralized process with a 
combination of easy-to-read bank coverage maps, joint account options 
and complementary mobile bank services. 
Clientelism and fragmentation 
The brief Kosovar political experience is replete with instances of 
clientelistic party competition, which manifests in all its forms such as 
benefits, patronage, and corruption. With regards to benefits clientelism, 
the government of PM Hashim Thaçi (2008 – 14) of the Democratic Party 
of Kosovo (PDK) increased public sector wages and all non-contributory 
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pensions by some 25 percent prior to the 2014 elections, at the expense 
of public investment projects. The hike in old-age retirement benefits 
alone cost the budget more than 40 million Euro in 2015, and the annual 
bill is bound to increase to 66 million by 2017. The move has to be seen as 
a one-off event, as its cost was excessive and the targeted population too 
heterogeneous. 
Thaçi, now Kosovo's President, and a (former) member of the inner 
circle of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the PDK constituted from 
its political wing, made sure the subsidization of veterans was high on the 
agenda. In particular, the Kosovar Assembly passed Law no. 03 / L-100 on 
the pensions for Kosovo Protection Corps members in 2008, Law no. 04-
L-84 on pensions for members of the Kosovo Security Force in 2012 (the 
KPC, later KSF, were the civilian successors to the KLA) and Law no. 04-L-
261 on Kosovo Liberation Army veterans in 2014. 
In each case, the IMF has been extremely critical. The KPC and KSF are 
non-contributory, earnings-related, final salary schemes, whose eligibility 
is relaxed and benefits generous (members can retire as early as 45 / 50 in 
KPC / KSF, and benefits are not lower than 50 / 60 percent of the final 
salary). Worse even, the war veterans' pension (plus additional benefits 
paid to KLA war invalids, martyrs' families and the families of civilian 
victims of the war) was set to become the most expensive special benefit 
program in Kosovo, due to its generosity, ease of access and extension, 
thereby exacerbating the safety net's inequities (Feher et al., 2014; 18 – 23).  
Although the government led by PM Isa Mustafa of the Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK), in coalition with PDK, vowed to cap veteran benefits 
at 50 million Euro in the 2017 budget, these have soared to almost double 
that. The main reason, again in line with theoretical expectations, is that over 
46,000 people are eligible, which more than doubles the IMF's initial estimate 
of 18,000. The number swelled partly because the paramilitary organization 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) was LDK's military wing, 
which also requires its share of the welfare pie, in fierce (and bloody) 
competition with the KLA. Such cronyism spurred the protests of senior 
members of the War Veterans' Association, which complained that the list 
includes people who never saw the front lines, thereby enabling associates of 
both ruling and opposition parties to claim welfare (Quirezi, 2016). 
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Dismantling the basic pension 
The costly fragmentation of the Kosovar pension system obviously 
requires additional resources, which could be carved out from schemes 
that are ill-suited to be further exploited as a source of benefits 
clientelism, such as basic pensions. As cutting welfare is politically costly, 
a rich literature sprung up in the mid-1990s, explaining that reforms 
nonetheless succeed when politicians successfully deploy blame-
avoidance strategies. These include obfuscation (through the low 
visibility of cutbacks), division (creating a wedge between otherwise 
homogeneous groups), compensation (ranging from direct financial pay-
outs to exclusion from reforms) and justification tactics (convincing the 
public of the reforms' necessity) (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1994; Green-
Pedersen, 2003).  
Plenty of governments, e.g. Berlusconi in Italy or Juppé in France in 
the mid-1990s, have been wrecked by public opposition to welfare cuts. 
When losers to a proposed change are veto players, a government may 
search for viable options instead of using blame avoidance. By choosing 
the safer path of least resistance, the costs are concentrated on marginal 
groups, such as widows, younger pensioners, temporary workers, etc. 
These groups are less likely to mobilize effectively, especially when 
complementary reforms are pursued through long phasing-in periods and 
liberalization at the margin. 
Given the basic age pension's cost, universalistic objectives and 
particular demographic characteristics, the scheme offered a path of least 
resistance to retrenchment. Indeed, during the spring of 2016, the 
Kosovar Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare started a process that would 
have turned the universal scheme into an income-targeted scheme.  
This chapter contends that this was an ill-conceived reform, and that 
the policymaking process was deeply flawed. The few gains achieved 
would likely be offset by the appearance of horizontal leakages and 
increased administrative costs. Consultation with civil society and the 
social partners almost did not take place. The scope of changes 
presumably exceeded those allowed by the chosen procedure. In addition, 
the content did not take into consideration any priorities other than 
redirecting the liberated funds towards politically more profitable 
schemes (KSI, 2016).  
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The proposed changes 
A 2016 Concept Paper of the Labor Ministry envisaged three scenarios 
regarding the future of tax-financed pensions in Kosovo (Government RK, 
2016). The no-reform scenario was deemed to be unfair. First, the basic 
age pension continues to be paid out to Kosovar citizens permanently 
living abroad (10 – 15,000 people) due to excessively lax residence 
requirements and to pensioners having additional sources of income, as 
there is no means test. Second, Kosovar citizenship as an eligibility 
criterion may be in breach of the European coordination regime (e.g. 
Regulation 883 / 2004) of social security schemes; hence, a better 
solution than bilateral agreements should be legislated. 
An alternative scenario was to draft a new law regulating all pension 
and disability schemes financed by the state with a single bill. This would: 
a) introduce nuanced disability scales on which to calculate invalidity 
benefits; b) create a separate administration for all non-contributory 
Kosovar schemes (including the special ones for veterans, for the blind 
etc). The new administration would have a one-stop-shop in each Kosovar 
municipality. Although a new law was the preferred solution, the 
shortages in trained staff, time constraints, a dire labor market situation 
and the many uncovered citizens with disabilities (only 20 out of 200 
receive a benefit) would make the solution exceed budgetary capabilities. 
Hence, the favored option became amending the Law no. 04 / l-131. 
The basic age pension would be replaced by a social age pension, with 
substantially different characteristics. It is means-tested and implicitly 
taxed at a rate of 100 percent (so if one's income is less than the social 
pension, one receives just the top-up). Second, both Kosovar and foreign 
citizens can draw benefits, provided that they have resided in Kosovo for 
the past 10 years (and the last five as permanent residents). The benefit 
becomes non-exportable abroad in the absence of a bilateral agreement. 
The law would also regulate the main procedures, documents and 
requirements for the Labour Ministry to monitor the residence and 
income requirements. Additionally, the criteria for the application to a 
disability pension would be clarified. 
Substance flaws 
Two of the proposed reform's objectives are particularly problematic. 
First, the creation of an independent administrative body vis-à-vis 
keeping the Department for Pension Administration (DAP) within the 
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Labor Ministry clearly duplicates capacity. It is advisable to ‘piggyback’ on 
existing administrative structures, as several countries tend to centralize 
and automatize social security procedures and communication. For 
example, in Latin America, only Paraguay is reported to have an 
independent directorate in charge of non-contributory pensions. The 
others either manage them through the institutions responsible for the 
contributory pension system or for social assistance (Rofman, Apella and 
Vezza, 2015). Given the lack of trained staff and the unenviable record of 
patronage, the new administration would be used to appoint cronies and 
it is likely that there would be few administrative improvements (Skendaj, 
2014).  
Second, the introduction of an eligibility test takes away the core 
function of universal poverty alleviation. Introducing a generic means test 
is, in the Labor Ministry's conception, akin to linking the basic pension to 
the generic social assistance scheme, which have the same purpose but 
apply different eligibility criteria (according to the Ministry, the pension 
ones are soft and prone to abuse, whereas those related to social 
assistance are hard and solid) (Government RK, 2016).  
A targeted system may reduce fiscal costs, it is horizontally more 
equitable (people who do not need a service / benefit do not get it) and 
the political support can be higher than for universalism (Grosh and Leite, 
2009; Korpi and Palme, 1998). At the same time, however, it requires a 
complex and expensive targeting system, which, depending on the type 
(income, pension, proxy, etc.) has its own administrative, efficiency and 
equity problems. Although there have been advances in targeting in the 
past decades, this chapter advises against an ex-ante income test beyond 
testing against other pension benefits.  
First, the experience with social assistance in Kosovo1 is deemed to 
be relatively positive in terms of efficiency, but there are coverage gaps, 
e.g. poor children are excluded (Roelen and Gassmann, 2011). That 
several categories of the elderly fall off the income-tested scheme might 
have severe consequences on individual well-being. During the 1996 
crisis in Russia, various households lost their entitlement to a public 
pension. Despite income replacement strategies, the event increased the 
                                                      
1  Social assistance benefits are targeted towards poor families on the basis of a 
hybrid form of targeting, including categorical targeting, a proxy-means (asset) 
and means (income) test. 
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probability of men dying from all causes within the next two years by five 
percent (Jensen and Richter, 2004). 
Second, strengthening the residence test and the coherence of the 
pension system is likely to better improve financial sustainability. As 
means testing in Kosovo is problematic due to economic informality and 
large inflows of remittances, the required administrative capacity is 
substantial, and the operating costs are likely to partly offset the 
prospective savings. 
Third, if testing against other pension income is sensible, general 
income and other means testing creates inactivity and poverty traps. The 
likely consequences are to severely limit gainful employment or self-
employment in retirement and to create tangible disincentives for 
younger, lower income workers to save or formalize their employment 
status. 
Lack of consultation, illegitimate procedures, political motivation 
The amendment of Law no. 04 / l-131 affects every Kosovar citizen. As 
such, the revision should include an encompassing consultation process 
with civil society actors, thereby aiming at reaching consensus. Instead, 
the procedure has involved mainly the Labor Ministry staff and external 
(domestic and international) consultants. Public consultations lasted one 
week only from 22 to 29 January 2016 (Government RK, 2016). 
Furthermore, the legal procedure applied by the Labor Ministry's 
working group was probably unsuitable. The amending and 
supplementing process allows for a maximum 40 percent change of a law. 
Exceeding that, a new law should be drafted. Although the number of 
articles affected falls within the remit, the amendment radically changes 
the nature of the basic age pension, which makes the procedure de	facto	
inadequate (KSI, 2016). 
Finally, the stated motives behind the proposed legislation were to 
harmonize the basic age pension to social assistance and to generate fiscal 
savings. Such policy objectives neither take into account the raison	d'être 
of the Kosovar zero pillar, which is to protect from poverty, nor reveal that 
the funds would fuel well-targeted benefits clientelism. Rather candidly, 
the Finance Ministry inserted into the Concept Paper the 
recommendation to employ the saved funds to finance the family and 
work disability schemes that were legislated in 2014 but never 
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implemented (war veterans are the other important group that would 
benefit, but they are not explicitly mentioned).  
Such retrenchment represents for the government the path of least 
resistance for a number of reasons (Bonoli, 2012). First, Kosovo being a very 
traditional society, the gender imbalance is a fundamental trait of basic age 
pensions. Women represent almost two-thirds of recipients, due to short or 
inexistent contributory histories, compared to just 12 percent of those 
entitled to a contributory pension. A reform of the basic pillar would hence 
overwhelmingly affect women (mainly former family workers). Second, 
politics and civil society are uninterested in the defense of such a 
constituency. On the one hand, although there are some 6,000 registered 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Kosovo, there are only a few 
that actively deal with municipal policy, corruption and environmental 
issues rather than with social policy (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016). As for 
the social partners, neither the employers nor trade unions are particularly 
affected. Labor leaders often are themselves pensioners, who hold the belief 
that people with no contribution record should not be entitled to public 
pensions. Finally, the recipients of the basic age pension do not represent a 
major voting platform to be targeted through benefits clientelism, as 
opposed to the beneficiaries of other special schemes. 
AN ALTERNATIVE REFORM STRATEGY 
The Kosovar pension system shows several inconsistencies with regards 
to its various components. As the IMF notes, however, most complications 
are concentrated in special benefit schemes, family and disability 
pensions. In comparative terms, the zero pillar is less problematic. As 
advocated by the World Bank, a mixed strategy that tackles the problem 
on multiple fronts may sensibly improve the basic pension's design 
efficiency (Robalino and Holzmann, 2009). There are several ways of 
reducing the costs while preserving universality: taxing pensions as 
ordinary income; increasing the pensionable age; reducing the benefit 
ratio; and increasing administrative efficiency (Willmore, 2007).  
Taxation 
As universal basic pensions are financed from general revenue, a way of 
ensuring both vertical equity and fiscal sustainability is by applying a 
progressive Personal Income Tax (PIT). By doing so, retirees contribute to 
lowering the costs, with wealthier pensioners paying a proportionally 
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higher share of the burden. This method is successfully implemented, for 
example, in the Nordic countries, but has not been applied in many lower- 
and middle-income countries, where administrative capacity is low. 
In Kosovo, all social transfers are exempted from PIT. Except for the 
neediest recipients, beneficiaries should pay income tax and health 
contributions (Feher et al., 2016). Consequently, all sources of income 
would be similarly treated, thereby sharing the burden of social security 
among generations, and improving vertical and horizontal equity. This 
would, furthermore, create fewer distortionary effects on the labor 
market, reducing consequently inactivity and poverty traps. Of course, 
such taxation would hardly apply to recipients of zero-pillar benefits. 
People engaged in dependent employment or self-employment who 
are also benefit recipients should be allowed to continue working. At the 
same time, they should be subject to a partial claw back of pension 
benefits as their income rises. 
Eligibility 
An effective way to contain costs and simultaneously increase the 
adequacy of benefits is raising the statutory retirement age (Barr, 2012). 
The advantages of age targeting are easy identification of the eligible 
population and administrative simplicity, important in countries with low 
implementation capacity. The disadvantages are vertical leakages 
(benefits flow to people who are not poor), the crowding out of funding to 
other groups at risk of poverty (e.g. children) and regressivity, as the poor 
die younger than the rich. 
Despite Kosovo's population being the youngest in Europe, rapid 
ageing (also a result of sustained working-age population migration) 
might pose a challenge in the medium- and longer-term (Table 5).  










1980	 +65 5.8 11.7 4.0 3.1 -
2015	 +65 8.3 17.6 6.4 3.6 8.0
2050	 +65 16.0 26.5 14.4 6.6 22.8
Sources: United Nations (2015); KAS (2016)2. 
                                                      
2  The projections for Kosovo refer to the years 2016 and 2051. All projections are 
based to either the UN or KAS medium variants. The UN divisions into more, less 
and least developed countries apply. 
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A sensible solution is to link the statutory retirement age to life 
expectancy, which is precisely what the European Commission 
recommends. If this is done automatically, it also reduces the politicians' 
incentive to tinker with the system during periodical reviews (Schoyen 
and Stamati, 2013). As there is no silver bullet, beneficiaries have either 
to accept to save more, receive lower benefits, or work longer. The latter 
option is the most palatable, provided that the labor markets are ready to 
venture into uncharted territory. 
Benefits 
The Kosovar basic age pension was rather incorrectly categorized as 
ranking among the most generous. It errs on the profligate side, and yet, 
the disbursed benefits are only slightly higher than the recommended 
15 – 20 percent of per	capita GDP. So, it is not zero-pillar benefits that are 
problematic with regards to generosity. It is rather the other special 
pension schemes and inefficient disability assessment procedures that 
should be addressed first. As avoiding ad	 hoc increases by decree is 
paramount, all budget-financed benefits should be subject to systematic 
indexation. 
An important point for future consideration is the recipients' 
general perception that the basic benefit is modest compared to the costs 
of living. Given the high levels of indigence (circa 29.7 percent of the 
population lived under the national poverty threshold in 2011, according 
to World Bank data), the pension system shall play a prominent role in 
poverty alleviation, once its remaining problems are resolved and 
compatibly with budgetary capacity. 
Administration 
The interventions that may improve the efficiency of the Kosovar pension 
system include stricter residency requirements (partly introduced in the 
amendment to Law no. 04 / l-131) and a consolidated social security 
database (more capacity duplication was instead recommended in the 
Concept Paper). First, although the basic and contributory pensions 
cannot be paid to the same person, the numbers do not add up. At the end 
of 2015, there were reportedly 172,365 recipients of basic and 
contributory pensions, against an estimated population aged 65 and 
above of circa	142,000. So, there may be as much as one-fifth of the cohort 
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that are unlawfully receiving the basic pension. The IMF adduces four 
possible causes: individuals claiming both basic and contributory 
benefits; unreliable population estimates based on the 2011 census; non-
declaration of deaths; and flaws in the concept of residency, both for 
benefit eligibility and for the census. 
In order to improve the situation, residency requirements should be 
more rigidly enforced. This would mean that the recipients of old-age 
pensions should present themselves more often to the designated 
government agencies, lest they trigger a suspension of benefit 
disbursement, and that retroactive collection of benefits should be 
limited. As some NGOs deem this requirement as excessively burdensome, 
a partial solution may be to oblige, as some municipalities do, religious 
communities to report all burials, thereby enabling the immediate de-
registration of all deceased from the lists of recipients (KSI, 2016).  
Second, the administrative costs of the pension system should be 
reduced through a gradual integration of all social security payments, 
checks and tests with the tax administration as is the trend in many 
developing countries. Hence, a consolidated database of budget-financed 
cash transfers for individuals and households as well as of recipients, 
through the introduction of, e.g. a Danish-inspired Personal Identification 
Number (CPR‐nummer) should be complemented by automated data 
exchange between the benefit database, the tax authority and financial 
service providers licensed to execute money transfers benefitting natural 
persons (Feher et al., 2016). This would serve the double purpose of 
reducing overall administrative costs and limiting the fruition of mutually 
incompatible benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Consistent with the theoretical expectations on the clientelistic party 
competition in Mediterranean welfare regimes, the Kosovar budget-
financed pension system has undergone steady fragmentation since the 
international community relinquished authority to local politicians. If the 
original, World-Bank-inspired, design espoused universalism as its 
defining feature, since 2008, a host of special schemes has sprung up, 
especially favoring the powerful constituency of war veterans.  
In order to finance the costly and inequitable plans, the Labor 
Ministry planned to free up fiscal resources by limiting the coverage of the 
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basic age pension. Due to its universalistic character, which reduces the 
potential for benefits clientelism, as well as low political and societal 
salience, the scheme represented a path of least resistance for 
retrenchment. The consequences of such reform would be dear: given 
Kosovo's socioeconomic reality, the planned measures might 
unnecessarily harm the poorest strata of the elderly population. 
In line with the IMF's proposals and the World Bank's current 
orientation, a more sensible solution would entail a mixed reform strategy 
that simultaneously tackles issues of: eligibility (a progressive linkage of 
the statutory retirement age with life expectancy); taxation (treating 
pensions as all other income and allowing recipients to continue 
working); benefit structure (keeping benefit levels and introducing 
systematic indexation); and administration (more rigidly enforcing 
residency tests and consolidating social security databases).  
At the time of writing, the reform of the basic age pension has been 
stalled for some months. The unofficial reason is that the governing 
coalition between PDK and LDK is increasingly antagonistic, and 
incapable of solving the distribution of rewards between FARK and KLA 
veterans. Only the external intervention of the IMF, which imposed a cap 
on war-related and other special schemes under the threat of 
discontinuing the Stand-By Arrangement, is holding back such 
detrimental benefits clientelism.  
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHILD WELFARE INSTITUTIONS 
IN KAZAKHSTAN: LAYERING, HYBRIDIZATION AND 
MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Sofiya An  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty-five years, welfare institutions in the former socialist 
and Soviet states have undergone major reforms as a part of political and 
socio-economic restructuring. Post-Soviet social policy reforms have been 
often constructed as a replacement of ‘old’, Soviet-style, and discredited 
welfare institutions and policies with ‘new’, global, and essentially, 
Western frameworks. Research shows that post-socialist and post-Soviet 
transformation of welfare institutions has been a complex, dynamic, and 
multidirectional process, and there has been no consensus among 
scholars of social policy on how to conceptualize change (e.g. Aidukaite, 
2004; Beblavy, 2008; Deacon, 2000; Ferge, 1997). With a multitude of 
minor and major welfare reforms, the question remains of how to 
examine change and what changes indicate meaningful transformation. In 
this chapter, I examine the interplay of continuity and change through a 
case study of child welfare transformation in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. I 
seek to address the following research questions: (1) What types of 
changes characterize post-Soviet child welfare evolution in Kazakhstan? 
(2) To what extent have multiple changes introduced over the past two 
and a half decades transformed the dominant institutional logic 
underlying child welfare provisions in Kazakhstan? 
After this introduction, I briefly review the literature on post-
socialist and post-Soviet welfare provisions and then outline selected 
approaches to theorizing institutional change within historical 
institutionalist scholarship. Specifically, two theories are considered: 
Streeck and Thelen's (2005) typology of incremental institutional 
transformation and Thornton and Ocasio's theory of institutional logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2012). The second, empirical, part of the chapter 
provides an overview of multiple reforms in the provision of child welfare 
in Kazakhstan since the country's independence, focusing on legislation, 
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child welfare providers, and governing institutions. This analysis seeks to 
identify types of institutional change and tracks the evolution of the 
dominant institutional logics underlying welfare provisions. In the third 
section, I will summarize the case study findings, organizing the 
discussion around two themes: the continuity and incremental change in 
post-Soviet child welfare institutions and the shifting institutional logic 
underlying the evolution of welfare institutions. 
UNDERSTANDING POST-SOCIALIST AND POST-SOVIET INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
While Soviet and socialist social policy was largely excluded from 
mainstream welfare state analysis (Aidukaite, 2009), the end of state 
socialism twenty-five years ago gave rise to scholarship on post-socialist 
and post-Soviet social policy1. Initially, the social transformation 
occurring in the former Soviet socialist countries was theorized as a 
‘transition’, a linear path from socialism to capitalism that entails 
structural reforms leading to market-oriented economies and Western-
type pluralist democracies (Kuzio, 2001)2. Applied to social policy, 
‘transition’ translates into a process of replacement of the discredited 
Soviet welfare system by modern, global, and essentially, Western-type 
welfare institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
However, a growing body of research into transnational post-
socialist policy points to the multiple, complex, and multidirectional 
processes that do not fit into the reductionist notion of ‘transition’ (e.g. 
Aidukaite, 2004; Beblavy, 2008; Deacon, 2000; Ferge, 1997). One stream 
of research emphasizes institutional continuity, arguing that post-Soviet 
and post-socialist states constitute a distinct welfare regime which has 
maintained its unique characteristics over time (Aidukaite, 2004; Burlacu, 
2007). An alternative perspective points to the diversity of post-socialist 
and post-Soviet transformations and contends that ‘transition’ states 
                                                      
1 In this chapter, the term ‘post-Soviet’ refers to fifteen former Soviet Socialist 
republics and ‘post-socialist’	refers to the former socialist states in Europe. The 
terms are used, first, to suggest that these two families of states share a common 
past and, second, that they differ from one another. While this empirical study 
focuses on the case of post-Soviet social policy, it is located within a broader body 
of literature on post-socialist social policy. 
2  Later, the concept grew to incorporate other dimensions transforming into a 
‘triple’ and ‘quadruple’ transition (Kuzio, 2001). 
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follow multiple paths and cannot be aligned within a conventional welfare 
regime typology (Kuitto, 2011; Fenger, 2007; Ferge, 2001; Orenstein, 
2008). Pointing to the complexity and multidirectionality of changes, 
scholars used the terms ‘fuzzy’ (Ferge, 2001) and ‘unique hybrids’ 
(Cerami, 2009) to describe post-socialist welfare institutions. As Hacker 
(2009) points out, changing welfare institutions in post-socialism is 
better described as ‘hybridization,’ rather than clustering. 
The question of the relationship between institutional continuity 
and change is central to inquiry into post-Soviet and post-socialist welfare 
transformation. Historical institutionalist scholarship, emphasizing the 
maintenance of institutions and their resistance to change, has developed 
two different perspectives on institutional change (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). From one perspective, 
institutional change is viewed as a ‘critical conjuncture,’ with short 
periods of transformation interrupting long periods of stability and self-
maintenance (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). Incremental changes, it is 
argued, serve the purpose of institutional adjustment and maintenance, 
while ‘real’ institutional change can only result from major, drastic 
restructuring (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). 
Alternatively, Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that institutional 
transformation can result from incremental changes. Their typology of 
institutional change includes five types of incremental institutional 
transformations: (a) displacement, which refers to the rise of subordinate 
institutions to replace the dominant ones; (b) layering, which refers to 
creating new institutions in addition to existing ones; (c) drift, a process 
of institutions losing significance due to inadequate maintenance; (d) 
conversion, that is, remodeling of institutions; and (e) gradual 
breakdown, which refers to institutions dying out (2005; 57). This 
typology of institutional change has been instrumental for examining 
complex institutional changes in various contexts (Bick, 2016; Carey, Kay 
and Nevile, 2017; Heijden, 2014; Rocco and Thurston, 2014). 
Yet the question remains of when exactly incremental changes 
become (or can be interpreted as) transformative. What institutional 
dimensions can signify the ‘turning point’ in institutional change? In other 
words, how do we know that institutions have actually changed? To 
conceptualize institutional change, a promising approach is to 
incorporate ideas into institution-centered models (Beland, 2005; Beland, 
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2007; Hall, 1993; Steinmo, 2008). Different ways of analyzing the 
ideational dimension of social policy include, for instance, causal beliefs, 
concepts, language, sentiments, political ideologies, policy paradigms, 
language, or discourses (Beland, 2014; Hall, 2003). A more 
comprehensive approach to integrating ideational frameworks in the 
analysis of institutional change can be found in Thornton and Ocasio's 
(2008) institutional logics theory. Institutional logics refers to ‘socially 
constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material 
practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals 
and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity’ and ‘frames of 
reference that condition actors' choices for sense-making’ (Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012; 2). Institutional logics, therefore, can bridge 
the macro- and micro-levels of analysis, that is, individual and 
organizational actors and the institutional environments in which they 
operate. 
METHODOLOGY 
The question that has driven this study is how post-Soviet institutions 
change. Specifically, I seek to examine the interplay of continuity and 
change through a case study of child welfare transformation in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan. I seek to address the following research questions: (1) What 
types of changes characterize post-Soviet child welfare evolution in 
Kazakhstan? (2) To what extent have multiple changes introduced over 
the past two and a half decades transformed the dominant institutional 
logic underlying child welfare provisions in Kazakhstan? For the study of 
child welfare restructuring in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, these two 
analytical tools are combined. Firstly, I apply Streeck and Thelen's 
typology of incremental institutional change to examine multiple reforms 
of child welfare institutions. Secondly, I employ Thornton and Ocasio's 
institutional logics perspective to track the shift in the institutional logic 
underpinning post-Soviet child welfare transformation. This analysis 
draws upon in-depth semi-structured interviews I conducted over the 
summer of 2012 with 30 individuals, including representatives of 
domestic NGOs, government organizations, agencies, and transnational 
organizations (TOs) involved in child welfare policy reforms in 
Kazakhstan. I also analyzed documents including relevant laws and 
regulations, policies and programs, organizational documents, media 
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publications, and research reports. In the empirical section of the chapter, 
I examine multiple developments in child welfare provisions in 
Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2012 and trace the shifting dominant logic 
underlying these provisions. I begin by outlining the main characteristics 
of the Soviet child welfare system inherited by Kazakhstan. Then I proceed 
to an examination of the post-Soviet child welfare transformation, broken 
down into two periods: the phase of welfare retrenchment (1991 – 2000) 
and the phase of welfare revival (2000 – 2012). 
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO CHILD WELFARE: THE LOGIC OF ‘SOVIET 
WELFARISM’ 
Soviet child welfare was an integral component of the comprehensive 
Soviet welfare system, which encompassed full employment, generous 
maternity benefits, child allowances, sick leave and pensions, free 
education and health care, state housing, and subsidized goods and 
services (Deacon, 2000). In addition to universal programs available to all 
citizens, the state provided special categorical benefits, such as for 
families with four or more children, military personnel and their families, 
people with disabilities, and orphans (Maltseva, 2005). Since all sectors of 
the society—the economy, the political system, and welfare provision—
were governed by the state, the entire society functioned as a welfare 
system. 
Similarly, the child welfare system inherited by Kazakhstan was 
characterized by the key role the Soviet state played in planning, 
financing, and providing assistance to families and children. Child welfare 
was provided in three forms: cash transfers to families with children; 
public services, including child care and recreational programs for 
children; and government-run children's residential institutions. By the 
late 1980s, cash transfer programs encompassed a generous maternity 
leave program, child birth allowance, paid childcare leave in case of child 
sickness, pensions for widows with children, and allowances for children 
who were deprived of parental alimony (Teplova, 2007). Public social 
services for families with children were provided through nurseries, 
kindergartens, after-school centers, children's summer camps and 
resorts. Soviet child welfare was governed by the principle of 
universalism, ensuring wide coverage. The needs of selected special 
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groups were addressed through categorical benefits in the form of cash 
transfers and in-kind programs3. 
The emphasis on universality in the Soviet child welfare system can 
be also found in the absence of (personal) social services and / or social 
work to address the specific needs of families with children (e.g. low-
income families, families with many children, single mothers, parents 
with alcohol / drug addiction, parents with disabilities, and children with 
disabilities). The lack of personal social services and / or social work was 
tied to the well-known official denial of social problems intrinsic to the 
Soviet ideology and culture. The official discourse constructed a society 
without social problems, which effectively eliminated the need for social 
work (Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, 2009; Iarskaia-Smirnova, 2011). 
While personal social services were absent, children's residential 
institutions became the main approach to addressing the needs of families 
requiring special support. Throughout Soviet history, children's 
residential institutions were an institutional solution to the issue of 
children's deprivation caused by changing socioeconomic and political 
conditions (Kostina, 2003; Zezina, 2000). On the one hand, children's 
residential institutions symbolized the paternalistic state that cares for its 
children. On the other hand, institutions were used to remove social 
problems (e.g., abandoned, abused children, or children with disabilities) 
from the public eye and render them invisible. When a family failed to 
provide care to their children, the state would intervene by depriving 
parents of their parental rights and responsibilities and placing children 
in residential institutions. Kazakhstan (like other post-Soviet states) has 
inherited and maintained a variety of residential institutions for children4, 
such as: infant houses; orphanages and boarding schools for children 
deprived of parental care; special correctional institutions for children 
with disabilities; boarding schools for children with deviant behaviors; 
centers for temporary isolation and rehabilitation of unattended children; 
family-type children's homes; children's villages, and youth homes for 
care leavers. 
                                                      
3  For instance, children with disabilities were entitled to monthly pensions and free 
medications and access to professional education, free use of public transportation 
and a 50 percent discount for travel within the Soviet Union. 
4  Most of the institutions listed here were inherited from the Soviet system, but 
children's villages and family-type orphanages were introduced in the 1990s. 
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Thus, the main characteristics of the child welfare system inherited 
by Kazakhstan from the Soviet system included: a key role for the state; 
universality as the main principle of welfare provision; the family's 
responsibility for child care relying on state support; a major role for 
children's residential institutions; and the absence of personal social 
services and / or social work. These features, I argue, were interlinked 
with the logic of ‘Soviet welfarism’, the dominant institutional logic 
underpinning the massive Soviet child welfare infrastructure. In this 
chapter, the logic of ‘Soviet welfarism’ refers to the notion of the 
paternalistic, all powerful, all-encompassing, and supposedly benevolent 
Soviet welfare state, which played the major role in the provision of child 
welfare. While the family was viewed as the primary childcare provider, 
the state adopted supportive family policies through universal public 
programs, including state cash transfer programs and public services, 
while the needs of special categories of families and children were 
addressed through a wide network of government-run children's 
residential institutions. 
POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION OF CHILD WELFARE INSTITUTIONS 
Shaped by the shifting economic and political environment, the post-
Soviet transformation of child welfare institutions in Kazakhstan has gone 
through two distinct phases: child welfare retrenchment (1991 – 2000) 
and child welfare revival (2000 – 2012). 
Child Welfare Retrenchment 1991 – 2000 
Cutting ‘old’ programs: Cash transfers and public services 
In the 1990s, the government introduced structural economic reforms, 
such as privatization and liberalization, while drastically reducing social 
welfare expenditures on two pillars of child welfare: cash transfers and 
public services for families with children. Cuts in cash transfers were 
achieved by restricting the entitlement for welfare and monetization of in-
kind categorical welfare benefits5. Real public expenditures on education 
                                                      
5  As ex-Minister of Labor and Social Protection G. Karagussova admitted in her 
interview, monetization allowed the government to cut costs of welfare programs 
because monetary compensation was overall lower than the costs of in-kind 
benefits (KAZINFORM, 14 December 2006).  
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in 1996 dropped to 28 percent of the 1991 level; similarly, real public 
expenditures on health care in 1997 fell to 35 percent of the 1991 level 
(Falkingham, 1999). Apart from cuts in existing universal and categorical 
programs, in 1994 a means-test was introduced to the main child 
allowance scheme, indicating a shift from universalism to selection 
(Maltseva, 2008; World Bank, 1998). 
Reinforcing old institutions: Children's residential institutions  
Surprisingly, the third major component of child welfare—children's 
residential institutions—was not only maintained but reinforced. The 
number of residential institutions for children without parental care 
increased by 50 percent and the number of children in institutions more 
than doubled between 1990 and 19996 (Kazakhstan, 2000). Residential 
institutions continued to be viewed as a legitimate response to children's 
deprivation in sharp contrast to a regional orthodoxy of 
‘deinstitutionalization’. As claimed by the government in the First 
National CRC Report (Kazakhstan, 2001a), ‘this is the only network within 
the system of primary and secondary education that has not been 
optimized [cut]’ because ‘the least protected [groups] are considered 
orphans, children with limited developmental capacities [disabilities] and 
children from large and low-income families. State support for them is 
provided through the system of children's houses and boarding schools’ 
(Kazakhstan, 2000). While maintaining Soviet-type children's residential 
institutions, the government made an attempt to introduce	Family-Type 
Children's Villages and Youth Homes in 2000,	modelled after SOS villages	
(SOS Kinderdorf Kazakhstan, 2017) with the aim of the ‘gradual 
transformation of children's homes into children's villages’ (Law on 
Family-Type Children's Villages and Youth Homes, 2000). However, rather 
than replacing Soviet-type children's residential institutions, children's 
villages have simply co-existed as yet another type of children's 
residential institution. 
                                                      
6  41 children's homes and boarding schools accommodating 4,700 children in 1990 
and 65 institutions accommodating 10,961 children in 1999 (Kazakhstan, 2000). 
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Ideas underlying child welfare policies: The roles of family vs state re-
interpreted  
A number of legal acts in the area concerning child welfare that were 
adopted in the 1990s indicate an attempt to introduce new ideas of the 
family as the primary caregiver while largely preserving the logic of 
‘Soviet welfarism’. First, Kazakhstan ratified the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) in 1992, symbolically, the first UN Convention ratified 
by a new state; but despite the importance of this gesture, the translation 
of the Convention into practice was slow (Kazakhstan, 2001b). Further, 
the new country's Constitutions, adopted in 1993 and 1995, declared that 
the family has the primary responsibility for caring for children with a 
smaller role for the state, as compared with the 1978 Constitution (the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995). Similarly, a new Law 
on Marriage and Family (1998) placed the primary responsibility for 
children on parents. Yet, the Law maintained the Soviet child welfare 
approach to dealing with families failing to provide necessary care: the 
state intervenes by depriving parents of their parental rights and placing 
the child under the protection of state authorities. 
Child Welfare Revival 2000 – 2012  
Introducing new policy ideas: A children's rights framework 
The economic recovery of the 2000s was accompanied by a steady 
increase in public spending on education, health care, and social welfare 
in absolute figures7. After a decade of being secondary to economic 
reforms, social policy shifted from the periphery to the center of the state 
agenda, and children re-gained their status as one of the primary target 
populations for welfare policy8. The revitalization of child welfare is 
evident from the visible increase in the number of regulations and state 
programs concerning children adopted in the 2000s. First, the Law on the 
Rights of the Child (2002) has symbolic significance as it had no analogous 
regulation in the Soviet welfare system and signifies an ideational shift in 
child welfare as the Law mirrors the CRC. The Law, however, made no 
                                                      
7  Public expenditure still lags behind as a percentage of GDP as compared to OECD 
countries7 (UNICEF, 2007). 
8  As the President of RK stated in his 2005 Address to the nation, ‘An important issue 
for our strategy is the decent provision for the livelihood of the least protected 
member of the society—children, their mothers, and the older generation. The 
government will not save resources for the solution of these issues.’ 
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attempt to change the system of child welfare provision, and its 
introduction was not accompanied by amendments to other laws. Rather, 
the Law re-instated the Soviet-era principles of child welfare provision, 
including the role of the state in child welfare provision and the dominant 
role of children's residential institutions, which were framed as 
‘organizations performing functions on the protection of the rights of the 
child.’ 
Institutional maintenance: Re-enforcing old welfare programs 
In the 2000s, the government increased spending on ‘traditional’ welfare 
programs, such as income transfers and public services for families and 
children. First, the Law on Targeted Social Assistance adopted in 2001 
replaced other cash assistance programs for the poor. Next, the Law on 
State Allowances for Families with Children (2005) introduced several 
family and maternity benefit programs, one means-tested and others 
universal.9 Unlike the almost negligible cash benefits in the 1990s, the 
cash value of these allowances is sizable10. Importantly, children made up 
the majority of recipients of targeted social assistance (60 percent) in 
2003 (ILO, 2004). The state also boosted its support for child care. From 
2007 to 2009, 2,557 pre-school facilities were opened with capacity to 
accommodate 142,000 children, and in 2010 there were 4,972 pre-school 
facilities, covering 38.7 percent of eligible children (MoESc, 2010). 
Layering: introducing new agencies in child welfare 
In addition to four traditional Ministries (the Ministry of Education and 
Science; the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection; the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) that had their own areas of 
responsibility within the public child welfare system, new government 
agencies were established that represent a global, rights-based approach 
to child welfare. First, the National Commission on Family and Women's 
                                                      
9  The newly introduced programs include: (1) monthly cash transfers to families 
whose per-capita income is below the food basket value until the child reaches 18 
years of age; (2) a single-payment child birth allowance (since 2003); (3) monthly 
childcare allowance until the child reaches one year; and (4) a monthly childcare 
allowance for parents / caregivers of children with disabilities. 
10 In 2013, child birth allowance was 45,360 KZT (approximately, $300); monthly 
childcare allowance for children from birth to one year was 8,316 KZT ($55) for a 
woman who was not employed and 40 percent of the average monthly salary for 
working women.  
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Affairs, created in 1998 as part of the state's agenda of advancing gender 
equality, was also involved in child welfare reform. Another coordinating 
body was the Council on Youth Affairs, established in 2000, which played 
no more than a consulting and advisory role. Next, created in 2002 under 
the President, the National Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Ombudsperson) is responsible for monitoring human rights (including 
the rights of children) and dealing with citizens' complaints on 
government bodies. Finally, in 2006, the government created the 
Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Child, a special body 
under the MoESc, which was tasked ‘to realize government policy in the 
area of protection of rights and legal interests of children, as well as 
implementing and control functions in this area’ (MoESc, 2011). However, 
the Committee's authority was limited because of its subordinate position 
within the MoESc. 
Thus, new governing agencies represent a ‘layering’ strategy in child 
welfare governance. New institutions were established, while ‘old’ 
governing bodies continued to exist. Typically, new institutions were 
‘weaker’ than old agencies: they were given fewer resources, smaller 
infrastructure, and limited authority11. While adding to the child welfare 
governance structure, new agencies have not changed the core principles 
of child welfare governance but rather contributed to greater institutional 
complexity. 
Drifting away: Children's residential institutions 
In the early 2000s, the total number of children in all residential 
institutions (including those with and without parents) rose. The 
numbers continued to grow until the mid-2000s and then stabilized (See 
Table 1, Children in residential care). 
Table 1 Children in residential care, at the end of the year (in 1,000s) 
1999	 2000	 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
58.0 67.2 69.2 76.2 82.5 87.0 84.6 79.5 79.0 82.9 78.5 77.4
Source: UNICEF (TransMonEE, 2012). 
By the late 2010s, the overall number of children in all residential 
institutions appears to be rather stable, but the number of children 
deprived of parents in residential care started to shrink (See Table 2). A 
                                                      
11  Interviews with key informants (2012). 
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recent media release12 reports that the government closed 17 children's 
residential institutions since 2010 due to the fall in the number of children 
without parental care. The government tends to attribute this 
development to state efforts aimed at de-institutionalization (Kazakhstan, 
2012). Although this argument cannot be substantiated13, the reduction 
in the number of children's residential institutions indicates that these 
welfare institutions are no longer viewed as legitimate modes of welfare 
provision in the national welfare system. 







Infant homes 2,436 2,120 (data 
unavailable) 
Boarding schools (for all children including 
those without parental care) 
71,400 73,200 79,674
Children's houses and boarding schools for 
children without parental care 
12,022 12,000 6,700 
*Sources: Kazakhstan CRC Report #2,3,4; Ministry of Education and Science of 
Kazakhstan data (2012); UNICEF TransMONEE data (2012). 
Layering and new modes of care: Social services for children 
Absent in the Soviet child welfare system, social services are a new 
modality introduced over the past two decades. Social services are an 
alternative to children's residential institutions operating according to a 
different institutional logic: to provide individualized support to families 
with children in the community, without removing children from the 
family. Three pieces of legislation adopted in the 2000s created the legal 
basis for the development of social services for children in Kazakhstan. 
First, the Law on Social, Medical, and Pedagogical Correctional Support to 
Children with Special Needs (2002), launched the development of the 
governmental institutional network responsible for the detection and 
correction / treatment of disabilities and the provision of medical, 
educational, psychological, and social services to children with special 
needs. Second, the Law on State Social Contracting (2005) was introduced 
                                                      
12  Meeting the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 16 June 2013, 
http://www.rfdeti.ru/news/7018-vstrecha-s-ministrom-yusticii-respubliki-kaza 
hstan. 
13  There was no respective increase in the use of alternative forms of family care, such 
as adoption, guardianship / tutelage, and foster care (patronat) (Kazakhstan, 
2012). 
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as an institutional mechanism for state funding of NGOs as providers of 
social services. Third, the Law on Special Social Services (2008) regulates 
the provision of social services to individuals and families in ten types of 
‘difficult living situations’ (five of them are children-only categories). 
Overall, while the main characteristics of the child welfare system 
inherited by Kazakhstan from the Soviet welfare system have been largely 
maintained over the past twenty years, a number of incremental changes 
can be identified. The state continues to play a major role in planning and 
financing child welfare but through a number of recent legislative acts, it 
allowed non-state service providers to enter the welfare sector. Alongside 
old universal and categorical welfare programs, means-tested social 
assistance has been introduced for poor families. The answer to the 
question of who is responsible for children—the family or the state—has 
been revised to justify the reduction of public support for families with 
children. State-run children's residential institutions continued to play a 
significant role in child welfare provision but began to lose their 
legitimacy, while personal social services and / or social work have been 
introduced on a small scale. These changes, I argue, can be associated with 
the introduction of a new institutional logic based on children's rights. 





education, health care, 
child care 
Cuts in public services, 
partial privatization, 
removal of subsidies 
Increase in state funding 
of public services 
Income transfers: 
benefits for families and 
children 
Cuts in income transfer 
programs, monetization 
of in-kind benefits 
Increase in income 
transfer programs for 
families with children 
Introduction of means-
tested family benefits 
Children's residential 
institutions as a main 
response to families and 
children's deprivation / 
special needs 
Increase in the number of 
children's residential 
institutions and the 
number of children in 
institutions 
Introduction of new 
types of children's 
institutions (family-type 
homes, children's 
villages, youth homes)  
Maintenance of 
children's residential 
institutions until 2010. 
After 2010, reduction in 
the number of 
institutions.  
Maintenance of new 
types of children's 
institutions (family-type 
homes, children's 
villages, youth homes) 
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Alternative forms of 
family care: adoption, 
guardianship / tutelage, 
and patronat / foster 
care (the latter was 
cancelled in 1968). 
Adoption and 
guardianship maintained  
Re-introduction of 
alternative forms of 
family care (patronat), or 
their reinforcement 
through cash benefits 
(guardianship / tutelage) 
No formal social 
services / social work 
Introduction of social 
services provided by 
NGOs funded by TOs 
Introduction of social 
services for children with 
special needs provided 
by governmental 
organizations and by 
NGOs 
Governance of child 
welfare divided among 
four agencies: MoESc, 
MoH, MoLSP, and MIA 
Governance of child 
welfare divided among 
four agencies: MoESc, 
MoH, MoLSP, and MIA 
Establishment of new 
agencies: National 
Commission of Women's 
and Family Affairs; 
National Commission for 
Human Rights 
(Ombudsman) 
Governance of child 
welfare divided between 
four agencies: MoESc, 
MoH, MoLSP, and MIA 
Maintenance of new 
governance agencies.  
‘Soviet welfarism’ as an 
underpinning 
institutional logic 
‘Soviet welfarism’ as an 
underpinning 
institutional logic 
‘Soviet welfarism’ and 
children's rights 
framework as competing 
and co-existing 
underpinning 
institutional logics  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The post-Soviet transformation of child welfare institutions: Layering, 
hybridization and multiple institutional logics 
This analysis of post-Soviet child welfare transformation in Kazakhstan 
was particularly concerned with tracing institutional continuity and 
change. Institutional continuity was conceptualized as the maintenance 
and reproduction of Soviet institutions. The evolution of child welfare 
institutions was examined using Streeck and Thelen's (2005) typology of 
incremental institutional transformation, while shifting ideas underlying 
child welfare provision were conceptualized through the lens of Thornton 
and Ocasio's (2008) institutional logics theory. 
Post-Soviet child welfare transformation in Kazakhstan has been 
made subservient to the economic and political restructuring. This 
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analysis points to two distinct phases in the evolution of post-Soviet child 
welfare: child welfare retrenchment during the first decade of the 
country's independence (1991 – 2000) and child welfare revival during 
the second decade (2001 – 2012). During the first post-Soviet decade of 
the dismantling of the Soviet welfare system, child welfare retrenchment 
included broad cuts in income transfers to families and public programs, 
such as education, health care, and child care. However, children's 
residential institutions not only survived cuts but also increased in 
number, indicating that the institutional logic underpinning child welfare 
was preserved: if the family fails to provide care for its children, the state 
steps in by placing children in residential institutions. While new types of 
children's institutions were introduced, they were maintained on a small 
scale, posing no threat to the dominance of Soviet-type children's 
residential institutions. 
As this analysis shows, changes introduced during the second, child 
welfare revival, phase fall into two categories: (1) the reinforcement of 
old, traditional child welfare programs, as seen in the increase in public 
spending on traditional, pre-1991 welfare programs, including children's 
residential institutions, and (2) the introduction of new institutions under 
the children's rights framework, which was used increasingly by policy 
actors to frame desired policy changes or to legitimize their claims (Table 
3). As a result, alternative forms of family care (e.g. patronat / foster care, 
guardianship / tutelage) were re-introduced or supported by public 
funds, while the legitimacy of children's residential institutions among 
policy actors started to fade, and the number of children's residential 
institutions began to contract (‘drifting away’, according to Streeck and 
Thelen's classification). Another new form of welfare provision, personal 
social services, was introduced and gained legitimacy. Funded by the state 
and provided by NGOs and by new or reformed state institutions, social 
services represent a different institutional logic of individualized and 
specialized support for the family and children. Furthermore, new child 
welfare governance institutions based on human and children's rights 
frameworks (e.g. the Committee on the Protection of Children's Rights, the 
Ombudsperson, the Commission on the Family and Women's Affairs) 
were established. 
The examination of child welfare reforms points to ‘layering’ as the 
key element of institutional change in post-Soviet child welfare provision 
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in Kazakhstan. While multiple welfare institutions (i.e. laws, welfare 
providers, and governing agencies) have been introduced over the past 
twenty years, much of the Soviet child welfare infrastructure has been 
maintained, including public cash assistance programs, public services, 
children's residential institutions, and the broad governance structure. 
Overall, the child welfare system shows remarkable resilience and an 
ability to change incrementally, mainly by adding new layers of 
institutions, while maintaining its core welfare institutions. 
A crucial characteristic of post-Soviet child welfare transformation 
was that new welfare institutions did not replace old ones but were added 
to existing institutions (in Streeck and Thelen's typology, ‘layering’). 
However, the newly introduced institutions have struggled (informant 
interviews, 2012). The provision of social services in the public sectors 
suffered from a lack of expertise, formalism, and a general confusion 
about their new roles and responsibilities. NGOs as new social service 
providers faced institutional barriers to accessing public resources. The 
development of alternative forms of family care became stagnant. Also, 
new governance institutions that are based on rights' frameworks (e.g. the 
National Commission on Women's and Family Affairs, the Committee on 
the Protection of Children's Rights) were given less authority than the 
traditional governing agencies (e.g., Ministries), that convey the logic of 
‘Soviet welfarism’. 
Drawing upon the empirical study of post-Soviet welfare reform, 
this analysis confirms the value of examining the ideational dimension of 
institutional change (Beland, 2005). The post-Soviet transformation of 
child welfare institutions in Kazakhstan has been characterized by co-
existing and competing institutional logics: the logic of ‘Soviet welfarism’ 
and the logic of children's rights. Both logics can be traced in existing, 
reformed, maintained, and newly introduced welfare institutions. While 
multiple institutional layers may not indicate an actual shift in 
institutional logic underlying welfare provisions, the shift in institutional 
logics may be indicative of a more profound institutional change that can 
ultimately lead to institutions drifting away and dying out. 
To conclude, child welfare transformation in post-Soviet Kazakhstan 
can be understood as a dialectical interplay of institutional continuity and 
change. Institutional continuity can be found in the maintenance and 
revival of old welfare institutions. Institutional change has been 
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incremental in the form of multiple layers of new institutions. At the core 
of the transformation of child welfare institutions in post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan, I argue, was the change in the dominant institutional logics: 
the logic of Soviet welfarism (paternalistic child protection) that fed the 
Soviet-type child welfare system did not go away but co-existed with the 
imported transnational logic of children's rights. Institutional layering 
along with the co-existence of multiple institutional logics produced a 
hybrid child welfare system which includes preserved Soviet welfare 
institutions and layers of newly introduced institutions. 
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CHAPTER 9:  
THE IMPACT OF WOMEN'S AGENCY AGAINST POVERTY IN 
RUSSIA 
Ann-Mari Sätre  
INTRODUCTION 
Post-Soviet transformation has created large income gaps and removed 
social safety nets for ordinary people across Russia. Societal structures 
have disappeared, and workplaces are no longer obliged to provide 
housing or child care, as in the Soviet time. Individuals have to pay for 
services that they did not previously pay for. The situation some people 
end up in is chronic poverty, where expenses are constantly higher than 
income. Many families are close to the edge of poverty, particularly 
younger families. Families with many children are even more vulnerable 
(Korchagina and Prokofeva, 2008; Moskovskii Finansovyi Forum, 2016). 
This chapter examines developments in social policy in Russia, along 
with trends concerning women's work and engagement, to solve problems 
of poverty as a complement to state policies. Although there are general 
tendencies towards decreasing poverty levels since the turn of the century, 
certain elements of persistent poverty within some population groups are 
likely to remain, while inequality by and large also remains high and stable. 
Following the initial shocks in 1991 – 92 immediately after the Soviet Union 
collapsed, a major financial crisis in 1998 and the international economic 
crisis in 2008 – 09 represented setbacks to households and enterprises in 
Russia. Also, the economic crisis in Russia in 2014, following the falling price 
of oil and economic sanctions due to the Crimean annexation, has had 
consequences. Recent changes in directions of social policy further 
contribute to some worrisome developments and trends.  
Section 2 outlines the theoretical and research basis for this chapter. 
Section 3 discusses the evolution of poverty in Russia and highlights the 
problematic nature of the chronic elements of poverty. Then state policies 
of social policies are analyzed in Section 4. It is argued that although 
resources devoted to social policy have increased, efforts appear 
insufficient to cover basic needs. The effect of the continuing responsibility 
of women for solving problems of poverty through their paid and unpaid 
work is analyzed in Section 5, before the conclusions are drawn. 
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THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH BASIS 
The analytical framework is based on Douglass North's (1990) 
categorization of four main kinds of institutions which influence the way 
a society develops: legal rules; organizational forms; enforcement; and 
behavioral norms. Institutions are all the restrictions that humans have 
created to regulate interaction in society. While formal rules can be 
changed by political decisions, informal rules, such as behavioral norms 
that are rooted in society, are not so quickly changed. 
Although North (1990) highlighted the need for ‘agency’ (action) for 
change, he did not incorporate the inter-relationship between agency and 
the institutional framework. In this chapter, the agency dimension is 
added, drawing on Sen's (1984) capability approach. Sen's analytical 
framework also connects agency to the issue of empowerment, and seeks 
not only to answer the actual needs for a resource (e.g. money, housing), 
but also to identify the kind of support needed to transform resources into 
goods and services (Sen, 1984). The core of the empowerment concept 
lies in the ability of the individual to control her own destiny, that is, the 
agency aspect. 
The aim here is to highlight the impact of institutions on women's 
agency against poverty in Russia. The chapter pays attention to the 
relationship between socially-oriented NGOs and social work, given the 
assumption that resources devoted to social policy are insufficient 
relative to needs. A goal is therefore to identify when and how socially-
oriented NGOs can contribute to empowerment processes involving poor 
people. The impact of two kinds of informal institutions are highlighted; 
firstly, the survival of a general hierarchical structure of organizations 
from the Soviet era (in both municipal agencies and NGOs), and secondly, 
the survival of the norm that women are responsible for the organization 
of social welfare. 
Empirical data has been collected in 2002 – 2017, using semi-
structured qualitative interviews; this is complemented by observation 
and in some cases by special methods like focus group meetings. 
Interviews are typically 40 – 80 minutes long, structured with basic 
questions but varying to a degree because of different places, work tasks 
and socio-economic features of the interviewees. The data has been 
collected during several projects focusing on local development and / or 
poverty. The most relevant part of data for this chapter was composed of 
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over 250 interviews on policies on poverty collected in 2010 – 2017 from 
five Russian regions with social work experts, social workers, and social 
pedagogues (see Sätre, 2019). Interviews also took place with teachers, 
doctor's assistants, NGO representatives, local politicians and deputies of 
commissions or local village councils. Most of the respondents were 
women. Four of the regions are located in north-western Russia and one 
in the Volga region. 
Formal versus informal institutions and the role of agency 
An institution-centered approach to poverty takes aspects of a society as 
a cause of poverty rather than individual failings (Sen, 1984). According 
to this approach, slow-adapting institutions would explain why many 
people would be unable to support themselves; salaries that are too low 
are seen as an integral part of the functioning of the economic system 
(Gaddy, 2007; Kornai, 1980; North, 1990; Sätre, 1994; 2001). In effect, 
some features of the Soviet system have survived the reform measures 
from the 1990s, which explains why a large part of the Russian workforce 
is still employed in unprofitable large-scale enterprises. The tradition of 
low salaries in certain professions, such as for teachers and doctors who 
are employed in non-commercial organizations, seems to have survived. 
At the same time, privatization made it so that firms are not obliged to 
secure welfare for their employees as in the Soviet times, while 
individuals have to pay for services that they did not previously have to 
pay for (Lazareva, 2009). The situation some people end up with is living 
in chronic poverty, where expenses are constantly higher than income. 
Many of the poor are young people whose situation became worse as a 
result of their poor adjustment after the global economic crisis in 2008 
(Rimashevskaya, 2010). The majority of the poor are working families 
with children (Moskovskii Finansovyi Forum, 2016; 14). 
North (2005) argues that the post-Soviet experience highlights the 
wide gap between intentions and outcomes and the fragility of social 
order in the process of fundamental economic, political and social change. 
According to the general ideas in North (1990), although formal 
institutions in the form of laws and regulations have changed as a result 
of political decisions, informal institutions such as behavioral norms and 
organizational culture are not likely to have evolved to the same extent. 
Two main reasons for this can be identified. Either the informal 
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institutions are more deeply rooted culturally and change slower than 
formal ones, or they barely change at all or in another direction than what 
was intended by policy-makers. Adding the agency dimension, effects of 
reforms as such need to be separated from consequences arising from the 
survival and evolution of informal institutions. All these aspects are 
related to how people react or adapt to reforms, and they are also 
connected with their faith in the enforcement of rules, organizational 
structures, norms, behavior and attitudes. 
The capability approach to analyzing poverty highlights relational 
aspects rather than incomes or ownership as such. This means that a 
person's exchange entitlements are highlighted. The ability of people to 
get out of poverty thus depends on their ability to transform whatever 
income or assets they have into food and other necessities. Assets are, 
according to Sen (1984), classified into three categories: resources, 
including all kinds of capital (also social capital, human capital, cultural 
capital); rights, such as welfare entitlements; and relationships. This 
means that according to this approach, incomes or assets are not enough 
for people to overcome poverty; agency in one form or another is also 
required. 
THE EVOLUTION OF POVERTY IN RUSSIA 
Output was falling in Russia all through the 1990s until 1998 / 9 (Ericson, 
2009; Leeson and Turnball, 2006; Roland, 2006). After that, high 
economic growth was registered from 1999 to mid-2008, when it was hit 
by the global economic crisis (Sutela, 2013). Since mid-2009, economies 
were recovering again until 2013, when falling oil prices started to cause 
problems. Poverty levels followed these trends quite closely. Federal law 
No 134-FZ, ‘About a living wage in the Russian Federation’ was adopted in 
1997. This law established ‘a legal basis for minimum wage definition, 
state guarantees and social protection’. The law was revised in May 2000, 
August 2004 and July 2009. The official poverty line (prozhitochnyi	
minimum) is defined as the minimum income necessary for physiological 
survival (Yates, 2004; 13). 
Poverty is officially defined with an absolute ‘subsistence minimum’ 
based on the price of a basket of goods, which is assumed to cover basic 
needs. According to the resulting national poverty lines, while in the early 
1990s on average a third of the Russian population was considered to be 
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poor, poverty rates then started to decrease. In 2007 – 2013, poverty rates 
in Russia have remained rather stable at 11 – 12 percent (Rosstat, 2015). 
This is partly due to the indexation of poverty lines for inflation, but it 
does highlight that a section of the population lives in entrenched, chronic 
poverty. In Russia, poverty has, since 2014, started to increase again; in 
2016, according to official figures, 13.5 percent of the population was 
poor. A sign of increasing poverty was that people were using increasing 
shares of their income for food (Ovcharova and Biryukova, 2015; 5 – 6).  
Measuring poverty simply on the basis of income has, however, 
proven to be a problematic approach (Yates, 2004). One reason is due to 
irregular payments (Rimashevskaya, 2010). Another reason is the spread 
of the informal economy and hidden types of income (Gaddy and Ickes, 
1998; Kim, 2002). A third reason is that peoples' subjective evaluations 
differ from the official definitions based on income (Chebankova, 2010; 
Rudenko, 2014). A fourth reason which is less commonly highlighted is 
that focusing on income does not adequately reflect the effects of changes 
in entitlements that people have experienced in the aftermath of the 
perestroika processes. The large number of people close to the poverty 
line means however that if this was set at a slightly different level, the 
percentage of official poor would change quite substantially (Ovcharova, 
2008). Therefore, one should not focus on exact figures, but rather on 
tendencies. 
Interviewees give the impression that the ‘subsistence minimum’ is 
far too low to provide a decent variety of food. Additionally, the poverty 
line is based on a political decision and it can be moved down or up 
according to the government's considerations. If the line is dropped down, 
the number of beneficiaries decreases. That can save budget expenditures 
but will also bring a bias in statistics.  
State policies of social policy in Russia 
Across Russia, the sudden emergence of large-scale poverty in the 1990s 
was exacerbated by the fact that the social welfare programs inherited 
from the Soviet Union were inadequately focused on deprivation. The 
Soviet authorities denied that social ills like poverty existed. Social 
benefits were generally universal, for example pensions, or else awarded 
to particular groups of the population on the basis of merit or special 
needs: for example, to military veterans, mothers of large families and 
194  Ann-Mari Sätre  
 
disabled people. A significant amount of support was provided in-kind or 
as discounts on services, rather than cash. The notion of ‘targeting’ state 
financial resources to individuals on the basis of material need was 
unfamiliar, and existing welfare programs thus could not cushion shocks 
to income and well-being during the 1990s (Klugman, 1998; Lokshin and 
Popkin, 1999; Yates, 2004). Russia confronted the challenge of reforming 
its social protection systems in conditions of limited budgetary resources. 
Also, resistance to change has appeared from a range of stakeholders: 
public protests broke out across Russia in 2005 when the government 
attempted to replace a range of subsidies and free benefits for pensioners, 
veterans and other groups with cash payments. 
The poverty phenomenon of the 1990s led to increased resources 
being allocated to social security but also laid the basis for the 
professionalization of social work (Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov, 
2002). Russia has used budgetary reserves amassed from natural 
resources to raise pensions and social payments from time to time. Such 
moves as increasing pensions by 35 percent in 2010 have ensured that 
real disposable incomes actually rose, despite the economic downturn in 
the years of financial crisis (Zubarevich, 2015a). Wages for teachers, 
librarians and cultural workers have been raised, and—according to the 
government's plan from 2013—were to continuously rise until 2017. 
Regardless of their employment status, all individuals are eligible by law 
for a basic pension and free health care. This principle of universal 
coverage of the provisions is combined with a low level of provision. 
Welfare has been financed by oil and gas revenues rather than income tax 
revenues (Gaddy and Ickes, 2015).  
Up until 2012, expenses for social policy in Russia were adjusted to 
inflation rates (Ovcharova et al., 2015; 2). From 2013 to 2015, 
adjustments were not done even if inflation rates were increasing 
(Biryukova and Bardanyan, 2015; 2 – 3). Nevertheless, despite the falling 
GDP, leading to considerable cuts in most budget expenses for 2015, the 
budget for social policy was increased in nominal values.1 The formal 
conditions and procedures regulate who has the right to social services.  
                                                      
1  Budget spending on education, health and social policy has since 2013 decreased 
in a number of Russian regions, in 2015 spending decreased in eight regions 
(Zubarevich 2015b). 
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Some major reforms have been initiated, for example, the ‘maternity 
capital’ reform, the ‘foster family’ reform and the ‘social enterprise’ 
reform enabling delivery of social services by non-state actors. The 
‘maternity capital’ reform (Federal'nyi	Zakon	No. 256-FZ 2006) came into 
force in Russia in 2007.2 It is aimed to encourage women to give birth to a 
second or even a third child by providing families with a substantial 
financial incentive. In addition to the state support system are the regional 
programs, i.e. subsidies for families for their living and for education, and 
extra rubles for a third child. Families may also get land for free to build 
homes. It is important for the local administration to be active in order to 
get any federal funding. This funding is mostly based on the system of local 
co-financing. Consequently, local residents face different possibilities of 
benefitting from such programs, depending on how active their 
community is.  
There are also documents demonstrating the size of the different 
benefits, and depicting their adjustment to compensate for price 
increases. Social services provide information to groups entitled to 
support about their rights. At the same time, it is evident that hierarchical 
structures in social service have many negative effects, among others that 
recipients maintain low trust in authorities (Shlapentokh, 2006). Also, 
there exist problems of enforcement as, for example, it appears that it is 
difficult for social services to allocate help to the most needy. The poor 
have to apply for benefits themselves, but many do not fulfil the 
requirements (interviews with social work experts, 2010 – 2013).  
The financial distribution of social benefits has been the main means 
of regulating poverty. Resources allocated to poverty relief have generally, 
however, been insufficient when reflected against the fact that payments 
of social benefits do not cover basic expenditures. It appears that social 
policy has not been primarily devoted to combatting poverty. Birth grants 
are, for example, contingent on child-bearing only. The National Priority 
Programs and demographic policies have entailed new interventions in 
employment, housing and health care, in order to reach the state's 
demographic goals (Cook, 2011; Chandler, 2013). But there are also 
considerable subsidies distributed for housing and various forms of child 
                                                      
2  The maternity program was to be ended by the end of 2016, but has been extended 
to 2018. In a speech before the presidential election in March 2018, Vladimir Putin 
announced that it will be extended to 2021. 
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benefits. Many of the benefits are quite small, but gathering all of them 
together implies a contribution to family incomes, especially to families 
with three or more children. These are distributed according to category, 
and not based on needs, and as such not primarily to the poor. This is 
about solving the problem of social orphans by, on the one hand, 
increasing support to families in connection to the birth of children and, 
on the other, to increase support to families who step in to take care of 
bringing up children whose parents have lost custody. 
Changing priorities? 
Russian administration has two levels of socio-cultural expenses, those at 
the federal level and those by regions. Seventy-five percent of expenses 
for social policy are paid by the state, reflecting the fact that the state has 
to secure payments of pensions, while the regions have to finance the bulk 
of expenses for health and education by themselves. However, only a small 
part of benefits is targeted to low income families; this consists of a 
subsidy for accommodation plus a minor child benefit per child and, since 
2013, additional monthly payments for families with three children or 
more (Zubarevich and Gorina, 2015; 51 – 52). 
But there is somewhat of a contradiction here, which is due to the 
downturn of the economy implying restrictions on expenses directed to 
social policy. This is about the increased effort to also direct support to the 
poorest. Minimum subsistence level, along with its components and ways 
of calculation, is set by the federal level, while it is the regions that are 
charged with the responsibility to secure rights with their own budgets.  
Some restructuring of priorities has been reflected through a few 
pieces of legislation in 2013 – 2015. According to new principles adopted 
in 2014, support should be reoriented from general support to support to 
those below the poverty line. The policy is implemented by regions, but 
due to financial deficiencies in 2014 – 2015, in order to fulfil the new 
regulations, other kinds of adjustments are required. In effect, the 
normative decisions regulating rights to support have been changed; the 
list of responsibilities that should be covered has changed. Conditions for 
measures have become stricter and decision-making concerning 
payments have also been altered (Gorina, 2017). The specific changes 
vary between regions, but in general terms this is about stricter 
conditions for actually being entitled to support aimed for the poor. In 
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Arkhangelsk region, for example, according to a social work specialist, the 
minimum subsistence level has been reduced from 13,500 to 10,000 
rubles in 2016 (interview, social services, December 2016). 
The change to targeted subsidies has meant a cut in social transfers, 
while also reducing the number of people entitled to support. In addition, 
inflation is no longer compensated for, as there is no indexation. 
Interviews with foster families indicate that even they are not protected 
from inflation (interview with foster family, Arkhangelsk oblast, April 
2016). By and large, only a small percentage (seven percent) of total sums 
for social support go to targeted groups (Moskovskii	 finansovyi forum, 
2016; 5). This is not surprising given the extremely small money that 
actually is paid in the form of child benefits and the like. 
Russia has relied on income from oil when funding the general 
welfare system. In 2015, as the oil price went down, the Russian budget 
was running with a deficit. Although price decreases of oil did not affect 
the budget, it contributed to increasing inflation rates and consequently 
decreased the real value of social policy measures for individual families. 
The temporary solution of financing social policy through the reserve 
fund provides a warning; one should assume that there will be more cuts 
in social expenses to come, and that this could be harmful to parts of the 
Russian population. 
The State and socially-oriented NGOs 
Although the number of NGOs was indeed growing in the 1990s, many 
commentators have noted that doors have been closing again after Putin's 
access to power, which is reflected in a decreasing number of NGOs (Cook, 
2011). Generally, after the Federal Law on ‘foreign agents’ was enforced 
(Federal'nyi	Zakon	No. 121-FZ 2012), NGOs became more dependent on 
domestic funding and the Presidential Administration increased its 
capacity to distribute presidential grants (Chebankova, 2012). In order to 
be able to get grants one has to make sure to enter the ‘right’ NGO list 
(interview with NGO leaders, Novgorod, May 2016). 
In particular, increased control from above (as manifested in new 
legislation in 2006 and again in 2012 and 2014), suggest that it has 
become more difficult for bottom-up initiatives to provide social services, 
given that they are not likely to get support from the state (interview with 
a lawyer, Arkhangelsk, December 2016). Some of the larger NGOs with 
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roots from the Soviet period, such as the non-governmental organizations 
‘for Deaf and Blind’ and ‘for the Disabled’, provide an example of NGOs 
who are accepted and supported by the state (Interviews, Arkhangelsk, 
October 2012; December 2016). 
The increased effort to engage people in the ‘third sector’ or socially 
oriented activities, is promoted by the Federal Law No 40-FZ ‘On socially-
oriented NGOs’ (adopted in 2010). It appears that, rather than increasing 
tax payments to finance social policy, citizens are ‘encouraged’ to 
contribute to the fulfillment of social aims in various ways 
(Obshchestvennaya	 palata, 2012). First, there are general measures to 
redirect NGO activities from politics or human rights to social welfare, 
through new laws regulating the activities of NGOs promising tax relief 
measures, fewer audits and less control. NGOs should contribute to ‘social 
help’, emphasizing the importance of being an active citizen in the social 
sphere; that is, a special kind of activism is promoted. Secondly, there are 
raised expectations of voluntary work, mainly by women engaged in the 
social sphere. Third, voluntary contributions to charity by businesses are 
encouraged on the basis of ethics and moral values, rather than through 
the use of monetary incentives (ibid., 2012). 
Women responsible for solving problems of poverty  
It is well documented that female politicians were commonly responsible 
for social policies in the Soviet Union, and that women continue to take 
this responsibility at higher as well as at lower political levels in post-
Soviet Russia (Lapidus, 1975; Moses, 2008). The same women are 
sometimes also the chairpersons in the women's councils which are 
registered NGOs, although they are not examples of bottom-up 
organizations. Kulmala (2013) and Phillips (2005) have observed that 
many of the organizational skills evident in NGOs were developed from 
women's experiences in Soviet organizations. As a result of the low 
priority given to female dominated sectors such as health and social 
services in state policy, women had to develop an ability to find practical 
solutions to everyday problems, and these skills have survived after the 
Soviet system (Sätre, 2001; 2016). Women use them in their formal 
positions as responsible for social policy and in informal positions, when 
taking responsibility voluntarily in social work. Interviews provide 
evidence of how social workers actually make their own judgements 
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about whom to support, taking into account the inadequate resources 
they have at their disposal. Adhering to North, this is about the survival of 
informal institutions. Referring to Amartya Sen's framework of 
capabilities, to act they need to have access to some assets, and also to be 
able to use these assets. 
Interviews were conducted with directors of children homes, 
rehabilitation centers, schools and other places in order to find out 
whether women helped to make possible increasing resources, rights or 
relations of the poor. Focusing on their agency facilitates distinguishing 
their potential roles of empowering the poor from their controlling roles. 
Interviews tell about how social workers, social pedagogues at schools, 
teachers, doctor's assistants, deputies of commissions or local village 
councils, local politicians and others have tried to help people take part in 
state programs and become classified to be entitled to support in one way 
or another (Sätre, 2014b). 
Parallel hierarchies versus personal networks 
Earlier research acknowledges that NGOs have been formed in order to 
address current social problems (cf. Cook and Vinogradova, 2006; 
Hemment, 2007; Kay, 2000; Salmenniemi, 2008; Sperling, 1999). Many of 
these have addressed the problems of poverty in one way or another; one 
example is distribution of food in rural areas (Sätre, 2000). It has been 
argued that many of these organizations adapt to changes and try to solve 
problems as they appear rather than trying to change something through 
open protests in society (Mendelson and Gerber, 2007). This is illustrated 
by an NGO representative (the director of a charity fund, interview 2011 
and 2017). Six years after the first visit, the fund is still in place, and the 
leader is also the same, the former secretary of the Communist Party in 
the mono-town. On her list is 70 local people, these are people she knows. 
They are former party officials, from the trade union, those in 
administrative positions. The director of the fund knows what each of 
them can contribute: ‘they all help, nobody refuses’, she says. When 
somebody needs help, she makes the necessary phone calls, or she writes 
a letter. 
It appears that female officials view women's organizations as 
potential allies in the social sphere, being potential providers of social 
services, and filling gaps in the badly shredded Russian safety net (cf. 
Sätre, 2014a). One aspect is also the continued reliance on help from 
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voluntary organizations in one way or another (Kay, 2011; Salmenniemi, 
2008). Interviews with professionals at state social services have revealed 
that they are dependent on NGOs in different ways. 
It seems reasonable to assume that Soviet type systems aggravated 
the condition for bottom-up, empowering civil organizing (Rose, 1996). 
These legacies fulfill a function also in today's Russian society, since NGOs 
assisting the poor often are formed top down rather than bottom-up, and 
rather than working for empowerment, stand for charity.3 Interviews 
from four Russian regions provided evidence of how social welfare 
institutions and NGOs seem to function as two parallel hierarchies of 
support that do not necessarily reach people most in need. It appears that 
state policies promote hierarchical top-down models, with both social 
welfare offices and NGOs providing charity rather than empowerment. 
There are no formal structures for collaboration, and therefore no regular 
means of co-operation. On the contrary, co-operation between NGOs and 
social services appears to be based on personal contacts or on ad	hoc 
agreements. When something happens, resources are mobilized to meet 
the particular emergency situation.  
Recent pressure from the state to engage socially oriented NGOs is 
compatible with developments at the local level. Women who were used 
to finding informal solutions to problems during the Soviet period 
continue to find ways to secure survival in post-Soviet Russia through 
their unpaid voluntary work (in addition to paid work). Local authorities 
are intertwined with traditional organizations, such as women's councils 
and veteran's councils, which are officially registered as NGOs (Kulmala, 
2013; Sätre, 2014c). There are networks between women leaders, across 
state organizations and NGOs, as well as between leaders of informal 
clubs. Foster family clubs and networks of mothers with many children or 
single mothers are examples of the latter. A woman in charge at the 
administration of a small town says she as a member of the regional 
women's council, is a mentor to a child in a poor family (interview, Nizhny 
Novgorod oblast, April 2016). 
Charity organizations are engaged in helping homeless children and 
young criminals, and also, to some extent, in ‘bottom-up projects’, such as 
helping individuals or groups with funds to start up various activities 
                                                      
3  See further Crotty (2009), who finds that social NGOs are hierarchical and they do 
not promote the development of civil society, but rather focus on one question. 
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(Granberg and Sätre, 2017). A local head of administration tells about how 
she had herself initiated all the ongoing TOS4 activities in her area 
(interview Arkhangelsk oblast, December 2016). This implies a blurring 
of responsibilities, of roles and of tasks, so that it is difficult to see where 
the state's responsibility ends, and where the voluntary sector takes over. 
Returning to the role of institutions, social work through women's 
paid and unpaid work resulted from the non-priority status of social work 
in the Soviet system. A combination of different strategies is important to 
overcome different kinds of deficiencies arising in the processes of 
transformation and decentralization in post-Soviet Russia, during which 
various combinations of women's formal and informal organizations have 
survived. Women continue to carry significant responsibilities for 
organizing social welfare within society, as well as for empowering 
voluntary work, given the gendered nature of the responsibility for social 
work in both state and non-state contexts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although social policy continues to be financed by the state to a major 
extent, new ways of organizing social welfare have been launched which 
are opening up opportunities for empowerment processes. Networks of 
women working and engaging in the social sphere provide hope for the 
poor in Russia. But it is still mostly about charity rather than 
empowerment. Despite all the problems with the functioning of the 
system there are local tendencies towards collaboration between women 
in different positions who try to find ways to go forward. It is usual that 
women who are responsible for social welfare have to find sponsors by 
themselves, for their regular activities. Being responsible for organizing 
social welfare, women working in the social sphere have created their 
own support networks for this. They use relations to create resources. 
Their agenda is often larger than the directives they might be subject to 
from above. They are also actively working to increase available resources 
by, for example, applying for projects, striving to participate in state 
programs and collecting charity. This means, however, that solutions are 
likely to be more heterogeneous than before. The empirical material 
                                                      
4  Territorial'noe	 Obshchestvennoe	 Samoupravlenie, in English ‘self-managed local 
association’ (see Granberg and Sätre (2017). 
202  Ann-Mari Sätre  
 
provides information about how this happens, how women continue to 
take responsibility for social welfare, how they react, and about their 
efforts. The broad picture supports the finding that Soviet culture taught 
women to find solutions which continue to be needed in contemporary 
Russia. 
As to the Russian social policy, there is a risk that the state places too 
much reliance on women's unpaid work. No matter how active are women 
who take on responsibility for social welfare, whether they do this 
formally or informally, in any case, this activity will not be enough to solve 
the basic problems of poverty in Russia. Furthermore, stricter attitudes to 
NGOs are hindering initiatives and agency and provide additional 
difficulties. Agency is clearly not enough; stronger support from the 
government is needed as well.  
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CHAPTER 10:  
THE POLITICS OF PENSION REFORMS IN KAZAKHSTAN: 
PRESSURES FOR CHANGE AND REFORM STRATEGIES1 
Elena Maltseva and Saltanat Janenova 
INTRODUCTION 
Following the dissolution of the USSR, Kazakhstan led the way amongst 
post-Soviet states by launching some of the most ambitious economic and 
welfare reforms (Dave, 2007). The government pursued a program of 
liberal economic reforms designed to establish a free market economy. In 
the social realm, dramatic changes in the economy and the failure of the 
Soviet pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system to provide for the proliferating 
number of pensioners, had led the government to the realization that 
Kazakhstan's collapsing pension system and rapidly growing pension 
arrears needed to be addressed (Maltseva, 2012). During this time, the 
international and regional policy contexts favored a liberal policy 
paradigm in the sphere of social security that was also promoted by major 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as the only viable solution (Becker et al., 2009; 
Maltseva, 2012; Blackburn, 2016). As a result, in 1997, the Kazakhstani 
government went ahead with a radical pension reform (Maltseva, 2012). 
The Pension Law of 1997 replaced the PAYG system with a new pension 
system based on individual investment accounts to be maintained either 
with the State Accumulation Pension Fund (SAPF) or with non-state 
(privately-owned) pension funds (NSAPF) (Andrews, 2001; Maltseva, 
2012). According to the original plan, an old state-supported PAYG 
pension system would remain in place for pensioners who had 
contributed to the system until 1998, with all workers who had accrued 
benefits under the old system retaining their entitlements. It was 
                                                      
1 Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the International Labour Organization for 
providing financial support to this study; to the Ministry of Healthcare and Social 
Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Unified State Pension Fund 
(ENPF) for allowing access to the data used in this chapter; to the Federation of 
Free Trade Unions of Kazakhstan and civil movement ‘For Fair Maternity Benefits,’ 
as well as Sabit Khakimzhanov and Meiram Zhandildin for sharing their valuable 
insights on the implementation of the 2013 pension reform. All errors are our own.  
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expected that the new pension system would completely replace the old 
one between 2045 and 2050 (Seitenova and Becker, 2003). 
Critics of this radical privatization model, primarily the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), long argued that the emphasis 
of the liberal reform on the technocratic elements of pension provision 
and the financial stability of the future pension system, without taking 
into consideration issues of inclusion, social justice and the adequacy of 
pension benefits, could lead to social protests and declining levels of old-
age social security—thus undermining the system's overall sustainability 
(Frilander, 2012; Deacon, 2015). During the 1990s, when the World 
Bank / IMF model of pension provision was the dominant policy 
paradigm, this argument was rejected by most countries in transition, 
primarily because of their close co-operation with and financial 
dependency on international financial institutions (Frilander, 2012; 
Deacon, 2015; Blackburn, 2016). However, as time passed, it became 
increasingly difficult for the post-Soviet governments to overlook the 
institutional, social and economic deficiencies of private pension systems. 
Eventually, the IMF / World Bank model of old age security lost its appeal 
and the world witnessed the rise of several alternative policy solutions 
(Wang, Williamson and Cansoy, 2016; Koutronasa and Yew, 2017).  
In Kazakhstan, the gradual transformation of the old age social 
security system unfolded in the context of a changing international policy 
paradigm in the area of pension provision. It was determined by the 
presence of lingering social, economic, demographic and financial 
pressures, which seemed to become more complex after the 
implementation of the liberal pension reform in 1998. Starting in 2005, 
the Government of Kazakhstan worked on adjusting the liberal pension 
system to fit Kazakhstani economic and labor market realities. An 
important ideational shift happened in 2012, when the President of 
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, presented his vision of how the 
country should develop if it wanted to join the list of the 30 most 
developed countries in the world by 2050, echoing the East Asian 
developmental model. Titled the Kazakhstan‐2050 Strategy, the program 
set ambitious developmental goals in the areas of economic development 
and diversification, good governance, education, public health, and others 
(Aitzhanova, Katsu, Linn and Yezhov, 2014). As part of this broad 
modernization effort, the president also ordered the development of a 
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new concept for a pension system to align with the priorities of the 
Kazakhstan‐2050	 Strategy and tackle the deficiencies of the previous 
system (Mozharova, 2013). 
Guided by these instructions, the new 2013 pension reform 
reflected the modernizing drive of Kazakhstani political elites. The reform 
reinstated a state monopoly in the sphere of pension provision, levied 
additional pension taxes on employers, and raised the retirement age for 
women from 58 to 63. Two years after the announcement of the 2013 
pension reform, the government went ahead with targeting Kazakhstan's 
large informal labor market by linking the size of the basic pension 
payment to the length of one's formal employment, thereby establishing 
a quasi-funded pillar that would be maintained with employer 
contributions. Scheduled to come into force in 2018, the proposed change 
suggested that the announced pension reforms were the continuation of 
the broader transformation agenda set by the government in 2012.  
This chapter offers insights into the causes and dynamics of 
Kazakhstani pension reforms since the 1990s. Using the theoretical 
framework of policy transfer, social learning and path-dependency, it is 
argued that the two distinct periods in the transformation of the 
Kazakhstani pension system during the last two decades are best 
explained by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. This 
includes an analysis of the shift in the global old age social security 
paradigm during the early 2000s, which at various stages of the reform 
process had a profound influence on the direction of Kazakhstan's 
pension reform.  
OLD AGE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The chapter will apply the policy transfer approach to study the origins of 
the government's decisions to reform the Kazakhstani pension system. 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) defined policy transfer as ‘the process, by 
which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in 
the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in another political system’ (5). Despite some legitimate 
criticism of this approach raised by such scholars as Stubbs (2002; 2005), 
Stone (2017) and several others, this approach allows researchers to 
explore the various dimensions of policy change, by answering such 
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questions as why a particular policy was preferred to other policy options, 
who was involved in the policy transfer, what were the outcomes of policy 
transfer, and others (Greener, 2002). 
According to Dolowitz and Marsh, policy transfer can be of a 
voluntary, negotiated or coercive nature (2000; 8; cf. Bender, Keller and 
Willing, 2014). Negotiated policy transfer occurs when, in exchange for 
loans or grants, policy actors agree to change their policies. Coercive 
policy transfer usually means that governments are forced to adopt 
certain policies by other actors, such as states or international or 
supranational organizations (Bender, Keller and Willing, 2014). 
Conditionality, which was frequently imposed on post-Soviet states 
during the 1990s, could be considered as one form of coercion (Bender, 
Keller and Willing, 2014). Finally, voluntary policy transfer is often 
compared to the process of policy learning, which presupposes that 
‘policies implemented elsewhere are examined by rational political actors 
for their potential utilization within another political system’ (Bender, 
Keller and Willing, 2014; originally quoted in Evans, 2008; 7). In this 
sense, the concept of social learning is useful to explore how policymakers 
adjust their policies in response to past experience and new information 
(Bender, Keller and Willing, 2014). 
Last but not least, to uncover the story behind Kazakhstan's pension 
reform, one should also pay attention to the considerable constraints that 
often prevent policymakers from implementing reforms as planned 
(Greener, 2002). Path dependency theory suggests that the choices 
available to actors at any given moment depend on the choices made in 
previous periods, and that once a path is chosen, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to change course because the processes become institutionalized 
(Rixen and Viola, 2009). This explains why radical policy change is so 
difficult to achieve despite the suboptimal performance of old institutions 
(Greener, 2002). 
For several decades, research on social policy and pension reforms 
in Western Europe and North America was one of the most popular topics 
in policy research. Interested in issues of policy change and institutional 
inertia, scholars studied developments in mature capitalist societies 
facing growing demographic pressures and mounting fiscal costs. Works 
by Pierson (1994), Bonoli (2000), Hinrichs (2000), Taylor-Gooby (2001), 
Mattil (2006), Steenbeek and Lecq (2007), Marier (2008), Andersen and 
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Larsen (2009), Ebbinghaus and Gronwald (2009), Bengtsson (2010), De 
Santis (2012), and others examined the origins, dynamics and outcomes 
of welfare reforms, trying to understand the causes of change and stability 
in welfare institutions. Many of these studies explained social policy 
change (or the lack of it) through the prism of neo-institutionalist 
approaches, such as rational choice or historical institutionalism, arguing 
that there was a tendency for established institutions to create conditions 
for their own reproduction over time. In other words, in line with path 
dependency theory, many scholars argued that the policy options 
available to many Western governments when dealing with growing 
demographic and fiscal pressures were circumscribed by the presence of 
well-established institutions and constituencies, and the political risks 
associated with any attempts at welfare retrenchment or radical policy 
change.  
In contrast, the welfare systems in developing and post-Soviet 
countries have been subject to more radical and more frequent policy 
changes, with governments reversing the course of earlier policies every 
time their priorities change. Starting in the 1980s, many developing 
countries in Latin America and other parts of the world, when faced with 
mounting economic and financial pressures, had no other choice but to 
agree to the implementation of drastic structural adjustment measures 
proposed by the IMF and the World Bank. As a result, during this time 
many developing countries switched to liberal private pension systems. 
The wave of neo-liberal pension reforms started in Chile, when in 1981 
the right-wing government of General Augusto Pinochet replaced the old 
pension system with a privately-managed system of pension provision. 
Shortly after, several other governments followed. However, as time 
passed, the new pension systems displayed serious shortcomings and 
were either rolled back or adjusted to fit socioeconomic and demographic 
realities. 
These developments offered scholars plenty of opportunities to 
study the weaknesses and limitations of private pension systems, and 
examine the origins and dynamics of pension reforms in unstable political 
and socioeconomic contexts. Scholars such as Paul and Paul (1995), 
Loayza and Palacios (1997), Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), Samwick (1999) and 
others analyzed Latin American pension systems after the reforms and 
pointed to a number of weaknesses in the operation of private defined-
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contribution pension models, and offered strategies for dealing with these 
problems. Several authors examined the dynamics of social policy change 
and obstacles to the implementation of liberal welfare reforms in 
transitional contexts of post-Soviet republics and Eastern Europe. 
Authors such as Cook (2000), Buckley and Donahue (2000), Andrews 
(2001), Chandler (2004), Seitenova and Becker (2003, 2004), Becker et 
al. (2009), Falkingham and Vlachantoni (2012), and others offered 
insightful accounts of welfare and old-age social security reforms in post-
Soviet states during the 1990s and 2000s. Other scholars, such as Mitchell 
Orenstein (2008), provided important insights into the role that 
international actors played in facilitating policy transfer and driving liberal 
policy change in the area of old-age social security around the globe.  
As time passed, and many countries reversed their liberal pension 
systems, scholars focused on explaining this, exploring the role of 
endogenous factors and changes in the international policy paradigm 
facilitating these reversals. Of particular interest are studies that tried to 
explain the recent reversals of private pension systems in Latin America 
(Bertranou, 2001; Mesa-Lago, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2009; Kay and Sinha, 
2008; Calvo, Bertranou and Bertranou, 2010; Arza, 2012; Hujo and Rulli, 
2014; Hujo, 2014), Central and Eastern Europe (Whitehouse, 2011; 
Hirose, 2011; OECD, 2012; Drahokoupil and Domonkos, 2012), Central 
Asia (Zhandildin, 2015) and Russia (Sokhey, 2017).  
Utilizing relevant insights from the literature on policy transfer, 
social learning and path-dependency, this chapter aims to add important 
details to a central puzzle in public policy analysis, namely why and how 
policies change. The chapter contributes to a growing body of literature 
on the post-Soviet welfare state and policy reversals. The authors aim to 
highlight the importance of endogenous and exogenous factors in 
explaining the policy outcome, paying particular attention to the role of 
international financial institutions in setting the post-Soviet social policy 
agenda during the 1990s.  
THE 1988 PENSION REFORM IN KAZAKHSTAN: THE PRIVATIZATION 
STAGE 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan underwent a 
dramatic socio-economic transformation that put great strain on the 
Soviet PAYG pension system. With nearly universal coverage, a low 
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retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women), generous earnings-related 
benefits, and a high average replacement rate that often exceeded two-
thirds of the workers' previous highest wages, the generosity of the Soviet 
pension system meant that the system was coming under pressure 
(Falkingham and Vlachantoni, 2012). During the 1990s, given the difficult 
economic situation, the aging population and negative trends in the 
pension system's dependency ratio, the question became especially 
urgent as to whether the PAYG system could and should be retained, or 
whether a completely new pension system should be adopted.  
During this time, the major financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and donors such as the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) promoted a 
particular policy paradigm in the sphere of social security, pointing to its 
success in Eastern Europe and Latin America (World Bank, 1994). As a 
result, in 1997, the government of Kazakhstan presented its Concept of 
Pension Reform, developed under the guidance of the World Bank and 
built on the experience of the radical pension reform in Chile and the 
multi-level pension system model proposed by the World Bank in 1994 
(Becker et al., 2009). It was hoped that the new system would avert an 
old-age social security crisis by promoting self-sufficiency instead of 
government dependence, help reduce government expenditures, improve 
the management of pension funds, encourage savings, and contribute to 
the development of the capital market (Bird, 1997; Kokovinets, 1998; 
Andrews, 2001; Seitenova and Becker, 2004; Becker et al., 2009). The 
proposed pension reform formed part of a broader package of 
socioeconomic transformation, including two other components: the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the development of 
a securities market (Becker et al., 2009). 
Effective from 1 January 1998, the new pension law transformed 
Kazakhstan's pension system from a solidarity-based system to one based 
on individual accounts to be maintained either with the newly established 
state pension fund or with privately owned pension funds. It also raised 
the retirement age from 60 to 63 for men, and from 55 to 58 for women 
(Soloviev, 1997; Andrews, 2001). The new pillar, known as the mandatory 
accumulative pension scheme, was financed with a fixed 10 percent 
deduction from income. In addition to the mandatory pillar, the 
government also introduced a voluntary accumulative pension scheme 
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that was based on voluntary pension contributions (VPC), with which all 
citizens could increase their savings and, thereby, secure a higher income 
after retirement (Hinz, Zviniene and Vilamovska, 2005). In regard to the 
old solidarity component, the reform recognized accrued rights earned up 
to 1998, but terminated solidarity pension benefits for all other 
population groups. This move meant that retirees continued to receive 
their benefits under the old solidarity pension system and that workers 
who had accrued benefits prior to 1998 retained the right to receive those 
benefits upon reaching retirement age in the future (Hinz, Zviniene and 
Vilamovska, 2005). In other words, according to the original plan, the 
mandatory, publicly funded pension would exist for as long as there were 
workers with accrued rights.  
In short, the presence of various economic, fiscal, demographic and 
social problems motivated the government to launch the reform process, 
which, in turn, was heavily influenced by the ideology of neoliberalism 
and the advice of such powerful international policy actors as the IMF and 
the World Bank. However, as time passed, the deficiencies of the newly 
implemented pension system raised important questions about the 
applicability of fully privatized pension systems in the context of weakly 
developed political and economic institutions. Less than a decade after 
the implementation of the reform, it became evident that few of the 
government expectations pertaining to the development of the 
Kazakhstani fully-funded pension system had materialized due to 
deficiencies in the Kazakhstani labor and capital markets (Gorst, 2013; 
Zhandildin, 2015). One of the biggest obstacles to the successful 
implementation of the fully-privatized pension system was that the 
economic crisis of the 1990s was accompanied by serious problems on 
the labor market, with many people informally or only partially employed 
(Sziraczki, 1995). Since many people were paid unofficially, or received 
low official wages, they were prevented from amassing sufficient 
retirement savings, with many people making no contributions to the 
pension fund at all. The situation particularly affected women, who often 
had lower salaries than men, shorter or broken careers due to maternity 
leave, or entirely lacked an official employment record. To tackle the 
problems of these population groups, in 2005 the government introduced 
a basic social pension (Bazovaia	 Pensia in Russian) that was not 
dependent on private contributions or work history, and was provided to 
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all persons reaching retirement age. The new initiative was seen by some as 
a positive development that guaranteed at least minimum income security 
to all citizens reaching old age, in addition to funds earned under the 
residual old solidarity system and fully-funded accounts (Kurmanov, 2011). 
The situation on the Kazakhstani capital market was equally 
concerning. Affected by strict capital requirements and state restrictions 
on investments in foreign securities due to concerns about volatility on 
international markets, pension funds had failed to make a positive impact 
on the development of the Kazakhstani capital market, as was envisaged 
when the government launched the reform in 1998 (Gorst, 2013; 
Zhandildin, 2015). In addition, since the reform was implemented in the 
context of a weakly developed rule of law and underdeveloped financial 
markets, it came with a price in the form of non-transparent deals, weak 
governance in the private pension sector, and high service fees and 
operating costs (Yesirkepov, 2013). 
Furthermore, the reform failed to achieve high replacement rates, or 
enhance pension coverage and compliance as expected. According to the 
World Bank World Development Indicators from 2011, 65 percent of the 
labor force in Kazakhstan did not contribute to a retirement pension 
scheme (Abdih and Medina, 2013). This especially concerned self-
employed workers in the informal sector and / or unemployed people 
who remained in the socioeconomic shadows. For example, domestic 
services and subsistence farming were the two areas that grew rapidly in 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan and in which many people, especially women, 
worked unofficially (Semykina, 2014). Also, the low returns on 
investments, which averaged 3 – 4 percent, made the goal of attaining the 
60 percent replacement rate stated by the government at the beginning of 
the reform highly unlikely (Yesirkepov, 2013). In the end, the insufficient 
performance by the second pillar and the limited presence of the first 
pillar contributed to low replacement rates, which stood at 27 percent in 
2010 and 29 percent in 2013 (Zhandildin, 2015).  
In other words, by the end of the 2000s, the realization was growing 
within government circles that it was problematic to focus on the 
development of a fully-funded pension system and not keep the parallel 
solidarity system to protect workers in the context of a deep economic 
crisis and weakly developed labor and capital markets. Therefore, a range 
of adjustments to the 1998 pension system were required. 
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REFORMING KAZAKHSTAN'S PENSION SYSTEM: FROM PRIVATIZATION 
TO NATIONALIZATION 
The next stage in the transformation of the Kazakhstani pension system 
was preceded by mounting criticism of the dominant policy paradigm in 
the area of old age security (Orszag and Stiglitz, 1999; Kotlikoff, 1999; 
Barr, 2000; Heneghan, 2015). In addition to the growing academic 
literature questioning the outcomes of pension privatizations, perhaps 
one of the most significant reports was one published by the Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank in 2006. The report concluded 
that the World Bank's advice on pension reform had been based on 
political considerations rather than the optimal solution for each country; 
it concluded that in many developing countries, which had implemented 
the liberal pension reforms, the negative effects of reform outweighed the 
positive ones (IEG, World Bank, 2006). The research showed that in most 
countries studied, the reforms failed to significantly improve pension 
coverage, mainly because the poor did not have sufficient capacity to 
contribute to expensive private insurance systems. In addition, private 
pension fund companies had no interest in lowering administrative costs 
and making the system more affordable for the poor. Furthermore, the 
transition from one pension system to another proved to be prohibitively 
expensive, creating fiscal pressures on governments. Under conditions of 
the weak rule of law and weakly developed political and economic 
institutions, pensioners risked losing all their life savings if a country's 
financial markets collapsed. The report concluded that, in most countries, 
the reforms were driven by political elites without adequate social 
dialogue and the involvement of a range of stakeholders. Even though 
some positive effects of private pension systems on capital markets were 
reported, the ultimate goal of pension reform, namely creating an effective 
and sustainable old-age income support system, was not achieved (IEG, 
World Bank, 2006). 
As a result, since 2008 the general trend has been that several 
countries with private pension systems, including Argentina, Bolivia, and 
Hungary, have either reversed earlier privatizations or offered citizens the 
option of returning under the umbrella of the public redistributive 
pension system, which was the case in Uruguay and Peru (Datz and 
Dancsi, 2013; Mesa-Lago, 2014, 2016; Olivera, 2016). Other countries, 
including Poland, Russia and Chile, have also experimented with their 
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pension systems, often strengthening the public pension pillar rather than 
the private one (Sinha, 2000; Latorre-Artus, n.d.; Cohen and Cienski, 2014; 
Chłoń-Domińczak, 2016; Bertranou, 2016; Sokhey, 2017)2. In short, by the 
late 2000s, the global discourse on pension reform was no longer 
dominated by the ideas promoted by Western financial institutions, which 
contributed to the rise of alternative policy solutions to the problem of old 
age security. 
In Kazakhstan, an important shift in welfare policy happened after 
the 2008 financial crisis, and the events in Zhanaozen (Stratfor 
Assessments, 2009; Anichshenko, 2009; Maltseva, 2017). The 2008 
financial crisis revealed a troubling situation in Kazakhstan's banking 
sector and pointed to the need to restructure the country's financial 
system and diversify its economy. The importance of economic 
modernization was further reinforced during the early 2010s, when in 
response to growing external and internal pressures and falling oil prices, 
the country's economic development fell from 7.5 percent of GDP growth 
in 2011 to 4.1 percent in 2014 and 1.2 percent in 2015 (Asian 
Development Bank, 2016). However, economic modernization required 
the inflow of significant financial resources, which, given the slowing 
economy, were difficult to find. The situation was further complicated due 
to the events in Zhanaozen, when in December 2011 a conflict between a 
state-run oil company and a group of disgruntled oil workers turned 
violent, leaving 16 people dead at the hands of police, seriously 
challenging the legitimacy of the existing regime. The crisis highlighted 
the problems of Kazakhstani single-industry towns, and the need to invest 
in the reconstruction and development of cities like Zhanaozen (Human 
Rights Watch, 2012; Maltseva, 2017).  
In the end, growing social and economic pressures motivated the 
government to launch an ambitious developmental project that aimed to 
address numerous problems including rule of law, state transparency and 
accountability, economic diversification, and social cohesion (Maltseva, 
2017). The developmentalist turn happened in 2012, when President 
Nazarbayev declared in his address ‘Socio-Economic Modernisation—The 
Main Vector of Kazakhstan Development’ the beginning of extensive 
administrative, social, and economic reforms (Nazarbayev, 2012). The 
                                                      
2  See also Bretton Woods Project 2014. “Poland reverses World Bank-promoted 
pension scheme,” 31 March 2014. 
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program known as ‘Kazakhstan 2050’ set out to transform Kazakhstan 
into a modern state with effective institutions and a knowledge-based 
diversified economy driven by the private sector (Nazarbayev, 2014). In 
line with the main goals of this strategy, the president gave an order to 
develop a new concept for a pension system that would fall in line with 
the proposed modernization goals and tackle the deficiencies of the 
previous old-age social security system (Mozharova, 2013). Already, 
reliance on Western advice had been replaced by a focus on the 
experience of the East Asian developmental states, especially Singapore 
(Stark and Ahrens, 2012; 2014; Roberts, 2016; Araral, 2016).  
In April 2013, the government presented the public with a draft bill 
‘On Pensions in the Republic of Kazakhstan,’ which reversed the process 
of liberal market and social reforms adopted in the late 1990s (Savchenko, 
2013). With this move, the Kazakhstani government became the first 
Central Asian republic to follow in the steps of some Latin American and 
East European countries that introduced similar changes into their fully-
funded, defined-contribution pension systems. This time, the process of 
policy formulation was relatively fast and initially involved only a limited 
number of policy actors. To be more specific, the reform process was led 
by the president, the government, the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection, and the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, whereas 
the involvement of civil society, private pension funds, and other 
stakeholders, including international policy actors, was minimal 
(Savchenko, 2013). The draft bill proposed the following changes to the 
1998 fully-funded pension system: creation of a single pension fund under 
the name of the Unified Accumulative Pension Fund (UAPF, or ENPF in 
Russian) on the basis of the State Accumulation Pension Fund (SAPF); 
assigning of the management function of pension assets held by the ENPF	
to the National Bank; increasing the retirement age for women from 58 to 
63 progressively between 2014 and 2024; and introducing mandatory	5 
percent contributions paid by employers for workers employed in 
difficult and dangerous occupations (Medeusheyeva, 2013; Torebayeva, 
2013). 
The reform institutionalized a four-pillar pension system comprised 
of basic plus solidarity, mandatory, and voluntary levels. In 2013, no 
changes to the basic social pension were made, with the government 
providing it to all individuals who reached retirement age. Both the basic 
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social pension and the solidarity pension were financed from the state 
budget. At the same time, changes affected the mandatory accumulative 
pension system, which was financed with a fixed 10 percent of mandatory 
pension deductions from workers' income (Government of Kazakhstan, 
21 June 2013). To prevent some possible dissatisfaction and to 
compensate employers for the losses incurred as a result of these 
additional payments, the government promised tax deductions. It also 
urged employers to improve working conditions for employees, as this 
would allow them to obtain certificates confirming safe working 
conditions, and hence stop paying occupational pension contributions 
(Telemtayev and Adjivefayev, 2014).  
The 2013 pension reform was driven by the imperfections of the 
1998 pension system, domestic political and economic considerations, 
and the desire to make the existing old-age social security system, in 
particular its pension funds, an important element in the country's 
modernization process (Savchenko, 2013). The government and the 
president framed the issue, arguing that the poor performance of private 
pension funds, high fees that the private pension funds charged for their 
services, low returns from investments and frequent cases of corruption 
made it necessary for the state to intervene and rescue the accumulated 
pension funds from the deficiencies of financial markets (Alshanov, 2013). 
In other words, the new pension reform kept the individual pension 
accounts as the primary instrument of pension provision, but entrusted 
their administration to the state via the National Bank of Kazakhstan.  
Of note, the decision of the government was met with limited 
criticism from international financial institutions and business actors. 
The general concern was that the nationalization of pension funds would 
result in the violation of the rights of depositors, the ineffective 
management of private pension assets, and the loss of jobs in the private 
pension sector. Some business actors were also concerned with how this 
move would affect the attractiveness of the Kazakhstani capital markets 
to	 international investors. Other observers pointed out that the 
nationalization of pension funds raised the risk that the fund's investment 
strategy would be decided by political priorities, rather than a balanced 
assessment of risks and likely returns.3 Despite this legitimate criticism, 
                                                      
3  For more about investor reactions to these changes, please see “Kazakhstan Funds: 
Astana Merges Pension Funds,” 2013. The	Economist:	Intelligence	Unit, August 15. 
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the general dissatisfaction with the performance of the private pension 
system was evident not only in the statements of various policymakers, 
but also the critics of the new bill, who spoke not of preserving the private 
pension system, but rather criticized the hasty manner in which the bill 
was passed; they were concerned about possible negative outcomes of the 
state monopolization of pension funds (Galat, 2012).  
The most negative reaction to the reform came from women's NGOs 
and women's rights movements, who openly criticized various aspects of 
the proposed increase in the retirement age for women from 58 to 63. To 
the surprise of many in the government, the scale of protests on the 
streets and social media was unprecedented for post-Soviet Kazakhstan. 
Peaceful demonstrations by women's groups took place across different 
regions in several major cities across the country, and a collective petition 
was signed by over 100,000 citizens including prominent female leaders 
in education, culture, sports and politics, all against the increased 
retirement age for women. The petition was passed to the president with 
alternative suggestions on how to improve the welfare system for women 
(Janenova, 2015). 
Activists argued that the introduction of changes to women's 
retirement age should have been accompanied by comprehensive reforms 
of Kazakhstan's economy, labor market and healthcare system, as well as 
better access to childcare facilities for families with young children. It was 
argued that, even though Kazakhstani women live longer than men, they 
have numerous health problems that undermine their ability to work 
effectively after the age of 58, and are disproportionately affected by the 
deficiencies of the Kazakhstani labor market, including the difficulties for 
women aged 40 and over to find stable employment or to change jobs. 
Moreover, as some women argued, the introduction of a higher retirement 
age would dramatically affect the economic well-being and social fabric of 
many Kazakhstani families. Given the shortage of state-run pre-school 
childcare facilities, many young families have no other choice but to accept 
the traditional structure of Kazakhstani families and rely on their 
grandmothers for free babysitting services (Kuzhabekova et al., 2017). In 
the absence of timely developments in this area, respondents claimed that 
many young families would find it extremely difficult to balance their 
work and family obligations. In summary, they argued that Kazakhstan 
needed more jobs, a diversification of the economy to accommodate a 
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greater number of female workers, better employment policies and their 
stricter enforcement, and significant improvements in the healthcare and 
education systems if the government wanted to move ahead with a higher 
retirement age for women.3 
In light of the negative public reaction and the protests, the 
government was forced to respond. In an attempt to soothe public 
discontent, the government justified the reform with growing 
demographic and fiscal pressures, claiming that under the current system, 
although men were paying the bulk of money into the pension system, 
they could not benefit from it because they had a lower life expectancy 
and higher retirement age than women. Therefore, by increasing the 
retirement age for women, the government tried to create parity between 
the pension contributions of male and female workers, and also to 
increase the opportunities that would be available to women for receiving 
larger pensions (Mozharova, 2013). In addition, after discussions, the 
government pushed the start date of the retirement age hike from 2014 
to 2018, with an annual increase of the retirement age by six months. They 
kept the right to early retirement for some groups such as women with 
five or more children, and several other categories were also left 
unchanged. In addition, the authorities promised to address the structural 
problems evident in the labor market and to introduce measures to 
improve the skills of women workers. A complex plan, Initiative	50+, was 
enacted to facilitate the employment of people over 50 years old within 
state and sectoral programs (Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
2013).  
Two years after the implementation of the 2013 pension reform, in 
an attempt to reduce the informal market and motivate people to properly 
record their employment, the government decided to link the size of the 
basic pension payment to the length of service / employment and 
introduce the so-called quasi-funded pillar, in which each participant will 
have an individual retirement account (in addition to the already existing 
accumulative account) and to which employers will make contributions in 
the amount of 5 percent of the employee's income. Effective from 2018, 
this pension payment will be available to all citizens with work experience 
of no less than five years (Atabaev, 2014). Participants with at least 10 
                                                      
3  Author interviews, June – July 2015. 
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years of contributions will be entitled to 50 percent of the subsistence 
minimum, and then, for every year worked, this figure will be increased 
by 2 percent (Urazova, 2014). 
In summary, after 2013 the Kazakhstani pension system underwent 
profound changes that made the ENPF the sole organization responsible 
for the administration of pension funds and introduced a gradual 
retirement age hike for women starting from 2018. In line with the 
general governance trend, the reform process was swift, top-down and 
involved no real policy dialogue, with the government presiding over the 
process (Janenova and Knox, 2017). The reform was presented as an 
urgent matter, and framed as an indispensable component of the broader 
modernization program known as ‘Kazakhstan-2050.’ Driven by the 
Kazakhstani political elite in response to growing international and 
domestic pressures, the program was envisioned as an attempt at radical 
modernization of Kazakhstani society and the economy, akin to the 
experience of East Asian states. It aimed at transforming the structure of 
the Kazakhstani economy and its labor market, using the accumulated 
pension funds for investment in grand infrastructural and development 
projects.  
KAZAKHSTAN'S PENSION SYSTEM AT A CROSSROADS: WHAT NEXT? 
The Kazakhstani pension system went through two major reforms, which 
started in 1998 and 2013, and its transformation continues. The 1998 
pension reform launched a radical overhaul of the old Soviet pension 
system to one based on fully-funded, privately managed pension accounts 
and defined contributions. During the 1990s, the decision to reform the 
Soviet PAYG pension system was made due to the presence of deep 
socioeconomic and demographic pressures affecting the country's 
transition. However, in line with the coercive policy transfer argument, the 
direction of the 1998 pension reform was largely determined by the 
broader international policy context, in which a particular policy 
paradigm in the sphere of old-age social security was favored and 
promoted by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, and often reinforced through conditionalities. Pointing to the 
experience of other transitioning or developing countries which 
undertook similar reforms a decade before Kazakhstan, such as Chile, the 
World Bank justified the transition, arguing that the privatization of the 
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pension system would help with keeping government social expenditures 
under control, increase workers' mobility and responsibility for their own 
fate, prevent the possible mismanagement of pension funds and have 
positive externalities for the financial sector as workers' savings would be 
invested in capital markets. Convinced by these arguments, the 
Kazakhstani political elites followed the advice and replaced the PAYG 
pension system with a private pension system (World Bank, 1994; 
Seitenova and Becker, 2004; Hinz, Zviniene and Vilamovska, 2005; 
Zhandildin, 2015).  
However, as the negative outcomes of private pension systems in 
unstable socio-economic and political conditions became increasingly 
apparent, countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe started moving 
away from private pension arrangements and reintroducing or 
strengthening the publicly managed components of their pension systems 
(Whitehouse, 2011; Altiparmakov, 2017; Sokhey, 2017). Since 2008, some 
countries have reversed the earlier privatizations, while others have 
offered the possibility of returning to the public redistributive pensions 
system, or redirected the contribution rates allocated toward private 
individual accounts towards the pooled public pillar. Even Chile, despite 
not having reversed the policy of private pensions, has introduced a 
solidarity-based pension managed by the state and is currently discussing 
possible revisions (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2006; Altman, 2010). In other 
words, by the mid-2000s, the international policy environment in the field 
of old-age security had changed, offering countries like Kazakhstan an 
opportunity to re-evaluate the effectiveness of their private pension 
systems. In Central Asia, this process coincided with the strategic turn to 
East Asia, with governments using the experience of East Asian 
developmental states as a reference model for Eurasian countries, with 
Kazakhstan leading this (Stark, 2010; Roberts, 2016). Kazakhstan's 
fascination with the East Asian story of developmental success, and 
particularly Singapore, became especially noticeable in the last decade 
when the country adopted a series of wide-ranging reforms in the fields 
of education, health care, social security, research and development, IT, 
and others (Mahbubani, 2015; Araral, 2016).4 
                                                      
4  See also “Why Kazakhstan Learns from Singapore—Analysis.” 2016. Eurasia	
Review:	News	and	Analysis, October 27. 
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The re-orientation of Kazakhstan to the East Asian developmental 
model could be described as a process of voluntary policy transfer and 
social learning, which came at a time when the old liberal social policy 
paradigm came under heavy criticism and the country was dealing with 
numerous problems. Following the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, the 
government was forced to come up with a comprehensive program of 
socio-economic transformation. The government declared its intention to 
strengthen the rule of law, actively invest in infrastructure, improve the 
management of natural resources, industrialize and diversify the 
economy, modernize the agricultural sector, and support employment 
mobility programs and entrepreneurship. The government also promised 
greater investments in education, research, professional training and 
retraining programs. Last, but not least, the new pension strategy was 
developed, which aimed to tackle the Soviet legacies and the deficiencies 
of the previous system, and also to assist the government with its 
ambitious modernization program. In other words, the 2013 pension 
reform, and the more recent 2015 changes to the basic pension, were 
developed by the government in the context of a global shift in pension 
policy discourse, albeit driven primarily by internal considerations and 
problems.  
Still, despite the comprehensive economic and social reforms, 
several problems in the operation of the Kazakhstani pension system 
remain, including issues with the efficiency and transparency of the 
Unified National Pension Fund, low pension coverage and low pension 
levels, which especially concern women. Addressing these problems will 
require better integration of unemployed and self-employed people into 
the Kazakhstani pension system, diversification of the economy to ensure 
the faster growth of jobs in the formal sector, especially in rural areas,	and 
better labor market policies and legal enforcement. Furthermore, to 
tackle the problem of gender inequality in the labor market and the 
gender wage gap, the government will need to ensure that its decision to 
increase the retirement age is accompanied by economic and labor 
market reforms and new social policies including financing paternity 
leave, improving child care facilities, introducing flexible working hours 
and working from home for women with young children. In the long run, 
these developments would facilitate a significant cultural shift in 
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Kazakhstani society, which would help advance the idea of gender 
equality in society and the workplace.  
In conclusion, given the growing global and domestic social, 
economic and demographic pressures, the Kazakhstani government is 
likely to continue the complex transformation of the country's social and 
economic institutions, including its pension system. Carrying out these 
reforms undoubtedly poses a challenge to a regime whose legitimacy is 
primarily based on its ability to deliver high economic growth and provide 
adequate social protection for its citizens. To avoid a possible legitimacy 
crisis in the future, the government needs to more actively engage with 
civil society and establish a regular and effective policy dialogue with 
various stakeholders, especially women's groups.  
REFERENCES 
Abdih, Y. and L. Medina. (2013). Measuring	the	Informal	Economy	in	the	Caucasus	and	
Central	Asia. IMF Working Paper. Available at: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/w 
p/2013/wp13137.pdf. 
Ahrens, Joachim and Manuel Stark. (2012). “Economic Reform and Institutional Change 
in Central Asia: Towards a New Model of the Developmental State?” Private 
Hochschule Göttingen, Research papers. Available at: https://www.pfh.de/ 
fileadmin/Content/PDF/forschungspapiere/fp_2012_05_stark_ahrens.pdf.  
Ahrens, Joachim and Manuel Stark. (2014). “Emulating Developmental States? The 
Institutional Foundations of Economic Transition in Kazakhstan,” Critique	
Internationale 63 (2): 95 – 110.  
Aitzhanova, A., S. Katsu, J. Linn, and V. Yezhov. (2014). Kazakhstan	 2050:	 Toward	 a	
Modern	Society	for	All. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Alshanov, Rakhman. (2013). “Pension	System	Modernization	to	Promote	Reliability	and	
Efficiency,”	 The	 Astana	 Times, April 10. Available at: http://astanatimes.com/ 
2013/04/pension-system-modernization-to-promote-reliability-and-efficiency/. 
Altiparmakov, Nikola. (2017). “Another Look at Causes and Consequences of Pension 
Privatization Reform Reversals in Eastern Europe.” Journal	of	European	Social	
Policy (December), 1 – 18.  
Altman, Daniel. (2010). “The Social Security Reforms in Chile: Can a Privatized System 
Work?” Undergraduate Honors Thesis, University of Redlands. Available at: 
https://inspire.redlands.edu/cas_honors/21. 
Andersen, J.G., and C.A. Larsen. (2002). “Pension Politics and Policy in Denmark and 
Sweden: Path Dependencies, Policy Style, and Policy Outcome.” Paper presented 
at XV World Congress of Sociology, Brisbane, July 7 – 13, 2002. Available at:  
http://www.dps.aau.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/ime/CCWS/workingpapers/20 
02-27-PensionpoliticsinDenmark-JGA.pdf.  
228  Elena Maltseva and Saltanat Janenova 
 
Andrews, Emily S. (2001). “Kazakhstan: An Ambitious Approach to Pension Reform.” 
World Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series Nr. 0104. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discu 
ssion-papers/Pensions-DP/0104.pdf.  
Anichshenko, Valeriya. (2009). “The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Banking 
System of Kazakhstan.” Central	Asia	Business	Journal 2. Available at: http://citese 
erx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.519.5948&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
Araral, Eduardo. (2016). “Independent Kazakhstan Following Similar Path as Singapore 
toward Successful Development.” The	Astana	Times, 5 December. Available at: 
http://astanatimes.com/2016/12/independent-kazakhstan-following-similar-
path-as-singapore-toward-successful-development/.  
Arenas De Mesa, Alberto and Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell, Petra E. Todd and David 
Bravo. (2006). “The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: Lessons from the Social 
Protection Survey.” National Bureau of Economic Research: 1 – 42. Available at: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12401. 
Arza, C. 2012. “Pension Reforms and Gender Equality in Latin America.”	 UNRISD 
Research Paper. Available at: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/ 
(httpAuxPages)/3513162DF26920D5C12579CF0053534B/$file/Arza%20pape
r.pdf. 
Asian Development Bank. (2016). “Sector Assessment (Summary): Finance.” Manila. 
Available at: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/4907 
6-005-ssa.pdf.  
Atabaev, D. (2014). “Ocherednaya Pensionnaia Reforma: Ot Pessimizma do Nadezhdy” 
[Another Pension Reform: From Pessimism to Hope]. Radio	 Azattyk, July 26. 
Available at: http://rus.azattyq.org/content/pensionnaya-reforma-kazakhstan/ 
25470850.html.  
Barr, Nicholas. (2000). “Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths, and Policy Choices.” IMF 
Working Paper, August. Available at: https://books.google.ca/books?isbn=1451 
901194.  
Becker, Charles M., Grigori A. Marchenko, Sabit Khakimzhanov, Ai-Gul Seitenova, and 
Vladimir Ivliev. (2009). Social	Security	Reform	in	Transition	Economies:	Lessons	
from	Kazakhstan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bender, Katja, Sonja Keller and Holger Willing. (2014). “The Role of International Policy 
Transfer and Diffusion for Policy Change in Social Protection—A Review of the 
State of the Art.” IZNE Social Protection Working Paper 14 / 1. Available at: 
https://www.h-brs.de/files/izne/policy_diffusion_1.pdf.  
Bengtsson, Tommy. (2010). Population	Ageing—	A	Threat	to	the	Welfare	State?	The	Case	
of	Sweden. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Bertranou, F.M. (2001). “Pension Reform and Gender Gaps in Latin America: What Are 
the Policy Options?” World	Development 29 (5): 911 – 923.  
 The Politics of Pension Reforms in Kazakhstan 229 
Bertranou, Fabio. (2016). “Pension Benefits in Chile: Is It Possible to Improve Adequacy 
and Solidarity?” Presented at a joint ILO / IZA Conference in partnership with 
leading G20 think tanks, ILO headquarters, Geneva, Switzerland, 10 – 11 March. 
Available at: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---inst/ 
documents/meetingdocument/wcms_461932.pdf.  
Bird, Chris. (1997). “Kazakhs Prepare for Sweeping Pension Reform.” Reuters	News, 
November 13. 
Blackburn, Robin. (2016). “The Global Drive to Commodify Pensions.” In Bryan S. Turner 
and Robert J. Holton (eds.), The	 Routledge	 International	 Handbook	 of	
Globalization	Studies, 2nd edition, 344 – 367. New York: Routledge. 
Bonoli, Giuliano. (2000). The	Politics	of	Pension	Reform:	Institutions	and	Policy	Change	
in	Western	Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bretton Woods Project. (2014). “Poland Reverses World Bank-Promoted Pension 
Scheme.” 31 March. Available at: http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2014/ 
03/poland-reverses-bank-promoted-pension-scheme/.  
Buckley,	Cynthia and Dennis Donahue. (2000). “Promises to Keep: Pension Provision in 
the Russian Federation.” In Mark G. Field and Judyth L. Twigg (eds.), Russia's	Torn	
Safety	Nets:	Health	and	Social	Welfare	during	the	Transition, 251 – 270. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Calvo, E., F.M. Bertranou, and E. Bertranou. (2010). “Are Old-Age Pension System 
Reforms Moving Away from Individual Retirement Accounts in Latin America?” 
Journal	of	Social	Policy 39 (2): 223 – 234.  
Chandler, Andrea. (2004). Shocking	Mother	Russia:	Democratization,	Social	Rights,	and	
Pension	Reform	in	Russia,	1990	–	2001.	Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
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CHAPTER 11:  
DIVERSE HEALTH CARE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST-




Post-Soviet countries inherited the Semashko healthcare system from the 
Soviet Union1. The system is characterized by the paternalistic role of the 
state acting as financier, provider and regulator of healthcare services. 
Under this system, there was public ownership of healthcare institutions, 
and healthcare professionals were public employees. The paternalistic 
role of the state limited citizens' participation in decision-making. 
Twenty-five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence 
for the post-Soviet states, some countries have retained an extensive role 
for the state in healthcare, while others have introduced market 
mechanisms and involved non-governmental institutions in service 
provision. This chapter argues that post-Soviet countries, also known as a 
region in ‘transition’ (Borisova, 2011), are diverse and although they all 
inherited the Semashko	system, their reform paths in terms of healthcare 
developments differ considerably. 
There is limited literature analyzing healthcare reforms across all 
fifteen post-Soviet countries. The majority of studies focus on Central Asia 
(McKee et al., 1998; McKee et al. eds., 2002; Klugman et al., 2002; 
Borowitz and Atun, 2007; Rechel et al., 2012; Ulikpan et al., 2014) or 
single country case studies (cf. Rechel and Khodjamurodov, 2010; Mirzoev 
et al., 2010; Tonoyan, 2004; Gordeev et al., 2011). The Baltic States are 
often excluded from the analysis as European Union (EU) member-
countries (see Borisova, 2011; Balabanova et al., 2012). General 
overviews of the region either analyze healthcare financing, co-payments 
and public management (Leive, 2010; Kutzin et al., 2010; Antoun et al., 
                                                      
1  The system was founded in 1918 by Nikolai Aleksandrovich Semashko, who was 
the head of the Moscow Soviet's health department. 
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2011), or certain aspects of healthcare, such as primary healthcare or 
psychiatric care (Borisova, 2011; Polubinskaya, 2000). The studies rarely 
address the system as a whole. Those studies which do offer a broader 
overview of healthcare reforms in post-Soviet countries are now dated (cf. 
Belli, 2001). This chapter seeks to remedy this gap in the literature and 
aims to provide an overview of the healthcare systems in the fifteen post-
Soviet countries and to explain their diverse development. 
Diverse healthcare system developments in the region could be 
attributed to the interaction of national governments with external 
organizations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, states faced a 
number of internal pressures. These included the deterioration of public 
healthcare systems and services, an increased incidence of infectious 
diseases, healthcare system inefficiency and a large proportion of hospital 
capacity having poor infrastructure (Savas et al., 2002; 81 – 82). 
Governments needed to change the healthcare system in a short period of 
time to address the new social realities. Multilateral agencies such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed 
pressures for adjustment and compliance (cf. Ferge, 1997; 302). However, 
the outcomes of this pressure and the precise nature of reforms depended 
on the interaction between the government and external actors. Hence, 
the stability of the healthcare reforms and the value of any capacity 
building rested on countries' ability to coordinate assistance (Rechel et al., 
2012). There is an acknowledgement of external actors' influence on 
healthcare reform processes in some studies (Ulikpan et al., 2014; Rechel 
and McKee, 2009; Ancker et al., 2013). However, none of the studies have 
analyzed the role of external actors in the post-Soviet region as whole. 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
To analyze healthcare systems, this study applies the Rothgang-Wendt 
(RW) typology utilizing its systematic approach and broad focus. The 
framework builds on previous work evaluating various actors' roles in 
healthcare financing and service provision (Anderson, 1963; Field, 1973; 
OECD, 1987; Immergut, 1992; Freeman and Moran, 2000). It incorporates 
these dimensions and adds regulation. Although regulations have been 
mentioned before (Stevens, 2001), the RW typology was among the first 
to introduce a systematic approach to classification of healthcare systems 
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(Wendt et al., 2009: 71). It provides a useful framework for general 
analysis from a comparative perspective.  
The typology groups countries according to actors' roles in 
healthcare. The framework focuses on the role of the state, society and 
private actors in healthcare financing, service provision and regulation 
(Rothgang et al., 2010). Depending on the influence of each actor, the 
typology posits three models or ideal types. In the first, a national health 
service, healthcare is publicly provided and financed through tax 
revenues (Rothgang, 2010b; 15 – 17). Healthcare facilities are owned by 
the state, and healthcare professionals are public employees. The state 
regulates financing, provision and conditions by ensuring equal access to 
all citizens (Rothgang, 2010b; 14 – 17). With the state dominating across 
all three dimensions, this model is similar to the Semashko system. In the 
second, a social insurance system, healthcare is financed through social 
insurance contributions and largely provided by private non-profit actors 
(Rothgang, 2010b; 15). Private non-profit institutions dominate 
financing, provision and regulation. The state retains control over the 
system, but there is the strong presence of social or corporatist groups, 
such as insurance funds and professional associations (Rothgang, 2010b). 
Access to healthcare in this model is based on the principle of solidarity. 
In other words, the contributions of employed citizens cover expenses for 
the unemployed and dependents (Schmid et al., 2010; 26 – 27). Both the 
national health service and social insurance systems have redistributive 
mechanisms ensuring access to services. In contrast, the third, a private 
healthcare system, has limited distributional capacity. The guiding 
principle of this system is the ability to pay for services (Rothgang, 2010b; 
17). This model is characterized by the dominant role of the market. The 
main sources of funding are private insurance and out-of-pocket 
payments, and the main service providers are private for-profit actors 
(Rothgang, 2010b; 15). All three models represent ideal types and, in 
reality, healthcare systems combine features of all three. These models 
nevertheless provide a good proxy for evaluating change. Since all post-
Soviet countries had a system similar to the national health service, the 
varying role of the state in financing, service provision and regulation, 
indicates changes to healthcare systems. 
The RW typology is applied here with several modifications. The 
general typology attributes changes in healthcare to interactions between 
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the state, society and private actors. However, this study focuses on the 
role of the state and external actors in healthcare reforms. It excludes 
private actors and the general population, including patients, due to their 
limited role in healthcare reforms. Initial policy development during the 
Soviet era without public participation resulted in the passivity of citizens 
as beneficiaries (Ferge, 1997; Rechel et al., 2012; Savas et al., 2002; Gedik 
et al., 2002). Hence, public participation is generally limited in all post-
Soviet countries. Minor exceptions are civil society involvement in 
Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, and the cooperation of the state with 
professional associations in Kazakhstan (Footman and Richardson, 2014; 
34; HiT Kazakhstan, 2012; 23 – 24). In an environment of limited financial 
and technical capacities, as well as experience of healthcare reforms, 
external actors have played a significant role in healthcare reforms. 
Furthermore, a number of indicators used in the typology cannot be 
applied to post-Soviet countries, mainly because of a lack of comparative 
data. Therefore, the emphasis is on sources of healthcare expenditure 
(public, private and social insurance), the employment status of 
healthcare professionals, the ownership of healthcare facilities and 
benefit packages provided to citizens. In addition to data limitations, 
selection of indicators is driven by practical concerns. Coverage, as part of 
the regulations, refers to entitlement, and is often guaranteed in the 
constitution or in legislation. However, vague entitlement does not 
guarantee access to services in reality. Access could be measured by 
number of service providers and hospital beds per 1,000 population. Yet 
the physical presence of these facilities does not guarantee practical use. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on benefit packages, as an object of 
regulation. In contrast to vague entitlements or the number of facilities, 
benefit packages list services provided free of charge. Consequently, 
usability of these services is higher. Table 1 summarizes the three 
dimensions of the RW typology used here: 
Table 1 Operationalization of RW typology  
Financing		 Share	of	public	and	private	spending,	presence /	
absence	of	social	/	private	insurance	
Service provision Ownership of healthcare facilities and healthcare 
professionals' employment 
Regulation  Benefit packages
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In addition, the study considers whether reforms were implemented in a 
coherent or fragmented way. This will help understand the outcomes of 
interactions between the state and external actors. The overall analysis is 
based on the secondary literature on healthcare reforms across the region 
and the European Observatory's Healthcare Systems in Transition reports 
for each country2. 
RESULTS 
Financing  
Depending on the share of tax revenues, social insurance and private 
funding, countries are divided into three groups. First, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Russia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, have a mandatory health 
insurance system contributing to healthcare financing. Mandatory health 
insurance is a comparatively recent phenomenon in the region, and its 
share varies across countries. The existing database provides aggregated 
healthcare expenditures, without delineating the share of tax revenues 
and social insurance (cf. World Bank, 2017). This chapter groups 
countries implementing the insurance into one category (Graph 1). 
Independently of the share, adoption of this mechanism indicates change 
towards this system. Another group of countries are the states without 
health insurance, but with public health expenditure around 50 percent. 
These are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Turkmenistan 
(Figure 1). The large share of public financing in these countries suggests 
the dominance of the state in the healthcare system, although Uzbekistan 
is an outlier with an average share of public financing around 48 percent. 
                                                      
2 Most recent Health Systems in Transition reports: Armenia (2006 and 2013), 
 Azerbaijan (2004 and 2010), Belarus (2008 and 2013), Estonia (2008 and 
 2013), Georgia (2002 and 2009), Kazakhstan (2007 and 2012), Kyrgyzstan 
 (2005 and 2011), Latvia (2012, 2008), Lithuania (2013, 2000), Moldova 
 (2008, 2012), Russia (2003, 2011), Tajikistan (2010, 2016), Turkmenistan 
 (2000), Ukraine (2010, 2015), Uzbekistan (2007, 2015). 
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Figure 1 Average share (%) of public and private health expenditure 
(1995-2014)3 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
The third group of countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Tajikistan, have a share of out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) over 60 percent 
of healthcare expenditure (Fig. 1). OOPs and private insurance as sources 
of funding point to a private healthcare system. Since the share of private 
or voluntary health insurance is low in all post-Soviet countries, private 
expenditures mainly refer to direct OOPs (Richardson, 2010; 54). In other 
words, patients' payments constitute the vast majority of healthcare 
expenditure. OOPs jeopardize equal access to healthcare by burdening 
poor households (Schmid et al., 2010; 29). As a result, access to healthcare 
services with high OOPs is uneven. Table 2 summarizes the groupings: 






Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 




3  Average percentages are calculated by the author (average% total expenditure = 
average% public + average% private for the period of 1995 – 2014) based on the 
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Service provision  
Healthcare service provision refers to the share of public and private 
institutions in terms of the ownership of healthcare institutions and the 
employment status of healthcare professionals (Schmid and Wendt, 
2010). The post-Soviet countries largely retained state service provision, 
inherited from the Semashko model. Healthcare institutions are owned 
and administered by the government and healthcare professionals are 
civil servants. Privatization was limited to dental care, diagnostics and 
pharmacies, mainly located in capital cities (Footman and Richardson, 
2010; 33). Hospital privatization was also insignificant. One exception is 
Georgia, where 40 percent of hospitals are owned by insurance 
companies, 30 percent by individuals and 20 percent by other enterprises 
(Transparency International Georgia, 2012; 4). The state nevertheless 
remains the main owner of healthcare facilities in the region. Regarding 
the employment of healthcare professionals, Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania introduced mixed service provision. In this model, 
healthcare providers have financial and administrative autonomy from 
the state. In Armenia, healthcare providers are state health enterprises, 
managing their finances, staff and prices for services outside the benefit 
package (HiT Armenia, 2006; 28 – 29). Healthcare facilities in Georgia 
have similar functions. Healthcare personnel in both countries are 
employed by healthcare facilities on a contractual basis (HiT Armenia, 
2013; 18; HiT Georgia, 2009; 45 – 46). This change in employment status 
is important since it implies transition from public to contractual 
employment. Changes in the employment status of healthcare 
professionals are also visible in the Baltic States. Medical personnel in 
Estonia work under private labor regulations, while in Latvia they have 
the status of independent professionals or self-employed individuals (HiT 
Estonia, 2013; 23; HiT Latvia, 2012; 18). Lithuania has different payment 
regulations for state and private-employed specialists. State healthcare 
professionals are civil servants, whereas in the private sector employers 
define wage rates (HiT Lithuania, 2013; 69). Although retaining public 
ownership of healthcare facilities, diverse employment developments in 
post-Soviet countries suggests changes to healthcare systems. 
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Regulations (benefit packages) 
The range of benefit packages varies considerably across the post-Soviet 
states. Belarus has the most generous coverage in the region. It provides 
extensive access to health care and essential medicines free of charge (HiT 
Belarus, 2013; 35). Another group of countries retained a smaller share 
of benefits, although still larger than the basic package. The guiding 
principle of healthcare reforms in Estonia was ensuring access to 
healthcare, therefore health insurance provides a range of benefits (HiT 
Estonia, 2013; xxi, 53). Similarly, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Russia offer 
services in addition to the standardized benefit package. Moldova 
provides prophylactic dental care, care in the case of cardiovascular 
diseases, pediatrics and palliative care (HiT Moldova, 2012; 66 – 67). To 
improve access to medicines, Kyrgyzstan adopted the Additional Drug 
Package, while Russia introduced the State Program of Drugs Supply 
monetizing health benefits (HiT Kyrgyzstan, 2011; 100 – 104; HiT Russia, 
2011; 137 – 138). However, the majority of countries in the region 
adopted basic benefit packages (BBPs) mainly covering primary and 
emergency care (see HiT Kazakhstan, 2012; HiT Uzbekistan, 2014; HiT 
Lithuania, 2013; HiT Latvia, 2012; Kukava, 2013). In some cases, such as 
Armenia and Ukraine, the range of guaranteed benefits depends on 
budget availability (HiT Ukraine, 2015; 46 – 47; HiT Armenia, 2013; 37). 
This creates uncertainties and confusion for patients and service 
providers. Tajikistan is the only country in the region without a benefit 
package. The government introduced a package in 2005 to formalize 
informal payments, but the initiative was cancelled after two months 
because of low public support (HiT Tajikistan, 2016; 46 – 47). At the same 
time, the list of benefits does not always guarantee access. Turkmenistan 
provides for a range of outpatient, inpatient, dental and sanatorium care 
(HiT Turkmenistan, 2000; 22 – 23), but the practical implementation is 
questionable. Furthermore, informal payments in healthcare are 
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widespread in the region (see HiT Azerbaijan, 2010; Stepurko et al., 2015; 
Oka, 2015; Lewis, 2010; Polovinka, 2016). Therefore, there might be 
unofficial co-payments to services defined as free-of-charge. In general, 
depending on budget constraints, policy priorities and political volatility, 
the post-Soviet countries introduced various benefit packages (see table 4). 
The large number of countries opting out of the standardized benefit 
package suggests a decreasing role for the state in healthcare accessibility.  




















Table 5 summarizes changes in financing, service provision and benefits.  
Table 5 Overview of healthcare systems in post-Soviet countries 
Financing	 Provision	 Benefits		 Countries		
Tax  State Universal 
coverage 
Belarus, Turkmenistan
(the Semashko healthcare system) 












Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
OOPs Mixed Standard 
package 
Armenia, Georgia
OOPs State Standard 
package 
Azerbaijan




Russia is in the same group as Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, but it constitutes 
a case on its own. Diverse implementation of mandatory health insurance 
(MHI) across the country suggests dependence on the commitment of 
                                                      
4  Data on Turkmenistan is based on HiT report 2000, but its practical applicability 
is questionable given the limited data on the country. 
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regional authorities to reforms (HiT Russia. 2011; 146). Besides, there is 
a remarkable regional variation in access to healthcare (Borisova, 2011). 
Both size and regional diversity make it incomparable to other countries 
in the region. Therefore, Russia is analyzed as a separate case.  
REFORMS AS AN INDICATOR OF INTERACTIONS 
This section aims at explaining the changes described above by linking 
them to differences between post-Soviet countries in terms of interactions 
with external actors. External actors' assistance to healthcare reforms has 
been significant across the region. Newly independent countries could not 
finance the range of services provided under the Semashko system. At the 
same time, they lacked the finances, technical expertise and experience to 
implement healthcare reforms. Collaboration with external actors 
additionally defined the direction of healthcare reforms. The IMF, World 
Bank, USAID and other bilateral donors promoted neoliberal reforms and 
structural adjustment policies, which encouraged privatization, 
liberalization and deregulation (Rivkin-Fish, 2005; 76). These policies 
favored decentralization of the system across the region, weakening the 
regulative capacities of Ministries of Health and increasing regional 
inequalities. Some countries, notably Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
recentralized their healthcare systems. In general, the policies promoted 
by external organizations fitted with national agendas. Given budget 
shortages, the delegation of healthcare financing, service provision and 
decreasing the number of health facilities were among the priorities for 
these countries.  
Interaction serves as a better proxy for understanding the nature of 
external assistance than the amount of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) as a percentage of total health spending. Three types of interaction 
with external actors are identified across the region: organizational 
membership, the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and the project-based 
approach. The Baltic States, implementing the EU's acquis	communautaire 
and all the relevant regulations on healthcare, fit the first type of 
interaction. Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, mainstreaming financial and 
technical support of external organizations, have used SWAps. However, 
the majority of countries in the region have project-based interactions, 
limited to selected projects lacking an institutional platform for 
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mainstreaming financial and technical resources for comprehensive 
reform of the system as a whole.  
The amount of ODA, shown in Table 6, illustrates the presence of 
external actors in the post-Soviet region. The range of assistance across 
countries appears unrelated to the economic performance of the recipient 
states, the political regime nor the openness of the recipient country to 
external actors (Isabekova, 2016).  
Table 6 Official Development Assistance (healthcare and general) per 
capita in USD5 
Country	 Healthcare	 Period	 General	 Period	
Armenia 258 1993 – 2013 707 1994 – 2013
Azerbaijan 245 1992 – 2013 1567 1991 – 2013
Moldova 206 1994 – 2013 2573 1991 – 2013
Georgia 204 1994 – 2013 3633 1991 – 2013
Estonia 196 1991 – 2004 1443 1991 – 2006
Kyrgyz Republic 151 1993 – 2013 2181 1991 – 2013
Tajikistan 132 1992 – 2013 1430 1991 – 2013
Latvia 110 1992 – 2007 2614 1991 – 2010
Kazakhstan 96 1993 – 2013 1712 1991 – 2013
Uzbekistan 95 1994 – 2013 740 1991 – 2013
Lithuania 75 1992 – 2007 1606 1991 – 2007
Turkmenistan 60 1992 – 2013 956 1991 – 2013
Belarus 29 1994 – 2013 467 1992 – 2013
Ukraine 22 1993 – 2013 1023 1991 – 2013
Russia 18 1990 – 2009 870 1990 – 2011
Source: Aiddata, 2017; World Bank, 2017	
Another indicator is the percentage of external resources in total health 
expenditure (Fig. 2). External resources on average constitute around 10 
percent of total health expenditure in Kyrgyzstan, about 9 percent in 
Armenia and Tajikistan, 6 percent in Moldova, 4 percent in Georgia and 3 
percent in Uzbekistan). 
                                                      
5  The Official Development Assistance (healthcare and general) per	 capita is 
calculated by the author (development aid per country divided by average 
population for the relevant period). The results are rounded. Variations in the 
period are related to data availability. 
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Figure 2 Average share (%) of external resources in total health 
expenditure (1995 – 2014)6 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
Not all countries receiving high ODA have a high percentage of external 
assistance in health expenditure. Assistance to healthcare could be 
irregular and / or its share in overall expenditure low. As noted above, our 
main focus is on types of interactions, be they organizational membership, 
sector-wide approaches, or project-based interactions. Countries 
implementing the first two types of interactions have managed to reform 
their healthcare systems by mainstreaming healthcare resources. 
Organizational membership  
In the case of the Baltic States, the major external actor involved in 
healthcare and other reforms was the European Union. Health system 
reform was part of EU accession requirements, with an additional 
emphasis on public health and safety (Rechel and McKee, 2009; 1187; HiT 
Estonia, 2008; 190). Countries implemented a number of reforms aimed 
at legislative harmonization. Certainly, the Baltic States cooperated with 
other external actors in reforming their healthcare systems. The World 
                                                      
6  Average percentages are calculated by the author for the period of 1995 – 2014 
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Bank's ‘Health Reform Project’ had a considerable influence in Latvia. The 
project provided a loan and additional financing for policy reform, 
institution building, skill development, primary healthcare (PHC) and 
hospital sector restructuring (HiT Lativa, 2008; 219). Even here, reforms 
were nevertheless shaped in terms of compliance to EU standards. As seen 
from Table 5, all three Baltic States changed to insurance-based systems. 
Reforms were driven by both interaction with external actors 
(organizational membership) and national actors' willingness to change 
the system. Thus, Lithuania was among the first to adopt a law on health 
insurances and decentralization (1991), followed by compulsory health 
insurance (1997) (HiT Lithuania, 2000). Similarly, healthcare reforms in 
Latvia in the early 1990s primarily aimed at changing from the Soviet-
style Semashko system (HiT Latvia, 2008; 211). The role of national actors 
in the reform process is still considerable, however. Hence, despite the 
strong influence of compliance with EU standards, reforms in Estonia 
nevertheless followed the national plan (HiT Estonia, 2008; 190).  
SWAp 
The second type of interaction with external actors refers to the sector 
wide approach (SWAp). This framework channels government and donor 
activities towards the ‘comprehensive’ development of a particular sector 
(OECD, 2006; 36). The state and donor organizations collaborate to 
mainstream financial resources and technical skills and advance the 
system in general. SWAp is used in many sectors, including healthcare, 
education, water, and the like. According to this framework, the state and 
donor organizations agree on priority areas and a list of indicators. A 
SWAp is based on shared accountability, collective dialogue and long-term 
perspective (OECD, 2006; 36). Kyrgyzstan and Moldova are two countries 
implementing healthcare SWAp in the region. Both introduced social 
insurance reforms and retained state-dominated service provision with 
selective benefit packages. Interaction with external actors, based on 
SWAp, considerably shaped healthcare reforms in these countries. 
Kyrgyzstan was among the first countries to implement SWAp in the 
region, with reforms shaped by national Manas and Manas taalimi 
programs. The Manas healthcare reform program (1996 – 2006) was 
developed in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) 
(McKee et al., 1998; 138). To cut the number of healthcare facilities, 
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Kyrgyzstan initiated an optimization strategy. Hospital bed cuts 
contributed to PHC funding, while the strong commitment of the 
President mobilized the necessary resources from external actors (Gedik 
et al., 2002; 144; Vang and Haioff, 2002; 161; Savas et al., 2002; 86). The 
program aimed at retaining some of the benefits from the old system, but 
also prioritized prevention and cost-efficiency. Kyrgyzstan introduced 
family medicine and closed 43 percent of hospitals between 2000 and 
2003 (HiT Kyrgyzstan, 2011; 100). The outcomes of the first program 
ensured external support for the follow-up Manas taalimi initiative 
(2006 – 2010). This aimed at strengthening PHC by additionally 
promoting public participation (HiT Kyrgyzstan, 2011; 104 – 109). The 
SWAp ensured the pooling of resources to the national budget from key 
development partners and increased the accountability of the national 
government over the use of resources. 
Similar to Kyrgyzstan, Moldova implemented a SWAp in healthcare, 
supported by the WHO and the EU (WHO, 2017). Like other countries in 
the region, Moldova faced serious financial constraints while 
implementing healthcare reforms in early 1990s, but still emphasized a 
minimum package as a guiding principle for reforms (HiT Moldova, 2008; 
111 – 112). Moldova cut the number of hospitals by half and focused on 
family medicine, increasing the number of family doctors from 57 to 2,096 
between 1995 and 2004 (HiT Moldova, 2008; 114). All these reforms were 
implemented in collaboration with external actors. The World Bank's 
‘Health Investment Fund project’ (1998 – 2005) aimed at restructuring 
medical services, strengthening PHC and introducing healthcare service 
packages according to the available budget (World Bank 2000 in HiT 
Moldova 2008; 114). Similar to Kyrgyzstan, national policies guided 
healthcare reforms in Moldova. The country adopted the ‘Concept of 
reforming health-care system’ (1997 – 2003), the ‘Health system 
development strategy’ (2007 – 2016) and the ‘National Health Policy’ 
(2007 – 2021), contributing to coherent reform of the healthcare system. 
The healthcare reforms in both Kyrgyzstan and Moldova were 
shaped by interactions with external actors, not determined by them. Like 
the Baltic States, adherence to national strategies contributed to reform 
of the sector as a whole. Russia, to an extent, belongs to the same group of 
healthcare systems as Kyrgyzstan and Moldova (see Table 5). Although 
Russia did not implement SWAps, external actors nevertheless 
contributed to its healthcare reforms in similar ways.  
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Project-based interaction 
Russia's interaction with external actors shifted from financial aid to 
technical assistance, initiating decentralization and privatization in the 
early 1990s. Decentralization reforms weakened the Ministry of Health's 
regulatory capacities, contributed to regional inequality and political 
tensions between regional and municipal authorities (Footman and 
Richardson, 2014; 37 – 38). The country's experience with 
decentralization, as in other post-Soviet countries, was ambiguous. In the 
late 1990s, the government gradually decreased adjustment loans. 
International support, by the World Bank and WHO for instance, mainly 
related to technical assistance (HiT Russia, 2011; 89). In 2007, Russia 
adopted the Concept Paper on ‘Russia's Participation in International 
Development Assistance,’ transforming the country from an aid recipient 
to an aid provider. All subsequent healthcare reforms were initiated and 
implemented by the state. The government adopted the ‘National Priority 
Project—Health’ (2005 – 2013), which prioritized major healthcare 
problems, including maternal and child care, PHC and disease prevention 
(HiT Russia, 2011; 139 – 140). However, the stated priorities nevertheless 
followed policies previously suggested by the World Bank and other 
external actors (Cook, 2007; 147). Compulsory health insurance 
introduced in 1993 faced a number of administrative challenges. The lack 
of support by the Ministry of Health restricted the development of a 
regulatory basis for a functioning Mandatory Health Insurance (MHI) (HiT 
Russia, 2011; 20). The initiative was later emphasized in the ‘Further 
National Health Concept to the year 2020.’ Nonetheless, many regions 
retain a combination of old (tax-based) and new (insurance-based) 
financing elements (HiT Russia, 2011; 18 – 19). MHI implementation in 
Russia is incomplete. Certainly, the role of external actors in healthcare 
reforms of the country is incomparable to those in Moldova and 
Kyrgyzstan. However, the country followed reform paths chosen in the 
late 1990s, although conflicts between regional and municipal authorities 
restricted their coherent implementation.  
Two countries with a similarly small share of ODA and limited 
interaction with external actors are Belarus and Turkmenistan. However, 
the range and outcomes of reforms conducted in these two cases are 
considerably different. Belarus is the only country in the post-Soviet 
region providing healthcare benefits similar to the Semashko system. The 
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country followed a gradualist approach to reforms and retained universal 
access to healthcare (HiT Belarus, 2013; 95). To decrease dependence on 
external supply, Belarus aimed at increasing the domestic production of 
pharmaceuticals (HiT Belarus, 2013; 97). The government additionally 
controls prices for essential medicines to ensure their accessibility. 
However, the sustainability of the system with increasing healthcare costs 
and economic underdevelopment is questionable (Balabanova et al., 
2012; 843). The country implemented a number of reforms to optimize 
costs, including integration of parallel healthcare services (HiT Belarus, 
2013; 97). Similar optimization reforms were initiated in Turkmenistan. 
The healthcare reform program (LUKMAN) was implemented aimed at 
rationalizing hospital beds and supporting PHC (Savas et al., 2002; 87; 
Gedik et al., 2002; 144 – 145; HiT Turkmenistan, 2000; 63 – 64). However, 
governmental decisions contradict the general healthcare program and 
slow down the reform process (Savas et al., 2002; 87; Vang and Haioff, 
2002; 162). On paper, Turkmenistan provides a wide range of healthcare 
benefits to its citizens, although the literature reports that hospital 
rationalization led to closure of district hospitals (Horak and Sir, 2009; 81) 
and patients have to travel longer distance to access the system. Since 
compulsory health insurance does not cover the majority of costs, the use 
of traditional medicine increased (Horak and Sir, 2009; 80 – 81). However, 
estimating the true state of the healthcare system is difficult given data 
limitations. 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine have tax-based financing, state 
service provision and selective benefit packages. All three countries 
collaborated with external actors, although their interactions were 
limited to ad hoc projects. Here, the state remains a decisive actor, 
responsible for the lack of healthcare reforms. In Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, governments implemented a range of reforms. Uzbekistan 
cut 40 percent of hospital beds between 1991 and 1997 (Vang and Haioff, 
2002; 163), collaborating closely with external organizations. The 
primary and secondary care reforms in the country were implemented 
within the World Bank's ‘Project Health’ (1998 – 2018), maternal and 
child health service improvement with the help of the Asian Development 
Bank (2005 – 2012) and EU grants (2009 – 2016) (HiT Uzbekistan, 2015). 
Kazakhstan is another country in the region where the state played a 
strong role in the reform process. Kazakhstan adopted the ‘National 
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program of Health Care Reform 2005 – 2010’, reversing decentralization 
reforms implemented in the 1990s. Service provision is still administered 
by regional authorities, but the Ministry of Health is the main supervisory 
and regulating body. Similar to Uzbekistan, it introduced optimization 
reforms by cutting up to 45 percent of hospitals (1991 – 1998), 
emphasizing ambulatory care and PHC (Gedik et al., 2002; 144; Vang and 
Haioff, 2002; 160 – 161). The country piloted health insurance in several 
oblasts, but it was not rolled out at the national level (HiT Kazakhstan, 
2007; 110).  
Unlike Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the government of Ukraine did 
not play any active part in implementing healthcare reforms, although 
whether this was because healthcare was unimportant, or too important, 
is beyond the scope of this chapter to answer. Family medicine reforms in 
Ukraine are at an initial stage and PHC reforms are more formal than real 
(HiT Ukraine, 2010; 150 – 151). The country retained most elements of 
the Semashko system, except for the recent ‘Economic Reforms Program’ 
(2010 – 2014) (HiT Ukraine, 2015; 125). External actors have played an 
important role in the country's reform process. Thus, National Health 
Accounts were introduced in 2006 with technical support of international 
organizations (HiT Ukraine, 2010; 153). The overall contribution of 
external actors to total health expenditures is low, however, although 
there is strong pressure from the IMF, World Bank, WHO and USAID to 
reform the system (HiT Ukraine, 2015; 66, 125 – 126). Although the role 
of the state varies across the three countries, ranging from active to a 
passive reformer, all have largely project-based interaction with external 
actors, contributing to the fragmentation of healthcare reforms.  
Reforms in Uzbekistan have focused on maternal and child care, PHC 
and emergency care, with no coherence across different initiatives (Savas 
et al., 2002; 87; Gedik et al., 2002; 145). In contrast to Uzbekistan, the 
incoherence of healthcare reforms in Kazakhstan has been attributed to 
external actors implementing projects on an ad hoc basis, inconsistent 
with national policies and marginalizing the Ministry of Health (Savas et 
al., 2002; 87). Interaction with external actors is at an early stage in 
Ukraine. The Ukrainian government secured funding form the Global 
Fund for HIV / AIDS and tuberculosis prevention program (2007 – 2011), 
later suspended because of a scandal over increased medication prices 
(HiT Ukraine, 2015; 66). Financing was granted only after an international 
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non-governmental organization took over the project (HiT Ukraine, 2015; 
67).  
Armenia and Georgia received significant support for healthcare 
reforms, but external actors in both states pursued rather sporadic 
activities. Development assistance targeted small changes and ‘ad	 hoc	
interventions’ (Savas et al., 2002; 85). The healthcare organization in 
Armenia still resembles the Semashko system (Hovhannisyan, 2004; 4), 
although the country implemented privatization and decentralization 
reforms. Both contributed to the devastation of the referral system and 
weakened quality control mechanisms (HiT Armenia, 2006; 132 – 133). 
Privatization was most developed in Georgia, and was to the largest scale. 
According to the Development Master Plan, around 80 percent of 
hospitals were sold (HiT Georgia, 2009). Optimization and privatization 
policies in both countries significantly affected access to healthcare. As a 
result of privatization, visits to doctors fell by 30 percent and bed 
occupancy by 200 percent (HiT Armenia, 2006; 135 – 136; Tonoyan, 
2004; 9 – 11). Both Armenia and Georgia received a large amount of ODA 
per	capita, but the lack of a comprehensive national framework and ad hoc 
interactions with external actors, contributed to the fragmentation of 
reforms. 
Azerbaijan and Tajikistan largely rely on OOPs in healthcare 
financing but have state-dominated service provision. Limited healthcare 
reforms in both countries are attributed to violent conflicts delaying the 
reform process (McKee et al., 1998; 138; Vang and Haioff, 2002; 162). 
Both countries are among the largest recipients of ODA, but external 
actors have mainly focused on humanitarian aid. A number of external 
actors, including USAID, EU, the UN and others, provided significant 
humanitarian assistance from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s to 
support internally displaced persons from the Nagorno-Karabakh region 
(HiT Azerbaijan, 2010; 31). Similarly, development assistance to 
Tajikistan initially focused on emergency assistance, due to significant 
destruction of infrastructure (Savas et al., 2002; 86; Gedik et al., 2002; 
144). Both countries pursued project-based interactions with external 
actors. Healthcare reforms in Tajikistan are just beginning. The country 
initiated a program on family medicine (2011 – 2015) and piloted 
capitation-based financing to primary healthcare in two districts (2005 – 
2006) (HiT Tajikistan, 2016; 85 – 88). In contrast to Tajikistan, Azerbaijan 
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has implemented benefit packages. The laws ‘About protection of health 
of the population’ (1997) and ‘Health Financing Concept’ (2008) define 
state-guaranteed BBPs (HiT Azerbaijan, 2010; 24), but these have not 
been fully implemented. Therefore, despite formal entitlement, citizens 
often pay for healthcare services. Azerbaijan has adopted a number of 
presidential decrees, but their practical implications are restricted due to 
the lack of implementation mechanisms (HiT Azerbaijan, 2004; 55 – 56). 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study has several limitations. While providing an overview of 
healthcare developments in fifteen countries, it does not capture 
diversities within each state. These could be better captured by case 
studies. Furthermore, the categorization of countries is based on 
generalizations. Certainly, there are variations between the Baltic States 
(for variations regarding welfare systems see Ainsaar and Kesselmann, 
2016; Aidukaite et al., 2016; Rajevska and Romanovska, 2016) and closer 
analysis of Russia would address its peculiarities more closely. Specific 
analyses of healthcare sectors, such as primary healthcare, maternal or 
child care, would also increase divergence in terms of the typology. The 
categorization produced in this chapter is not definitive, but contributes 
to understanding the diversity of the region and encouraging further 
research on healthcare reforms in post-Soviet countries.  
Despite the Semashko healthcare system inherited from the Soviet 
Union, these fifteen states have followed different reform paths, largely 
explainable in terms of differences in interactions between the state and 
external actors. Three types of interactions have been proposed, namely: 
organizational membership, sector-wide approaches and project-based 
interactions. Countries implementing the first two types managed to 
reform their healthcare system by mainstreaming healthcare resources. 
The Baltic States, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan closely cooperated with 
external actors and introduced health insurance. Russia introduced 
similar reforms, although their practical implementation across the 
country is unclear. The majority of the states in the region have had 
project-based interaction, with healthcare reforms varying from retaining 
the Semashko system, to increasing reliance on out-of-pocket payments. 
Belarus has retained a broad range of benefits and the dominant role of 
the state in healthcare financing and service provision. The system in 
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Turkmenistan is unclear due to data limitations. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan 
and Ukraine have implemented standardized benefit packages but 
retained the key role of the state in financing and service provision. On the 
contrary, Armenia and Georgia, have limited the role of the state by 
introducing mixed service provision and increasing out-of-pocket 
expenditures. In general, more social- and market-oriented systems, with 
some exceptions, have replaced the Semashko system.  
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CHAPTER 12:  
DIVERSIFIED CONVERGENCE: UNEVEN WELFARE 
TRAJECTORIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Noémi Lendvai-Bainton 
INTRODUCTION 
While welfare regime theory has long argued that welfare states are 
distinctive socio-economic regimes with coherent and consistent 
patterns of delivering welfare, more and more contemporary research 
points not only to the internal inconsistencies of those regimes, but also 
to the regional diversification within regime types. In this chapter, I will 
argue that while the cluster of Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
welfare states as a particular sub-type within post-communist welfare 
regimes still points to many similarities and converging tendencies, 
there is also a fundamental divergence occurring within this cluster. 
These trends have in part been driven by the reoccurring crises and 
regimes of austerity capitalism post-2008, as some countries in CEE 
have opted for radical welfare state reforms reversing some of the 
reforms introduced in the 1990s. Neoliberal convergence is a strong 
pattern. While in some countries this is a gradual process, in other 
countries it is introduced abruptly and suddenly. Divergence on the 
other hand is important because while some of the welfare states in the 
region show stability and gradual recalibration, others show radical 
retrenchments and populist, nationalist and paternalist backlashes. I 
will also argue that transnational actors—such as the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—continue to have a 
significant influence over welfare reforms across all the countries. A 
multi-scalar framework for analyzing welfare state reforms is therefore 
crucial if we are to trace the transformation of welfare regimes in the 
region. 
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WELFARE REGIMES: POST-COMMUNIST WELFARE IN THE VISEGRAD 
COUNTRIES 
After the collapse of the communist regimes across the region, the 
Visegrad countries—that is Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland1—have enjoyed a much better initial economic and social 
conditions than that of the Baltic States or Romania and Bulgaria (Gebel, 
2008). The higher GDP per	 capita was coupled with fast pro-market 
reforms in all the four countries with strong IMF and World Bank 
influence particularly in Hungary and Poland. For Bohle and Greskovits 
(2012), the Visegrad countries have opted for a distinctive ‘embedded 
neoliberal’ regime in which market reforms and social cohesion and 
protective welfare have gone hand in hand. This embedded regime has 
been contrasted to the ‘pure’ or radical neoliberal regimes of the Baltic 
States and the neo-corporatist regime in Slovenia. The Visegrad countries 
have used welfare policies extensively to compensate for marketization 
and to negotiate between fast economic reforms and political legitimacy. 
Importantly, while all four countries have converged towards a Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI)-led economic model, significant differences 
emerged in terms of privatization patterns, International Organizations' 
(IOs) influence, as well as underlying political discourses around 
economic development. In terms of welfare patterns, the historical 
legacies of Bismarckian influences (Inglot, 2008) continued to dominate 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, even despite the scattered radical 
neoliberal reforms of pension and social benefit systems. Deacon (2000), 
in his seminal work, was spot on arguing that the internal tensions of post-
communist welfare states arose from how to reconcile the legacies of the 
Bismarckian insurance-based system with the pressures arising from the 
integration into the global economy, associated pressures on budgets, the 
liberal agenda of IOs, and the pressure towards residual social policies. 
                                                      
1  The Visegrád Group, Visegrád Four, or V4, founded in 1991, is a cultural and 
political alliance of four Central European states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. 
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THE CONVERGENCE DEBATE: POST-ACCESSION DEVELOPMENTS 
Ever since 1998, when CEE countries have started their accession 
negotiations resulting in the 2004 EU Accession, the main assumption of 
both EU policy-makers as well as many academic scholars has been the 
assumed socio-economic convergence and catch-up of New Member 
States (see Vojinovic, Oplotnik and Prochniak, 2010; Horridge and 
Rokicki, 2017). Convergence was anticipated economically as fast 
economic growth was predicted; social convergence was both expected to 
follow economic convergence and was assumed to be facilitated by EU soft 
governance and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) processes 
(Borras and Jacobssson, 2004; Lendvai-Bainton, 2017). Europeanisation 
of social policy literature emerged emphasizing policy learning, best 
practices and mainstreaming and streamlining policies all contributing to 
the ‘modernization of social protection systems’ (Lendvai, 2007, 2011, 
2017). By the time the New Member States had joined the EU in 2004, soft 
governance rapidly expanded as a main policy tool and covered key policy 
areas such as employment, education, social inclusion and social 
protection. The 2008 economic crisis has, however, fundamentally 
changed the social policy landscape both at supranational as well as 
national level. Soft governance has lost its significance and coercive, fiscal-
based, governance tools started to dominate the EU framework 
(Rodrigues and Xiarchogiannopoulou, 2014). Austerity hit all CEE 
countries with different sequencing, wrapped in a variety of domestic 
discourses, resulting in varied social outcomes. Following largely 
declining social spending as a percentage of GDP between 2004 and 2007, 
social spending hiked rapidly from 2007 until 2009, after which social 
spending fell again in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Slovakia, 
as the lowest welfare spender in the region, has been an exception. 
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Figure 1 Social spending as a share of GDP between 2004 and 2016 in 
four Central Eastern European countries (OECD data). 
 
Source: OECD social spending database, accessed on the 31 September 2017. 
What is noticeable from Figure 1 is that CEE counties have converged to a 
consistently low level of social spending as a percentage of GDP between 
2004 and 2016, compared to Old Member States. Importantly, since 2010, 
there has been a significant drop in social spending both in terms of the 
percentage of GDP as well as per	capita in three out of the four countries. 
In Hungary, social protection spending per capita has decreased by 11 
percent between 2007 and 2013 (OECD, 2017). In 2014, based on EU 
calculations, the gap between social spending in CEE countries and the 
average of the EU-28 is around 10 percentage points. The same figure in 
2006 was 8 percentage points, which suggest that the social spending gap 
has in fact widened (Eurostat data). This implies that the social gap 
between the ‘west’ and the ‘east’ has not diminished.	
I argue in this chapter that the expected social convergence was 
preempted by two main factors: economic integration and political 
resistance. The first makes social convergence impossible while the 
second makes it undesirable. Economic and social convergence has been 
at the forefront of broader socio-economic expectations associated with 
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governments, and academics alike. EU integration was assumed to bring 
about rapid economic growth and a form of ‘catch-up’. However, while 
indeed some economic growth has been impressive, economic 
convergence has produced a diverse set of outcomes. As Leitner and 
Romish (2015) argue, in terms of economic convergence measured as 
GDP per	capita at Puchasing Power Parity (PPS) between 1995 and 2011, 
the Visegrad countries have done very well. Taking the EU-27 at 100 
percent, the Czech Republic's GDP increased from 76.3 percent in 1995 to 
81.9 percent by 2011. Hungary has similarly impressive trends of 
climbing from 50.3 percent to 65.4 percent of the EU-27. Slovakia has had 
the biggest hike from 46.8 percent to 73.6 percent, while Poland improved 
from 41.5 percent in 1995 to 63.6 percent in 2011. Importantly, as Leitner 
and Romish argue, the problem with aggregate GDP data is that it ‘does 
not take into account changes in the distribution of income in an economy’ 
(ibid, 5). Indeed, they show income convergence to have been much 
slower, with the Czech Republic showing a relative deterioration of Gross 
Disposable Income (GDI) between 1995 and 2011. A crucial explanation 
they argue to explain this trend is that corporate profits have converged 
much faster that household income. 
Table 1 Corporate and Household Gross Disposable Income per capita at 
PPS, 1995 and 2011, EU-27=100. 
 
CR HUN POL SLO CEE‐10
average	
Corporate	disposable	income	1995	 106.6 38.5 27.3 65.7 40.5	
Corporate	disposable	income	2011	 81.8 67.6 68.6 88.2 74.2	
Difference	between	1995	and	2011	 –24.8 29.1 41.3 22.5 33.7	
Households	Disposable	income	1995	 65.4 51.0 45.7 40.5 44.0	
Households	Disposable	income	2011	 70.7 60.8 61.0 71.0 58.5	
Difference	between	1995	and	2011	 5.3 9.8 15.3 30.5 14.5	
Source: Leitner and Romish 2015; 8 
These data point to the fact that the relationship between economic and 
social convergence is complex. Leitner and Romish argue that economic 
convergence has been faster than social. Social convergence has been 
considerably suppressed by poor labor market performance such as low 
activity rates, compressed wage levels, tax collection and tax competition, 
and by overall national debt. As Table 2 shows, the region still has low 
minimum wages (particularly in relation to minimum subsistence levels) 
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and relatively high poverty rates, with Hungary suffering from extremely 
high severe material deprivation rate and Poland from high in-work 
poverty rates.  




















Czech R. €837 €407 3% 15% 6% 25
Hungary €615 €413 7% 32% 19% 28.2
Slovakia €755 €435 5% 18% 9% 23.7
Poland €775 €454 11% 25% 8% 30.6
Source: Eurostat data, accessed on 31 September 2017. 
While economic growth has failed to contribute to a significant boost of 
disposable household incomes and to the reduction of poverty, political 
factors have also played an important role. On the one hand, the political 
elite across the region has been pressurized by the EU to keep national 
debt low and suppress or reduce public spending in order to foster 
economic growth and encourage FDI. On the other hand, many of the EU's 
regulatory as well as soft governance frameworks for social policy have 
either been very expensive (i.e. active labor market policies) or have been 
undesired by New Member States (i.e. gender equality and gender 
mainstreaming policies). While the EU assumed that western European-
style welfare policies will quickly be ‘learned’ by New EU Member States 
(whether it be ‘social investment’ policies, ‘activation’, or ‘social 
inclusion’), political contestation has had a considerable effect on issues 
such as active labor market policies (ALMP), gender mainstreaming and 
gender equality policies, pro-poor policies as well as anti-discrimination. 
The political contestation of these issues has had a notable effect on the 
‘Europeanisation’ of post-communist social policies, one which was not 
necessarily resulting in adaptation, learning and convergence, but rather 
the first quiet, later louder, rejection or alteration of these policies. The 
traversing of ALMPs into punitive public work programs in Hungary, or 
the banning of the term gender in Poland points to the significance of 
those political contestations. Eurostat data on public spending patterns 
confirms that public spending on economic affairs, public order, defense 
and cultural and religious activities are higher in the region than in the 
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Old Member States. Social spending in the Visegrad countries also show 
not only high fragility, but also strong concentrations; so for example 
while most CEE spending is high on pensions (hence Rhodes' 
classification of CEE welfare as pension states), Slovakia shows a very high 
spending on health care. And while the Visegrad countries operate the 
largest and most comprehensive welfare states in the region (with the 
exception of Slovenia, which is the frontrunner in the region), particular 
forms of social polarizations (whether it be along ethnic, religious, or 
regional lines) remain strong in all four countries. Welfare developments 
have been highly fragile, both in terms of economic as well as in terms of 
political development (Greskovits and Bohle, 2012). 
In the section below, I shall focus on a particular pattern of welfare 
development post-2008, most prominently emerging in Hungary and 
Poland, but with some potential ramifications for other countries in the 
region. 
POPULISM, AUSTERITY AND WELFARE: THE RISE OF AUTHORTARIAN 
NEOLIBERALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
While for many the 2000s has been marked as a decade of 
‘Europeanisation of welfare’, where fast economic catch-up allows for 
‘modernization of social protection’ in the New EU Member States, the 
2008 economic crisis fundamentally changed the socio-economic and 
socio-political governance of the region. New forms of populist political 
mobilization have emerged most prominently in Hungary and in Poland 
with distinct patterns of austerity and anti-welfare populism.  
Theoretically speaking, populism and nationalism both have 
important ramifications for the institutional and political architecture of 
the welfare state and for the techniques of governing more broadly. While 
there is very little European literature on authoritarianism and welfare, 
we know much more about the intersection of populism and welfare 
states. In the European context, Swank and Betz's (2003) analysis of 
radical right-wing populist (RRWP) parties in 16 Western European 
countries between 1981 and 1998 found that a universal welfare state 
with generous social protection provisions suppressed the electoral 
support for these parties. They define RRWP parties as ones that (a) 
advocate fundamental change to the existing socio-economic and political 
order; (b) foster or accentuate social inequalities; and (c) appeal to public 
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sentiments of resentment, disillusionment and anxiety. They argued that 
‘RRWP parties typically embrace neoliberal economic programs, 
xenophobia and strident anti-establishment positions’ (ibid.; 218). Here, 
strong welfare states suppress radical politics to emerge as mainstream 
governing political power. Mau and Veghte (2007) focus on the perception 
of welfare states of populist parties, arguing that right-wing populism has 
strong anti-welfare state sentiments for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
right-wing populism operates with a sentiment where equality is reduced 
to one's own people: ‘through this idea, equality is defined in 
particularistic terms and is difficult to reconcile with the universalistic 
premises of welfare state ideology’ (ibid.; 190). Secondly, anti-statism, 
anti-establishment, and the anti-institutional elements of populism will 
also foster hostility towards the welfare state. Nordensvard and Ketola 
(2015) demonstrate how exclusionist views of the welfare state are 
combined with deep-rooted nationalism, where the ‘national’ character of 
the welfare state is reclaimed. They have looked at the Finnish and 
Swedish radical right in their discursive position towards the welfare state 
and found that right-wing Scandinavian populist parties promote an 
exclusive and exclusionist welfare state that favors ethnic nationals. 
Within this exclusive and exclusionist approach, ‘new rightist parties not 
only argue against welfare for foreigners but also criticize the way welfare 
is arranged and delivered in a manner that neglects the interests of the 
“common man”’ (Nordensvard and Ketola, 2015; 358). In their analysis, 
they find that ‘populist parties in Finland and Sweden move away from 
both a universal social democratic and a neo-liberal economic framing of 
the welfare state and thereby introduce a third framing of the welfare 
state: the welfare nation state’ (ibid.; 372, emphasis in original). Similarly, 
Keskinen and his colleagues (2016) argue that the economic crisis is likely 
to accelerate welfare chauvinism, which they see as part of a broader 
process of neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state. 
While, for many scholars, populism and nationalism are short-term 
political projects, the sustained electoral success of authoritarian 
neoliberal regimes in countries such as Hungary and Poland, calls for a 
more systematic consideration of these new regimes. Ekiert (2017) 
argues that both Poland and Hungary are rapidly becoming ‘electoral 
authoritarian regimes’ with ultra-nationalist leadership. Ekiert argues 
that these regimes ‘have learned how to live with relatively clean elections 
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and some trappings of political opposition and civil society. They tolerate 
even open borders and free flow of economic resources’ (ibid.; 7). As a 
political project, Ekiert argues ‘politics [in Poland] is no longer about the 
common good and cooperation in solving the country's problem but about 
enemies who need to be destroyed and friends who need to be supported, 
regardless of the moral or political cost’ (8). Colin Crouch (2017), 
reflecting on the populist assault on contemporary democracy, similarly 
argues that populism has become a key ingredient accompanying 
neoliberalism in the construction of social democracy.  
Both in Hungary and in Poland, populist and nationalist governance 
can be conceptualized as a distinct social-redistributive project, one 
which pursues welfare governmentality in radically new ways. These 
regimes represent a widespread assault on the welfare state in their anti-
establishment discourse. The welfare state as an establishment 
institution comes under attack through a variety of claims on how public 
resources should be allocated, exploiting social, gender, racial, ethnic, or 
territorial divides. The politics of common good and cooperation is 
replaced by divisions, exclusions and new normative values based on 
nationalism, religious affiliation and the idea of ‘good citizens’. In this 
context, the welfare state is constructed as an ‘outmoded’ institutional 
structure, that is ‘inefficient’ and one that conveys the ‘wrong’ values and 
moral imperatives. The ‘liberal’ foundations of welfare states are 
questioned and replaced by a moral economy that reifies ‘new 
communitarianism’ (Bathory, 2016). The reification of new nationalist, 
populist and religious values then gives rise to the institutionalization of 
new redistributive dynamics—one that is generous to certain groups, 
such as Hungarians living in neighboring countries, and meagre to others, 
such as the disabled, Roma and the poor. As such, in both Poland and 
Hungary, a kind of authoritarian nationalism emerges where political 
authoritarianism is accompanied by social authoritarianism. Political 
authoritarianism not only removes checks and balances and allows for 
radical constitutional changes (Ekiert, 2017), but as I will argue below in 
the case of Hungary, it is also accompanied by social authoritarianism. 
I will analyze different aspects of social authoritarianism in this 
chapter. I draw upon the notion of Bruff (2016) for whom the 2008 
economic crisis marks a significant new era of permanent austerity, which 
triggered a variety of authoritarian and coercive state practices, with the 
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prominence of the ‘brutal effects of austerity on the possibility for living’. 
For Bruff, austerity is state-directed coercion with a widespread attack on 
a range of social rights. For Giroux (2015; 5), the new neoliberal 
authoritarianism is defined as a ‘new politics of normalization of culture 
of fear, war, surveillance and exploitation’, and a ‘politics of disposability 
with its expanding machineries of civic and social death, terminal 
exclusion, and zones of abandonment’. For both Bruff and Giroux, 
authoritarianism is a social project using both economic and political 
tools to produce targeted and systematic patterns of social divisions, 
marginalization and insecurities. 
HUNGARY AS A MINI-CASE STUDY: THE POPULIST ATTACK ON THE 
WELFARE STATE 
In 2010, the Hungarian political landscape has seen a significant and 
lasting shift in consolidating a distinctively new populist, nationalist right-
wing regime led by Viktor Orban. While many scholars have argued that 
populism is a temporary and largely short-term political phenomenon, 
Orban's electoral success in 2014 consolidated authoritarian 
neoliberalism in Hungary and continues to deliver electoral support likely 
to be successful again in 2018. The 2008 economic crisis triggered a major 
socio-economic and socio-political crisis in Hungary. Once an economic 
front-runner and leading pioneer of the post-communist transformation 
in Eastern Europe, by 2008, the country had accumulated huge economic 
debts, was riddled by political corruption and had a stagnant labor 
market. The huge external and household debt of the country continued 
to build up throughout the 2000s, and made the country very vulnerable 
at the outbreak of the global economic crisis. To avoid insolvency, Hungary 
was the first to receive a 20 billion Euro emergency loan from the IMF and 
the EU (Greskovits and Bohle, 2012). Orban was elected in 2010 following 
radical austerity measures being introduced by the previous government, 
in the context of rising unemployment and poverty. Orban promised 
unorthodox economic policies such as withdrawing from the IMF loan, 
and imposing new taxes and levies on banks. In conjuncture with the 
economic crisis, the current refugee crisis allowed Orban to sustain a 
systematic political and religious discourse that has been deeply 
conservative, populist and nationalist.  
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Authoritarian neoliberalism in Hungary is assembled with 
seemingly very disparate elements. ‘Illiberal democracy’ is a flagship 
concept, which entails the 
abandonment of liberal methods and principles of organizing society, as well as 
the liberal way to look at the world, and parting ways with Western European 
dogmas, making ourselves independent from them … This is about an ongoing 
reorganization of the Hungarian state. Contrary to the liberal state's 
organizational logic of the past twenty years, this is a state originating from 
national interests. (Orban's speech, 26th July 2014)  
While clearly the notion of ‘illiberal democracy’ is an oxymoron, the term 
‘illiberal’ signals a critique of western style ‘individualism’, ‘rights-based 
approaches’, and ‘welfare-statism’. It has instigated widespread 
constitutional changes removing checks and balances, strong 
centralization of government structures, moving towards a much more 
presidential style of governing, challenging freedom of speech, and 
represents a strong grip on the media. Democratic institutions are 
systematically sidelined and the political community is only mobilized 
through ‘national consultations’, largely on issues such as migrant quotas 
and immigration. In a seemingly unlikely coupling, alongside illiberalism, 
a very strong ‘competition state’ (Drahokoupil, 2010) is being built with 
strong neoliberal elements: in 2017 corporation tax has been reduced to 
9 percent, the lowest in the EU; in 2011 progressive taxation was replaced 
by a 16 percent flat income tax, while massive subsidies and tax 
exemptions are offered to multinational co-operations. However, in its 
radical reconfiguration of socio-economic governing, the regime also 
mobilizes strongly nationalist, often anti-market, elements. Widespread 
re-nationalization of public utilities, banks and other key strategic sectors 
have been undertaken. Neoliberalism is delivered in a nationalist 
framework in which the ‘competition state’ is selectively delivered by both 
the market and the state. As such, the ‘illiberal’ and the ‘neoliberal’ goes 
hand in hand in delivering a unique governance that offers a coherent 
discursive framework. This emerging Hungarian regime is very similar to 
the one envisaged by Cahill (2014), who foreshadowed the possibility of 
the emergence of what he calls ‘authoritarian economic nationalism’, 
which pursues nationalistic policies with ‘widespread assault upon labor 
conditions and freedoms in order to both stifle sources of dissent and to 
impose a settlement of terms favorable to capital’ (ibid.; 152). This regime 
is built in the post-crisis landscape, enabled by the emergence of a robust 
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state; this is a state which manages austerity and imposes new 
regulations, all the while promoting strong nationalization. The 
relationship between ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ and ‘authoritarian 
nationalism’ is complex; at times it is mobilizing illiberal, anti-market, 
anti-FDI policies while at other times it is very much pro-market, 
neoliberal in its essence in terms of cutting corporate taxation, 
introducing generous subsidies for FDI and building the competition 
state. 
Importantly, the illiberal state is also the one that signals the ‘end of 
the welfare state’. As Orban argued ‘it is better to acknowledge, even if it 
is difficult, that the concept of welfare state is over. Instead of that, we 
should try to build up workfare states and replace entitlements with a 
merit-based society.’ (Orbán, speech, 26th July 2014, translated by Mihaly 
Koltai). Ever since 2010, there has been a significant reconfiguration of 
the welfare state. Overall social spending has been cut drastically; social 
assistance schemes have been terminated, and compulsory and punitive 
public works programs have been rolled out (Bako et al., 2014; Szikra, 
2014). At the same time, generous mortgage subsidies have been 
introduced to the middle class, and a tax credit system was expanded to 
support hard working families (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). The illiberal 
state as such presents a fundamental change to the previous social 
contract, one which replaces a welfarist social contract (with higher social 
spending) with a nationalist one based on identity politics, along with 
lower social spending and attacks on certain social groups. 
Crucially, illiberal neoliberalism in Hungary is a deeply 
redistributive project, one that entails the restructuring of the economy 
and public spending, the state and society with distinctly new techniques 
of illiberal governmentalities. Batory (2016) emphasizes the 
authoritarian element of the regime that holds a strong vision of the new 
society, which is based on self-responsibility as well as ‘a system of 
national cooperation’, conveying communitarian values in direct 
opposition to liberalism. This self-responsibilizing has been a particularly 
strong feature of the illiberal government policies in the field of 
employment. The new labor code has introduced a wide range of 
deregulations and increased labor market flexibility. The elimination of 
unemployment benefit and the introduction of compulsory public works 
has also removed the universal and collective protection, and replaced it 
 Welfare Trajectories in Central and Eastern Europe 275 
with an individualistic, and often punitive, scheme that offers bare 
survival.  
Juhasz (2012) highlights the massive backlash in gender issues, with 
gender mainstreaming being replaced by ‘family mainstreaming’ 
underpinned by a Christian ideology focusing on demographic growth 
and deep paternalism. Gender as a term has been erased from 
government documents and strategies and replaced by ‘family’. A UN 
(2016) report expressed alarming trends in terms of ‘pervasive and 
flagrant stereotyping of women, including by some political leaders, as 
unsuited to political power and the insistence on a woman's role as 
primarily wife and mother’ which undermines women's political, 
economic and social rights. Gero and Kopper (2013) assert that illiberal 
governmentalities feature the active and sustained effort to close down, 
marginalize and silence civil society organizations. Civil society 
organizations get selectively supported providing they promote religious 
or conservative values; otherwise they are closed down, accused of 
carrying out political activities critical of the government. 
Illiberal governmentalities promote a deep social polarization along 
ethnic, religious, social, territorial and gender lines. The latest Eurostat 
data shows that, in 2015, 28 percent of the population were at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion, and 19.4 percent of the population are 
severely materially deprived. The poverty rate for children is even higher: 
in 2014, 38 percent of children were at risk of poverty (Eurostat, 2016). 
Other studies suggest that 45 percent of the population has no wealth nor 
savings, and can only barely survive and go on with their everyday life 
(Kolosi and Fabian, 2016). Social deprivation has also become much more 
territorially concentrated, with pockets of poverty in regions described as 
‘third-world poverty’. Educational segregation of the Roma communities 
has been rolled out. The rise of homelessness, extreme poverty, and high 
suicide rates all point to increasing precariousness, growing insecurity 
and increasing commodification of life. Authoritarian neoliberalism 
delivers a range of insecurities, in which steps to remove support are 
actively rolled out for the ‘other’ (whether it be the poor, the Roma, the 
unemployed, the immigrants, the welfare dependent, disabled, etc.) and 
only mitigated for a select few. Securities and protections are rolled back, 
and spending on social protection and education has decreased 
significantly (Lendvai-Bainton, 2017). Mass out-migration created severe 
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shortages in the health care system and skills shortages are becoming 
more acute across the economy.  
Ironically, while the EU's discursive frame is very much around 
‘social investment’, the Hungarian regime has shifted much more towards 
a ‘social divestment’ model since 2010. Core public funding to social 
assistance, active labor market measures, health, education, and housing 
have been significantly contracting. The EU's 2016 Country Report for 
Hungary highlights significant social challenges Hungary faces with 
regards to: 
 Social indicators improved less significantly than the overall 
economic and labor market situation; 
 Poverty rates are high in regional comparison; 
 The adequacy and coverage of social assistance remains a 
challenge and recent reforms could further restrict access 
conditions for a number of benefits; 
 Poor health outcomes continue to be a major challenge (in terms 
of life expectancy); 
 Educational segregation has increased rapidly and dramatically. 
Three distinctive elements dominate the new vision of the ‘end of the 
welfare state’. First, a workfare state that is illiberal in character. Second, 
although austerity as a notion never entered the public domain as a 
discourse in Hungary, radical austerity measures have been introduced 
since 2010. Third, the ‘end of the welfare state’ involves the radical 
reconfiguration of both the language of ‘welfare’ and the ‘social’. 
Illiberal workfare has been founded on the assumption that the 
chronic problems of the Hungarian labor market lie on the supply side in 
that overly generous benefits create disincentives for people to enter the 
labor market (Bako et al., 2014). As such, in 2011, the Orbán government 
rolled out compulsory public employment schemes, the so-called 
‘National Public Work Program’ and radically reduced employment-
related and social benefits. In 2012, the government cut unemployment 
benefit from nine months to three months (Szikra, 2014). They also 
reduced the amount of long-term unemployment benefit from 95 to 70 
Euros per month, as well as radically restricting eligibility. Despite the 
European Commission expressing concerns of ‘a risk that the drastic cut 
in unemployment benefit, together with the reduced capacities of the 
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Public Employment Service, will result in channeling and locking people 
into public works’ (European Commission, 2012: 20), public work 
programs have been rolled out. In these programs, the unemployed are 
forced to accept work paying at 50 percent of minimum wage, at a large 
scale managed by the Ministry for the Interior (Szikra, 2014), and 
implemented in a rather militaristic style. While between 2011 and 2014 
public works became the largest employment-related program in the 
country—tripling the public expenditures on the scheme—several 
researchers highlighted its inefficiency (Bako et al., 2014; Koltai, 2012). 
For example, Bako at al found that only 10 percent of participants were 
able to find a job on the primary labor market six months after the scheme 
(2014; 4). Public work has also crowded out other active labor market 
measures. Considering the program's complex dynamics, it is 
questionable whether we could consider it as an ‘active labor market 
measure’ at all. The rolling out of the program continued even after 2014, 
the latest announcement being that public work schemes will allow 
people to join the Armed forces and become volunteer soldiers as part of 
their public work. Importantly, public work schemes continue to be 
fundamentally punitive, ethnically selective (targeting Roma and other 
ethnic minorities) and essentially decoupled from the competitive labor 
market. Should anybody refuse to participate, this would mean losing all 
their eligible benefits altogether. Finally, as Bako and his colleagues argue, 
while public work as a policy tool has been around for a long time, ‘the 
idea that it can and should replace the entire social benefit system is a 
brand-new ambition’ (2014; 4).  
The second formative characteristic of the end of the welfare state is 
the radical retrenchment of social benefits without a public discourse of 
austerity. In contrast with a British governmental discourse in which 
austerity is seen as a disciplined response to managing debt, the 
Hungarian post-crisis discourse does not reference austerity at all, and 
instead is built on a moral discourse of work and merit within a ‘new 
national contract’ based on ‘national co-operation’. The comprehensive 
reconfiguration of the Hungarian welfare state within the new contract 
started soon after 2010. In 2011 a flat tax system was introduced at 16 
percent, which meant a substantial tax increase for low income earners 
who lost their previous tax exemptions. A complete freeze on all benefits 
and public sector wages were introduced for four years. Not only was the 
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duration of unemployment benefit cut dramatically to the shortest in 
Europe, but so also was the monthly amount of long-term unemployment 
benefit. New, much more flexible labor laws have been introduced to make 
it easier for employers to fire and hire. In order to compensate for a 
shortfall in public revenues, VAT was increased to 27 percent, the highest 
in Europe. Public expenditure on education has been cut and higher 
education spending has seen a 30 percent cut between 2010 and 2014. 
Between 2008 and 2016, social spending on benefits has been scaled back 
dramatically. Unemployment related benefits have fallen from 0.4 percent 
of GDP in 2008 to 0.1 percent in 2016; sickness payments and disability 
benefits were reduced from 1.8 percent GDP to 1.3 percent, child benefits 
have fallen from 2.0 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP. Total social protection 
spending as a share of GDP has fallen from 15.9 percent in 2008 to 14.3 
percent in 2016 (Policy Agenda 2015). In 2015 a new law on social 
benefits was introduced which discontinued the state social assistance 
system and replaced it with a decentralized one. As part of the new 
system, some forms of social assistance were stopped altogether, such as 
housing benefit and discretional carers' benefit, while the remaining 
forms of social assistance were delegated to local municipalities, most 
often without any funding resources and on a discretionary basis. As Bako 
et al. (2014) argue, uniquely amongst OECD countries, Hungary has 
reduced the net value of all employment-related and social benefit 
payments by 6 percent between 2011 and 2014.  
The ‘new social contract’ also comes with a new language. While we 
have seen above that ‘illiberal’ is viewed as positive and authoritative, and 
‘the end of the welfare state’ is declared, the change to the linguistic 
landscape is even broader than those grand declarations; it aims to 
reconfigure and rebuild forms and practices of social solidarity, social 
bonds and relations in the widest possible terms. As noted earlier, an 
example of this changing linguistic landscape is the replacement of 
‘gender mainstreaming’ with the term ‘family mainstreaming’ (Juhasz, 
2012). ‘Social assistance’ has been renamed as ‘parish assistance’, with 
deliberate paternalistic and feudal connotations dating back to the 13th 
century. Abolished by the Communist Party in 1983, this administrative 
unit has been reinstated, with parish assistance being discretionary and 
subject to the financial resources available to the parish. Child benefit 
becomes ‘pedagogical and educational support’ with an explicit reference 
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to the duty of parenting as well as its conditionality upon compulsory 
education—educational support is suspended after 50 hours of 
unauthorized absence from school. Many of the former social benefits 
were renamed in a way that the ‘social’ becomes eradicated and replaced 
either with employment or parish-related terminologies. The 
reorganization of social and child care services around these new parish 
territorial units, also means that, often, these services become unavailable 
within rural and remote areas, where accessing services such as legal 
support or counselling is 50 – 60 km away.  
Table 3  New Social Policy Dictionary in Hungary 
Old	terminology	 New	terminology	
Ministry of Social Affairs Ministry of Human Resources
Child benefit Pedagogical and educational support
Unemployment benefit Jobseeker support
Regular social support Employment-replacing support
Social assistance Parish assistance
Gender mainstreaming Family mainstreaming
CONCLUSION 
The triple transformation of post-communist Europe posed very 
demanding pressures in terms of how to negotiate the contradictory 
demands for establishing a market economy, democracy and nation-states 
(Offe, 2001). Within this context, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue that 
nationalism, identity politics and / or welfarism have emerged as key 
pacifying mechanisms in Central and Eastern Europe through which 
economic losses and insecurities were mitigated and managed. Their 
stark warning becomes very relevant when they argue that:  
we sense a trade-off between welfarist and identity politics. Once embedding 
neoliberalism in socially protective arrangements becomes untenable, 
democratic politics is likely to lose balance, and stabilization may occur via 
larger doses of identity politics leading in the worst case, to sacrifices of 
democratic quality. (2012; 265) 
In both the case of Hungary and Poland, a marked shift from welfarist 
politics to identify politics can be identified, which has brought about new 
nationalist and populist discourses in the realm of economic, politics and 
the social. 
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The populist turn in Visegrad countries suggests that in Hungary 
and Poland the welfarist strategy has been replaced by identity politics 
and nationalism with a radical contraction of the welfare state. This shift 
points to downwards welfare convergence in the region which will sustain 
very low social spending and a widening social gap between the ‘west’ and 
the ‘east’ in Europe. It will also promote wider social and regional 
inequalities within the countries. 
Authoritarian neoliberalism marks a new paradigm for the welfare 
state, one which not only calls for the end of the welfare state, but also one 
that celebrates social disinvestment, so similarly rooted in the neoliberal 
project. In this new 21st century paradigm, the economic rationalities that 
underpin the European social investment model are replaced by, and then 
go beyond, political rationalities. Now the welfare state is no longer 
necessary—not even for political purposes. In this radical and troubling 
scenario, it is the welfare state itself that has been made discursively 
redundant. Crucially, this new discursive claim does not prevent the state 
from expanding, reconfiguring, and reallocating public spending, as well 
as redistributing public resources. 
The rise of authoritarian neoliberalism in Hungary is one of the by-
products of EU integration. The de-politicization of economic integration 
during the Accession process, as well as the intensification of austerity 
and fiscal discipline in the EU's crisis management has opened up spaces 
for a ‘break away from the resurgent orthodoxy’ (Bohle and Greskovits, 
2012; 267). As much as the case cannot be anything other than a 
historically and culturally unique domestic construction, it is also a 
transnational product of the EU's consolidation state. As such, if one 
considers the British 2016 referendum and Brexit to be a symptom of 
disintegration and dissent, the Hungarian regime is also a dissent: a 
dissent from the EU's economic and political integration, a dissent from 
open borders, a dissent from fiscal governance. The ‘illiberal democracy’ 
is then an attack on the EU integration project and on the European Social 
Model itself. 
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CHAPTER 13:  
REFORMING WELFARE ASSEMBLAGES IN SEMI-
PERIPHERAL SPACES: UNDERSTANDING ‘DRIVERS OF 
INERTIA’ IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, CROATIA AND SERBIA 
Paul Stubbs and Siniša Zrinščak 
INTRODUCTION 
Studying the post-Yugoslav space offers an ideal opportunity to 
understand the impacts on social policy of the confluence of post-socialist 
transition, new nation state building, post-conflict reconstruction, the 
large-scale presence of diverse international actors, and variegated 
Europeanisation. Nevertheless, large parts of what was once socialist 
Yugoslavia are almost entirely absent from the comparative social policy 
literature. Work on social policy in the region occupies a marginal position 
with little or no influence on discussions regarding welfare trajectories in 
wider Europe, and is largely absent from the literature on social policy in 
post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
This may be a result of the fact that the wars of the Yugoslav 
succession throughout much of the 1990s meant that in-depth research 
was difficult to undertake, and statistics were hard to obtain. The region 
may simply look too complicated for the outside observer to grasp, with a 
wide range of fluctuating political and institutional relationships, 
contested sovereignties and unstable citizenship claims. A mainstream 
social policy literature finds it hard to address welfare paths which are 
complicated and hard to classify. It may also be that the preoccupations of 
social and political scientists remain firmly fixed on questions of war and 
peace, ethnicized nationalisms, and regional stability with little interest in 
exploring other questions of public policy.  
Attempts to ‘bring the region back in’ are few and far between, and 
not always adequate. Bohle and Greskovits' (2012) understanding of 
Croatia, alongside Bulgaria and Romania, as a weak, neocorporatist, state, 
relies on a few texts on political economy with no direct engagement with 
the social policy literature. Stambolieva's (2016) extensive study of 
welfare state transformations in the Yugoslav successor states dealing, in 
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turn, with Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, whilst a useful point 
of reference, is overly influenced by historical institutionalism and welfare 
regime theory. The welfare outcomes described, a heady mix of liberal, 
conservative, social democratic, neo-liberal, neocorporatist and more, 
merely show the necessity of going beyond what Abrahamson (1999) 
termed ‘the welfare modelling business’, and of jettisoning the idea of 
coherent, path-dependent, welfare regimes, in favor of the concept of 
complex, unstable, welfare assemblages, or welfare ‘patchworks’ (Stubbs 
and Zrinščak, 2007).  
The concept of ‘welfare assemblages’ directs us to ‘complex 
becoming and multiple determinations’ (Venn, 2006; 107). Radically 
unfinished, fluid, ‘welfare settlements’ are a contingent product of 
complex interactions between agency, structure, institutions and 
discourses: the ASID framework (cf. Moulaert and Jessop, 2006; Deacon 
and Stubbs, 2013). Following Moulaert and Jessop, ‘agency’ refers to 
individual or collective behavior that ‘makes a significant difference’; 
‘structure’ refers to social realities which are resistant to agency-driven 
change; ‘institutions’ are interconnected sets of governing routines, an 
‘enduring ensemble of structural constraints and opportunities’; and 
‘discourses’ are ‘meanings produced inter-subjectively’ (Moulaert and 
Jessop, 2006; 2 – 3). 
The ASID framework fits with the need to define welfare, or social 
policy, very broadly, and not to over-commit to a crude notion of the ‘core’ 
of social policy as composed of a number of ‘sectors’ such as ‘pensions’, 
‘social protection’ (usually including cash and care services), and ‘health 
and long-term care’. This is because, over time, there is evidence of both 
‘re-domaining’, that is, shifting understandings of the nature and limits of 
formal welfare, and the creation of new ‘domains’, through processes of 
Europeanization, for example (Lendvai, 2007). With the rise of a ‘new 
right’ conservatism, the social policy arenas of ‘family policy’ and 
‘demographic renewal’ also become important, if contested (Dobrotić, 
Matković and Zrinščak, 2013). In much of the post-Yugoslav space, 
‘veterans' policies’ are also important, not least as they have a distorting 
effect on other social policy domains (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015).  
 In this chapter, focusing on the three most populous post-Yugoslav 
states—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia—we turn our earlier 
concern with ‘drivers of change’ (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2006) on its head, 
since what is in need of explanation in the social policy arena is the 
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relative lack of change, framed here in terms of understanding ‘drivers of 
inertia’. The cases are illustrative of the ‘paradoxical’ nature of reforms in 
‘semi-peripheries’, whereby exhortations to ‘modernize’ social protection 
systems are met with ‘simultaneous opposition and acceptance, imitation 
and rejection’ (Blagojević, 2009; 99). This is not, of course, to blame the 
semi-periphery, rather to address the complex and contradictory nature 
of relations between diverse visions of reform. There is much 
experimentation, the ‘performance of reform’ (Stubbs, 2015), which rarely 
impacts on institutional structures and rarely leads to systemic change. 
Reform mantras become translated as ‘fictions’ (Lendvai, 2015; 145), 
hyperactive spaces where everything appears up for grabs but nothing 
substantially changes. If we understand ‘path dependency’ in terms of the 
‘lock-in effects’ of ‘socialist legacies’ not as a pre-given certainty, but as a 
contingent empirical reality, then, socialist legacies may have a role to play, 
although always reworked, reconstructed and reconnected with other 
forces and currents.  
What follows is, then, an attempt to explore post-Yugoslav welfare 
trajectories and, crucially, analyze the paradox of large-scale 
experimentation, limited explicit reform, de	 facto erosion and complex 
‘layering’ of social rights in three post-Yugoslav states. In other words, 
inertia can still be produced as an unexpected outcome of agentic 
hyperactivity, institutional experimentation, novel discursive forms, and 
profound structural change. Whilst not an in-depth ethnographic analysis, 
it is an attempt to construct a ‘critical cultural story’ (Spry, 2009) of welfare 
reforms. In the process, it challenges an orthodox tradition of social policy 
research, usually ‘from above or from nowhere’ (Marcus, 1995), which 
appears to be based on the maxim that ‘nothing can be analyzed until 
everything has been described’. Its methodology is close to a ‘bending and 
blending approach’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007) creating and ordering 
research material through a reflexive lens based on multiple roles as 
researchers, policy advocates and consultants. It is complemented by 
material gathered in spring 2017, when we interviewed around a dozen key 
actors involved in, or knowledgeable about, reform processes in Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, complementing our more direct in-depth 
knowledge of the Croatian reform process. The empirical material 
presented is, necessarily, uneven and patchy. The same domains are not 
addressed to the same extent in each country case, not least because their 
significance varies across the cases described.  
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SERBIA: CHAOS, MODERATED NEO-LIBERALISM AND STEALTH 
AUSTERITY 
Throughout the 1990s, until the overthrow of the Milošević regime in 
October 2000, social welfare in Serbia was marked by what one 
respondent described as ‘total chaos’. A militaristic, nationalist and 
authoritarian populist state had presided for a decade or more over 
rampant hyperinflation, deindustrialization and the de	facto collapse of a 
social security system which, de	jure, had remained unchanged. This had 
resulted in massive arrears in terms of insurance-based benefits such as 
pensions, and a concomitant rise in informality, corruption, organized 
crime, and clientelism. The new Government, led by Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinđić from January 2001 until his assassination in March 2003, was 
composed of a mixture of young technocrats, radical reformers, and 
former dissidents, tasked simultaneously with restoring a degree of 
normality to a collapsed system and engaging in transition and change in 
adverse economic conditions; this all took place amidst a ‘crowded 
playground’ (Arandarenko and Golicin, 2007; 167) of diverse 
international actors.  
Leading reformers, including the ‘technocratic’ G17 Plus party, 
economists from the Institute of Economics and the Hayek-inspired think 
tank The Centre for Liberal Democratic Studies (CLDS), immediately 
started work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a loan 
agreement and with the World Bank on a Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Programme (PRSP). It is an overstatement, however, to suggest that 
‘consistent with its liberal orientation and commitments taken towards 
the international organizations, the government had initiated a welfare 
state withdrawal, considering it a remnant of socialism’ (Stambolieva; 
2016; 164). Rather, as Stambolieva herself suggests, the newly appointed 
Minister of Social Affairs, economist Gordana Matković, ‘shaped social 
policies as corrective measures to the adverse effects of initiated 
economic liberalization’ (ibid; 169). This was a moderate and moderated 
approach (Arandarenko and Golicin, 2007; 174), combining elements of 
neo-liberalism with ‘a stronger emphasis on social justice’ (ibid; 169). 
Matković's tenure at the Ministry was unusual, not least because she 
brought her own ideas and strategic vision to the reform process. 
Gathering a strong team of advisors drawn from the region but with 
experience of working internationally, she largely succeeded in 
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establishing a degree of ‘local ownership’ of welfare reforms. Crucially, 
Matković resisted the imposition of the World Bank's model three pillar 
pension reform, preferring to restore a system largely based on the pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) system. Although taking control of the PRSP away from 
World Bank experts, the broad thrust of reforms was still based on 
‘targeting’ benefits towards the most vulnerable, in line with the 
dominant World Bank mantra. At the same time, maintaining a less 
restrictive means-test for the receipt of child benefits was an important 
counter to the Bank. 
It is in terms of the development of community-based services, 
based on partnerships with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in 
the service of what became known as ‘deinstitutionalization’, the 
reduction in the number of children, and persons with disabilities, in 
residential care, where Matković's reforms perhaps had the greatest 
impact. The Ministry countered accusations that the reforms were ‘top 
down’ by establishing a number of working groups and, crucially, 
engaging in a large number of regional consultations. Supported by the 
Government of Norway, by UNDP, and others, a Social Innovation Fund 
(SIF) was established, in operation from 2003 – 2010, envisaged as ‘a 
transitory mechanism providing competitive funding and management 
support to reform-oriented social services projects at the local level … 
implemented through partnerships between a plurality of service 
providers’ (Bošnjak and Stubbs, 2007; 158). Judged as more successful in 
introducing new services than in institutionalizing them (Golicin and 
Ognjanov, 2010; 28), SIF was, at least, a home-grown institutional 
innovation, albeit contributing towards ‘a project-culture rather than 
needs-based provision’ (Arandarenko and Golicin, 2007; 175), and 
ushering in a new mantra of ‘partnership’. 
Apart from SIF, the other main institutional innovation in social 
policy in Serbia was the establishment, in 2002, of the Poverty Reduction 
Unit, later called the Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction Unit (SIPRU). 
Although situated within the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, SIPRU 
was described by one respondent as, to all intents and purposes, ‘an 
advocacy NGO within the Government.’ Largely funded by the 
Government of Switzerland, SIPRU provides a space for reformist 
thinking, as part of an interlocking network of researchers and activists, 
including the Centre for Social Policy, a ‘spin-off’ of the CLDS, where 
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Matković is now based. In the face of successive governments which have 
little or no interest in pursuing actively welfare reforms, SIPRU maintains 
an illusion of reform activity, through strategic documents which are little 
more than discursive ‘fictions’ (Lendvai, 2015), offering a channel for a 
range of projects, and having some leverage through convincing 
politicians of the importance of social policy reform as a key part of 
accession to the European Union.  
The Koštunica government from 2004 to 2008 did not only opt ‘for 
a strategy of postponed transformation in order to … preserve social 
peace’ (Stambolieva, 2016; 165) but was responsive to particular interest 
groups, notably war veterans, whose additional benefits, whilst 
significantly less than their counterparts in Croatia (cf. Dokić, 2017), were 
not questioned. In addition, ‘old style’ disability associations resisted 
plans to merge a Fund for Disability with the Social Innovation Fund. 
Subsequently, SIF itself was abolished, in part because those who 
designed it were concerned that once international donors withdrew it 
was in danger of becoming a non-transparent instrumentalized tool in the 
hands of local and national politicians. 
The onset of the economic crisis in 2008 produced cuts in a number 
of social benefits, including pensions, but no real push for substantive 
reforms. A notable exception was a new Law on Social Welfare, finally 
implemented in 2011, in part a legacy of Matković's period in office when 
it was decided that legal change should only be attempted after reforms 
on the ground, and in part a result of the efforts of a strong Working Group. 
One effect of the new Law, albeit also linked to impoverishment produced 
by the crisis, was that the number of households receiving social 
assistance increased by about 55 percent, supporting the argument that 
the ‘neoliberal penetration of the welfare system’ (Stambolieva, 2016; 
170) was limited or postponed. 
In short, then, with some notable exceptions, a key driver of inertia 
regarding social welfare in Serbia from 2004 until the present day has 
been the lack of political will, combined with a lack of technical 
competence. A kind of ‘neo-liberalism by stealth’ has been ushered in by 
diverse parties and coalitions, including reformed versions of what might 
have become ‘dinosaur parties of the old regime’ (Arandarenko and 
Golicin, 2007; 171), notably the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Thus, after Matković, successive Ministers 
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of Social Policy showed little interest in reforms and, indeed, tended to be 
marginal political figures, sometimes drawn from minorities, largely 
conceding power to Ministries of Finance, as well as to the IMF and World 
Bank.  
The absence of the European Union as an important factor in social 
welfare reform in Serbia was stressed by those who look to the EU as a 
potential corrective to the lack of domestic political interest in social 
welfare (cf Sunderić, 2015). Serbia's ambivalent relationship to European 
integration was, perhaps, most positive at the height of the economic 
crisis when the EU itself was as much focused on austerity and debt 
reduction as the IMF. A renewed interest in social welfare from within the 
EU seems unlikely to have any significant impact, however, beyond a new 
wave of ‘projectized’ interventions. A focus on ‘vulnerable groups’, their 
‘activation’ in the labor market, and measures such as the ‘youth 
guarantee’ scheme, translated in Serbia into a ‘packet for youth’ because 
of lack of resources, have a discursive rather than a practical meaning. 
Issues such as non-take-up of benefits, the need for in-work benefits, and 
benefits as rights seem unlikely to be placed on the political agenda in the 
near future.  
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: DIVISION, PROJECTIZATION AND 
INSTRUMENTALIZATION 
If the war which raged in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H) from April 1992 
to December 1995 did not completely obliterate any prospects for a 
developed and equitable social welfare system, then the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA) which ended the war effectively completed the process. 
Although only one part of the larger wars of the Yugoslav succession, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was by far the hardest hit, with war raging across 
the whole of the territory, resulting in the deaths of over 150,000 people, 
brutal acts of systematic ethnic cleansing and genocide, and millions 
becoming refugees or displaced persons (Maglajlić and Stubbs, 2017). 
The DPA essentially froze the conflict, creating a cumbersome 
administrative structure and a weak central state, with power resting 
within ethnically defined entities, Republika	 Srpska (RS) and the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FB-H), itself further divided along 
ethnic lines across ten Cantons, between ethnic Muslims (Bošnjaks) and 
ethnic Croats. When District Brčko is added into the mix, B-H effectively 
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has thirteen separate social systems, each one, with the possible exception 
of the tiny Brčko district, ‘ethnically based, founded on clientelism and 
networks and discriminatory’ (Keil, 2011; 47).  
Never a full protectorate, Bosnia-Herzegovina still resembles more 
of an improvised state (Jeffrey, 2013) marked by a ‘mobile sovereignty’ 
(Pandolfi, 2003) of multi-scalar agencies constituting an unfinished and 
competing set of governance apparatuses. Annex 4 of the DPA, the 
(externally-written) constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, established 
‘the worst possible’ structure for the development of social policy post-
conflict (Stubbs, 2001; 100), with responsibilities for social policy at the 
entity, Cantonal (in FB-H) and municipal level. Creating the conditions for 
separate, divergent, ‘ethnicized’ welfare assemblages, with no social 
policy functions at the central state level, the DPA created what one 
respondent called ‘the most decentralized social policy framework in the 
world’, with social rights set at entity and cantonal levels but 
responsibility for financing these rights set at the level of municipalities.  
Not only are ‘fundamental inequities in the realization of rights and 
entitlements … built into the system’ (Stubbs, 2001; 101) but the effect of 
this is that ‘the services one receives still largely depend on where one 
lives’ (Maglajlić Holiček and Rašidagič, 2007; 163). Although pressure 
from the World Bank and the IMF led to the merging of two separate 
pension funds in FB-H on 1 January 2002, rights based on health 
insurance in the Federation still remain Canton-based, with the Croatian 
state also investing in health care in those areas dominated by Bosnian 
Croats. The deep and intransigent nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina's 
social problems, including poverty, unemployment, emigration and de-
population is, of course, compounded by a lack of timely and accurate 
statistical data, with no census between 1991 and 2013 (cf. Maglajlić and 
Rašidagić, 2011).  
Whether channeling humanitarian aid through Centers for Social 
Work (CSWs) during and after the war, developing ‘pilot’ projects with 
‘vulnerable groups and communities’ in the war's immediate aftermath, 
or seeking to support the establishment of local NGOs as part of an ‘exit 
strategy’ in the early 2000s, social welfare practice on the ground in B-H 
has been thoroughly ‘projectized’, dominated by an endless stream of 
diverse, uncoordinated, time-limited, largely unsustainable, and 
sometimes ‘outright disastrous’ (Maglajlić and Rašidagić, 2011; 37) 
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initiatives led by international actors. Generally, these projects had little 
or no connection with state structures at any level, beyond encouraging 
an instrumentalization of local actors, as when CSWs would form their 
own NGOs to receive grants or when Assistant Ministers received 
honoraria for sitting on project advisory boards in a ‘private’ capacity 
(Maglajlić Holiček and Rašidagić, 2007; 161). A subsequent shift from 
‘projects’ to ‘strategic support’ did little more than ‘projectize’ the very 
strategies themselves, with the mantra of ‘local ownership’ contradicted 
by the absence of counterparts able or willing to implement them. One 
consequence of this was what might be termed the ‘sub-contracting’ of 
welfare governance to hybrid, flexible, and largely unaccountable, 
intermediaries. All manner of analytical, strategic, and capacity building 
initiatives, including the creation of a Directorate of Economic Planning 
(DEP) to supposedly steer B-H's largely fictional Medium-term 
Development Strategy (MTDS), were donor-driven and although, for a 
short period, had a degree of political ‘buy in’ from some actors judged by 
sections of the international community as more ‘technocratic’ than 
‘nationalist’, they soon became ‘empty shell’ institutions, staffed by 
incompetent political appointees (Stubbs, 2015; 89).  
In part because governance within the entity is rather centralized, 
social protection has been somewhat more coherent in Republika	Srpska 
compared to the Federation of B-H, not least in terms of children's rights 
with an entity-based Children's Fund setting criteria for child benefits, 
compared to the Federation where only a small number of Cantons have 
any child benefit system or even maternity rights for women outside of 
the public sector. Respondents in RS suggested that there was a ‘window 
for reform’ in the late 2000s, marked by a period of stability and growth 
and the tenure, from 2006 to 2015, of a more progressively minded 
Assistant Minister for Social Welfare, Ljubo Lepir, given a degree of 
autonomy for much of that time, by the then Minister for Health and Social 
Welfare. Credited with pushing through a Law on Social Protection in 
2012 which, as he suggested, established ‘the grounds for reform’, political 
changes subsequently meant that the reform momentum was again lost, 
however. 
In the context of the economic and financial crisis, both entities 
faced intense scrutiny of their social policies from the IMF and the World 
Bank, combining the mantra of targeting social benefits with an insistence 
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on tightening the criteria for benefits for war veterans, disabled veterans 
and civil victims of war. The situation was particularly dramatic in the 
Federation where increased benefits for precisely these groups was an 
important pre-election measure aimed to shore up political support for 
nationalist parties (Obradović, 2016). When the IMF insisted on benefit 
cuts in return for a significant loan, a series of protests led by war disabled 
groups led to a stand-off. In the end, benefits were reduced for all except 
those with the most severe disabilities, with formally stricter criteria and 
more frequent monitoring leading to a situation which meant, in the 
words of one respondent, that only those with ‘connections’ were able to 
realize their rights in practice (cf. Brković, 2017). 
A constant refrain, echoed by social workers in Bihać studied by 
Hromadžić (2017), was of reforms as ‘dead letters on paper’, with rights 
enshrined in laws never realized in practice. Perhaps not dissimilar from 
their colleagues across the region, social workers in B-H were generally 
described as disempowered, demotivated and demoralized, with a phase 
of un-coordinated ‘capacity building’, endless training courses on 
‘casework’, ‘supervision’ and the like, followed by complete 
disinvestment, the absence of ‘managerial’ approaches, and increasing 
distrust between workers in CSWs and local NGOs (Cuk, 2016). 
‘Progressive’ directors of CSWs only kept their positions through political 
connections and were often removed once the political make-up of the 
Government changed. In the last few years, even cursory attempts at 
reform have stalled, with the views of professionals and welfare users, 
systematically ignored. 
Not unlike in Serbia, the European Union was described as very 
much a ‘shadow’ actor, disengaged except through IPA (Instrument of Pre-
Accession Assistance)-funded ‘projects’. As Hromadžić points out, 
international discourses, including those promulgated by the EU, combine 
a ‘neoliberal discourse of loan conditionality, fiscal deficit, and credit-
oriented policy’ with a ‘discourse of human rights and social inclusion’ 
(Hromadžić, 2017; 3), although both are largely silent on the deep 
politicization of social welfare in B-H, with rights' discourses ‘perpetually 
fragmented, hijacked and ethnicized, and where politicians use the 
cannibalistic “thick structures” of the state to satisfy their and their 
parties' ‘private’ agendas’ (ibid.; 4).  
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CROATIA: CLIENTELISM, CONSERVATISM AND WELFARE PLURALISM 
Croatia's nationalist state building project, steered by President Tuđman 
throughout the 1990s, consisted of semi-authoritarian rule within a 
formally democratic frame (cf. Dolenec, 2013). War and ethnicized 
conflict, directly affecting large parts of the territory, strengthened 
nationalist sentiment with a political elite presiding over what has been 
termed re-traditionalization, de-secularization and re-patriarchalization 
(Zupanov, 2001); this occurred at the same time as systematic de-
industrialization and a process of privatization described by one 
economist as ‘organized robbery’ (Baletić, 2003). A highly centralized 
Government structure, albeit with over a third of Croatia's territory 
outside of its control until military actions in 1995 and the peaceful 
reintegration of Eastern Slavonia in 1998, faced a massive influx of 
refugees and internally displaced persons and tasked underfunded 
Centers for Social Work, the Catholic charity Caritas and the Croatian Red 
Cross to respond, with large numbers of international actors effectively 
working in parallel to state structures (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2006). Hence, 
throughout the 1990s, social policy issues were largely focused on 
refugees and displaced persons, the re-establishment of social 
infrastructure in the territories returned to Croatian control, and 
‘firefighting’ social problems in the face of rising poverty and 
unemployment (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2009). 
Although not incompatible with the mix of ‘crony’ and ‘predatory’ 
capitalism prevalent in newly independent Croatia, the successful 
implementation of a radical pension reform in the second half of the 
1990s, eventually completed under a Social Democratic-led coalition 
government in 2001, is in need of explanation. With the ratio of insured 
to pensioners changing from 3:1 in 1990 to 1.8:1 in 1995 (Stubbs and 
Zrinščak, 2006), largely because the Government pushed early retirement 
as a supposed solution to unemployment, a crisis-like situation was 
created. This opened a space to be filled by the World Bank whose Chilean-
inspired model, articulated in ‘Averting the Old Age Crisis’ (World Bank, 
1994), appealed to the political elite, keen to show that it could work with 
international actors, allowing the transnational pension fund business to 
gain a foothold in Croatia as an ‘emerging economy’ and regional center. 
Although, in the end, the system was reformed along the lines of the 
more modest Argentinian model, maintaining a revised PAYG first pillar 
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with the introduction of two private pension pillars, one compulsory and 
one voluntary, this was still a radical change, underpinned by a neo-liberal 
faith in free market solutions, and pushed by a coalition of experts, as a 
driver of future economic growth. In retrospect, the three-pillar 
framework, neither solved problems of pension sustainability nor of 
adequacy. Pro-reform voices including the entire Government, the World 
Bank and the IMF, transnational and domestic financial institutions and a 
coalition of neo-liberal and technocratic economists, completely drowned 
out the few oppositional voices, notably some Trades Unions and some 
social policy experts. The absence of the ILO and the European Union, who 
might have cautioned against radical reform, is also notable. 
Symbolically at least, the death of Tuđman and the election of a 
center-left coalition Government in January 2000, marked a sea change in 
terms of democratization, greater openness towards international 
organizations in general and membership of the European Union and 
NATO in particular. Collaborations between Government and ‘civil society’ 
were institutionalized and, by implication at least, the possibility of social 
welfare reform was created. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 
agreed to a World Bank-led social welfare reform project. The Social 
Democratic Party Minister Davorko Vidović was keen to define the reform 
as ‘technical’ or, at least, ‘consensual’, rather than ‘political’ and 
‘ideological’, a ‘reform to last a generation’ as he described it. As such he 
explicitly drew on the momentum of pension reform, bringing together 
foreign and domestic consultants under the leadership of Nino Zganec, 
brought from teaching in the School of Social Work in the University of 
Zagreb to be Assistant Minister.  
Although generating a new set of discursive frames to guide the 
reforms, the so-called ‘3 Ds’ of decentralization, deinstitutionalization and 
de-statization (reducing the role of the state and promoting a new welfare 
mix), within a more ‘active social policy’ (Puljiz, 2001), the project, was 
spectacularly unsuccessful in reforming anything. This set a pattern of 
reforms on paper not translated into practice. Over time, the World Bank 
retreated from a broad concern with social welfare to a focus on the 
familiar mantras of targeting and cost containment, including the 
rationalization of diverse social benefits emanating from different levels 
of Government. A pattern emerged of World Bank experts allied with 
Croatian economists outlining the case for reforms the evidence base for 
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which was, frequently, contested by Croatian social policy experts, 
sometimes with the support of agencies such as UNDP (cf. Sućur et al., 
2016). 
The European Union did have some influence on social welfare 
reforms in Croatia in the period leading up to accession, through the 
process of preparing, implementing and monitoring the Joint 
Memorandum on Social Inclusion (JIM), signed in March 2007. Stung by 
criticisms of the ineffectiveness of the JIM process in the earlier new 
Member States, the European Commission, through its Directorate 
General for Employment, took the process more seriously. Party because 
both the JIM Working Group and those evaluating progress for the 
Commission included social policy scholars, a set of priorities emerged 
which, whilst never implemented in full, did set an agenda for change, 
some of which, notably commitments related to deinstitutionalization, 
resulted in progress on the ground. These were steered by the State 
Secretary of the Croatian Liberal Party (HSLS), a minority party in the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)-led Government. Perhaps even more 
importantly, annual EU progress reports forced the Government to 
improve its monitoring and evaluation procedures and drew attention to 
the difficulties of any meaningful linkages between social welfare, health, 
and education. 
In the face of a prolonged economic crisis, the European Union has 
tended to be more relevant in its focus on fiscal discipline and debt 
reduction than social policy prescriptions. At the same time, both the 
Bank and the Commission have noted the relative lack of spending on 
social assistance of last resort. The SDP-led coalition which came to power 
in December 2011, creating a new Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, 
lacked a clear reform vision. The HDZ-led Government formed in January 
2016, returned to power under new leadership in October 2016, appears 
likely to resist a World Bank conditionality which would shift the 
administration of social assistance payments form Centers for Social 
Welfare to country administration offices. However, outside of reforms to 
promote ‘demographic renewal’, the Government also lacks a clear vision 
for social welfare.  
Beyond the role of international actors and, notwithstanding the 
lack of political will for reform, two broad forces are dominant in shaping 
social welfare in Croatia. The first is war veterans' associations keen to 
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maintain and even extend significant benefits in return for continued 
support for HDZ, a quasi-institutionalized form of ‘social clientelism’ 
(Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015). These benefits represent the most 
significant ‘layering’ of social welfare in Croatia today, with veterans able 
to mobilize quickly and effectively whenever there is any perceived threat 
to these benefits. Interestingly, the World Bank has made only very vague 
references to the distortions produced by these benefits, arguing that this 
is a political choice which should not be challenged. The European 
Commission's Staff Working Document for 2017 noted that 1.8 percent of 
GDP is spent on war veterans and noted the lack of assessment ‘in the 
context of other social expenditure items … [and] labour market effects’ 
(European Commission, 2017; 37). Although the Country Specific 
Proposals within the European Semester was silent on the issue, the 
preparation of a new Law extending veterans' rights may come under 
more scrutiny in the future, not least because it fits uneasily with 
commitments to ‘fiscal responsibility’.  
The second potential force for change is a newly empowered radical 
right, promulgating a conservative Catholic agenda of a return to 
‘traditional’ family values, opposing abortion rights and gay rights. Not 
unlike similar movements in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, the movement 
can be read as part of a backlash to the concessions supposedly forced on 
the Government to obtain membership of the European Union. Although 
victory in a referendum held on 1 December 2013 to define marriage in 
the Croatian constitution as ‘a union of a man and a woman’ can be seen 
as symbolic, and was countered by the SDP-led Government introducing a 
law on civil partnerships, the influence of the movement may be amplified 
given the renewed concerns, both real and ideological, with ‘demographic 
renewal’. The creation of a new Ministry of Demographics, Family, Youth 
and Social Policy shows, discursively at least, the new Government's 
prioritizing of this issue, in the context of low birth rates and significant 
emigration of people of working age, including skilled workers and some 
professionals. Plans to introduce universal child benefits and to increase 
maternity benefits are a challenge both to pleas to reduce social spending 
and to increase the participation of women in the labor market. In many 
ways, the balance of forces within Croatian society, and the exhortations 
of diverse international actors, constitutes a specific, and new, driver of 
inertia, somewhat different from the drivers of inertia in the past.  
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CONCLUSIONS: REVISITING THE ASID FRAMEWORK 
Analyzing the case studies through the ASID framework discussed in the 
Introduction, suggests that there are many similarities in the nature of 
social welfare development across the region. A focus on ‘agency’ does not 
lead us to concur with Arandarenko and Golicin (2007; 182) on the 
‘randomness’ of outcomes, however; whilst specific ‘choices’ at particular 
conjunctural ‘moments’ may have been ‘accidental or arbitrary’ (Deacon, 
Lendvai and Stubbs, 2007; 223), it is the complex and pervasive 
reproduction of inertia which is most in need of explanation. Clearly, 
across the region, the relative indifference of political parties to the issue 
of social welfare has been pronounced, with periods of intense 
commitment to reform rather short-lived, very much identified with 
particular personalities, and often undone by their successors in 
Government. Social welfare reforms have tended to be more implicit than 
explicit and influenced by the prescriptions of the World Bank, the IMF 
and, later, in conditions of economic and financial crisis, by the fiscal 
consolidation orthodoxies of The Economics and Finance Directorate 
General (DG ECFIN) within the European Commission, that is to say driven 
by neo-liberal economic reform frameworks. The impact of the region's 
troika has, itself, been blunted, however, since political elites' survival 
appears to rest less on commitment to these economic reforms and more 
to the maintenance of nationalist ideas, allied with the maintenance of 
clientelistic networks, leading to a form of ‘capture’ in terms of 
governance, social and citizenship rights and the distribution and 
redistribution of services and resources (Stubbs and Zrinščak, 2015). 
Although most pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sub-
contracting of welfare reforms to flexible intermediaries has occurred 
across the case studies, almost as if the pervasive and highly lucrative rent 
seeking opportunities afforded to elites in the region have been mirrored 
within a somewhat less lucrative, but no less significant, semi-public 
reform sphere filled by think tanks, NGOs, consultancy companies, and the 
like. The influence of international actors, whilst not negligible, must be 
seen, then, as a complex, contested and contradictory translation process 
with outcomes which are uncertain and variegated (Lendvai and Stubbs, 
2015; 448), and overdetermined by the actions of political elites. In this 
sense, at least, agentic power has thrived in new institutional forms, 
prioritizing instrumental rewards over real change.  
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In many ways, a nuanced understanding of the complex political 
economy of being positioned at the (European) periphery or (global) 
semi-periphery allows us to address the structural constraints on welfare 
settlements and outcomes more clearly. A full understanding of the 
region's ‘modes of insertion in the global economy’ (Cerami and Stubbs, 
2011; 23) is, of course, beyond the scope of this chapter although the 
changing nature of class power, and its intersectional relations to 
structures of oppression based on gender, age, disability, sexuality, and 
locality is a theme which needs to be foregrounded more in the future. 
How, inter	 alia, processes of marketization, commodification, and 
financialization work in the countries of the region, in the context of 
‘predatory’ foreign capital and ‘impatient’ International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), both setting limits to and creating new possibilities for 
managing variegated ‘debt-states’ and ‘crisis-states’ within a global 
economic order, is crucial for understanding welfare settlements in the 
European semi-periphery. Tracing how the ‘dynamics of welfare layering, 
welfare clientelism and ethno-nationalist politics conjoin with ongoing 
pressures from the “debt-state” to create welfare that can be mobilized, 
scaled back, scaled up or ethnicized’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2015; 461) is 
an urgent task theoretically, politically and empirically, then. 
Taking ‘institutions’ in their narrow sense, we can see that there has 
been very little institutional innovation in social welfare in Croatia, 
outside of early pension reform and, to an extent, the JIM process; there 
has been some innovation in Serbia, through SIPRU and the transitional 
Social Innovation Fund. Large-scale innovation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has occurred, a complex product of separate entity-based state building 
programs alongside international actor-driven improvised 
‘agencification’ at the central state level. The uneven institutionalization 
of NGOs is also worthy of note, with Serbia perhaps the clearest example 
of a degree of formal integration of NGOs within partnerships for 
delivering social services. Although central and local state funded NGOs 
are important actors in Croatia, too, this has tended to reinforce a kind of 
‘welfare parallelism’ between statutory actors on the one side and non-
state actors on the other. NGO involvement in social welfare in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina tends still to be largely donor-driven, albeit in the context of 
donor fatigue, often marshalled through privatized and sub-contracted 
funding mechanisms and intermediaries, and is, perhaps, the closest to a 
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neo-liberal frame in which NGO services become a poor and uneven 
substitute for state provision. 
The differences between these countries and the broad post-Soviet 
space was not the main focus of this chapter. Nevertheless, the impacts of 
the wars of the Yugoslav succession, not least in interrupting economic 
and social development, have led to rather different welfare settlements, 
and weakened social protection systems, compared to those in the first 
wave of post-communist EU Member States. At the same time, the 
‘comparative advantage’ of the rather well-developed welfare system 
during Yugoslav socialism, although eroded in the economic crisis of the 
1980s and, certainly, in the wars of the 1990s, has led to more positive 
welfare outcomes compared to those countries of the former Soviet 
Union, including the Russian Federation, which are neither EU Member 
States nor candidates for accession (cf. Cerami and Stubbs, 2011; Cook, 
2007). One important part of the exceptional nature of Yugoslav socialism, 
making it very different from those parts of Eastern Europe within the 
Soviet bloc, was the establishment of statutory Centers for Social Work in 
the early 1960s. These are multi-disciplinary institutions with a central 
role for social workers trained, originally in high schools, and later in 
universities, across SFRY, and which have proved resilient even in the face 
of wars and radically re-arranged governance structures. Although the 
Yugoslav socialist welfare settlement, combining socialist self-
management with Bismarckian insurance-based systems, was very 
uneven, decentralized and primarily oriented to the social protection of 
new urban industrial workers, it has proved resistant to radical reforms 
and, in the popular imagination at least, has appeared robust enough to 
be worth defending. Hence, we would argue that, although in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, it has been eroded and replaced by a highly residualized 
system, this is not the case in Serbia and, perhaps even less the case in 
Croatia where, in some ways, a driver of inertia may be a sense that the 
system is ‘good enough’.  
The study has also shown both the multiplication and divergence of 
welfare discourses across the region and over time. The ‘social’ EU has, 
perhaps, had a significant role in, to an extent, disrupting World Bank-
informed discourses of ‘poverty reduction’, marshalling its influence 
through the lens of ‘social inclusion’. At the same time, it has joined with 
the IFIs in promoting discourses of ‘activation’, ‘responsibilization’, and 
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‘competition’, in ways which have, albeit in complex ways, ‘socialized’ 
dominant market discourses of ‘innovation’, ‘enterprise’ and ‘investment’. 
The marginalization of ‘rights-based approaches’—articulated still by 
service users and by the UN social agencies, notably UNICEF, UNDP and 
the ILO, and enshrined within a legalistic institutional environment 
marked by a significant gap between ‘rights on paper’ and the possibility 
of realizing those rights in practice—is significant, and suggests that there 
are also discursive limits to the kinds of radical welfare settlements which 
may be envisaged in the future (cf. Matković, 2017). Welfare has been 
‘layered’ with clear divisions between those ‘deserving’ of support and 
those ‘underserving’ in each of the countries and, in the case of B-H, 
entities, although this is more complicated than the usual division 
between those capable and incapable of work, refracted through lenses of 
ethnicity, regions, and war service.  
Finally, our use of the ASID framework has contributed to a kind of 
middle-range comparative study of drivers of inertia which impact on 
welfare reforms, open to both ‘the play of contingency’ and to the 
continued relevance of structural factors including levels of development 
and forms of political economy. In the future, it may act as a bridge 
between macro-level analyses of welfare regimes and more recent 
ethnographic approaches to lived encounters of welfare.  
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Bošnjak, Vesna and Paul Stubbs (2007). ‘Towards a New Welfare Mix for the Most 
Vulnerable: reforming social services in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia’, 
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Dobrotić, Ivana, Teo Matković and Siniša Zrinščak (2013). ‘Gender Equality Policies and 
Practices in Croatia—the interplay of transition and late Europeanization’, Social	
Policy	&	Administration 47(2); 218 – 240.  
Dokić, Goran (2017). ‘Veterans' Policy in the Semi-Periphery: a comparison of Croatia 
and Serbia’, Paper presented to workshop ‘Translating Policies in the Semi-
Periphery’, Regensburg, Germany, May. 
Dolenec, Danijela (2013). Democratic	Institutions	and	Authoritarian	Rule	 in	Southeast	
Europe, Colchester: ECPR Press. 
European Commission (2017). Commission Staff Working Document, Country Report 
Croatia, SWD (2017) 76 final, Brussels: European Commission, web: https:// 
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-country-report-cr 
oatia-en.pdf (accessed 3 August 2017).  
Golicin, Pavle and Galjina Ognjanov (2010). Assessment	of	Results	of	the	Social	Innovation	
Fund, Belgrade: FREN. 
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Matković, Gordana (2017). The Welfare State in Western Balkan Countires—challenges 
and options Belgrade: Center for Social Policy, web: http://csp.org.rs/en/asset 
s/publications/files/The_Welfare_State_in_Western_Balkan_Countries_Position_ 
Paper.pdf (accessed 25 January 2018).  
Moulaert, Frank and Bob Jessop (2006). ‘Discussion Paper’, Paper prepared as part of 
the project Demologos: development of models and logistics of socio-economic 
organization in space, web: http://demologos.ncl.ac.uk/wp/wp2/disc.php 
(accessed 21 July 2017). 
Obradović, Nina (2016) ‘Reforme	 socijalne	 zaštite	 u	 Bosnia	 I	 Nercegovini’	 (‘Social 
Protection Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina During the Crisis’), Revija	 za	
socijalnu	 politiku (Croatian J. of Social Policy) 23(1); 121 – 136, web: 
http://www.rsp.hr/ojs2/index.php/rsp/article/viewFile/1282/1323 (accessed 
2 August 2017).  
Pandolfi, Mariella (2003). ‘Contract of mutual (in)difference: government and the 
humanitarian apparatus in contemporary Albania and Kosovo’, Indiana	Journal	of	
Global	Legal	Studies	10 (1); 369 – 381. 
Puljiz, Vlado (2001). ‘Hrvatska: od pasivne prema aktivnoj socijalnoj državi’ (‘Croatia: 
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